







A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 





Copyright and reuse:                     
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. 
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 





























The Politics of Algorithmic 
Management 
 










BA (Hons.) (Lond.), PGCert (Warw.), MA (Sus.) 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Interdisciplinary Studies 
 
 
The University of Warwick 
Centre for Interdisciplinary Methodologies 
September 2018  
  ii 
Contents 
Figures ........................................................................................................... 1 
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................... 2 
Declaration of authorship ............................................................................ 8 
Abstract ......................................................................................................... 9 
Abbreviations and acronyms ..................................................................... 11 
Introduction ................................................................................................. 12 
Laboratories of resistance ......................................................................... 13 
The future world of work ............................................................................ 15 
Technology and the ‘deeper unrest’ .......................................................... 17 
Glimmers in the algorithmic curtain............................................................ 21 
Chapter outline .......................................................................................... 24 
1. Reading Technology Politically ............................................................. 28 
Introduction ................................................................................................ 29 
Technology and class struggle .................................................................. 29 
Class society .......................................................................................... 29 
Marxisms on technology ......................................................................... 32 
Labour process theory ............................................................................ 35 
Operaismo and autonomist Marxism (autonomism) ............................... 38 
The offer of autonomy ................................................................................ 43 
A political tradition .................................................................................. 43 
Political framework: technology as struggle ............................................ 45 
Strategic framework: locating the potential for autonomy ....................... 47 
Ontological framework: class composition.............................................. 49 
Methodological history: the workers inquiry ............................................ 53 
Class composition analysis ........................................................................ 55 
Uncovering the political .......................................................................... 55 
Proletarian sociology? ............................................................................ 58 
Using inquiry to develop strategy ........................................................... 59 
Class composition today: immaterial inquiry? ............................................ 61 
Labour in cognitive capitalism ................................................................ 61 
Political organization in the digital age ................................................... 65 
  iii 
No politics without inquiry ....................................................................... 68 
Conclusion ................................................................................................. 70 
2. The Managerial Endeavour .................................................................... 72 
Introduction ................................................................................................ 73 
Humans at the centre of the algorithm? ..................................................... 76 
Problems arising ..................................................................................... 77 
Trust through transparency .................................................................... 78 
Better work ............................................................................................. 80 
Management .............................................................................................. 83 
The indeterminacy of labour power ........................................................ 84 
Cooperation ............................................................................................ 86 
Control: the early years .......................................................................... 90 
Management as strategy ........................................................................ 93 
From continuous improvement to adaptive systems .................................. 95 
Kaizen .................................................................................................... 95 
Total (quality) control .............................................................................. 96 
From knowledge to performance .......................................................... 100 
Managerial systems ............................................................................. 102 
Data-driven ........................................................................................... 105 
Algorithm + management = ? .................................................................. 108 
Ubiquitous management?..................................................................... 108 
3. Means of Distribution ........................................................................... 112 
Introduction .............................................................................................. 113 
Logistics of inquiry ................................................................................... 113 
From warehouse to their house ............................................................ 113 
Technical composition .......................................................................... 115 
Workers inquiry .................................................................................... 116 
Approach and challenges ..................................................................... 118 
Cases ...................................................................................................... 122 
Supermarket distribution centre, Greater London (Lorenzo) ................ 122 
Amazon fulfilment centre ...................................................................... 128 
E-commerce distribution centre, Yorkshire (Elaine) ............................. 131 
  iv 
E-commerce distribution centre, Hertfordshire (José) .......................... 133 
Online supermarket distribution centre, Sussex (Todd) ........................ 135 
Online supermarket delivery, Greater London (Lorenzo) ..................... 137 
E-commerce delivery platform, Greater London (José) ........................ 141 
Food delivery platform, south coast (Jamie and Noah) ........................ 142 
Technical composition in distribution ....................................................... 146 
Tracking ................................................................................................ 146 
Transmission ........................................................................................ 148 
Management interfaces ........................................................................ 149 
Conclusion ............................................................................................... 152 
4. The Meaning of Algorithmic Management .......................................... 153 
Introduction .............................................................................................. 154 
What algorithmic management means for work ....................................... 155 
Labour demand .................................................................................... 155 
Work flow .............................................................................................. 161 
Communication .................................................................................... 166 
Space ................................................................................................... 172 
What algorithmic management means for authority ................................ 175 
The algorithmic frontier ......................................................................... 175 
Algorithmic authority ............................................................................. 177 
Managerial distantiation ....................................................................... 178 
In the system we trust .......................................................................... 180 
Black-box management: reflections on a new terrain .............................. 184 
Taylorism for the twenty-first century .................................................... 185 
Informational asymmetry ...................................................................... 187 
Framing algorithmic management ........................................................ 190 
Conclusion ............................................................................................... 191 
5. Situations of Resistance ...................................................................... 192 
Introduction .............................................................................................. 193 
Trade unions and the future world of work ............................................... 196 
Recognition .......................................................................................... 196 
Precarity preoccupation ........................................................................ 200 
  v 
Resistance: what are we talking about? .................................................. 204 
From misbehaviour to subversion ........................................................ 204 
A framework of ‘refusal’ ........................................................................ 207 
What is observed? ................................................................................... 209 
Accidental resistance ........................................................................... 210 
Formal resistance ................................................................................. 210 
Informal resistance ............................................................................... 212 
‘I found this out…’ ................................................................................. 215 
Example 1: Slow-down ......................................................................... 215 
Example 2: Taking advantage of handheld devices ............................. 218 
Example 3: Intentional mistakes ........................................................... 222 
Example 4: Snooping ........................................................................... 224 
Collective action problems .................................................................... 226 
Principles of resistance ............................................................................ 228 
Metis ..................................................................................................... 228 
Commons ............................................................................................. 233 
Metic commonality ................................................................................ 236 
Conclusion: a new spirit of approach ....................................................... 239 
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 241 
From algorithmic anxieties to algorithmic guile ........................................ 247 
An expanded horizon of possibility .......................................................... 250 
Interviews .................................................................................................. 255 





Figure 1. Motorola WT4000 series wearable terminal with ring scanner. .... 123 
Figure 2. A ‘grid’ lined with cages at Greater London supermarket distribution 
centre. ......................................................................................................... 124 
Figure 3. Workers returning pallets at Greater London supermarket 
distribution centre. ....................................................................................... 125 
Figure 4. Productivity print out, Greater London supermarket distribution 
centre. ......................................................................................................... 128 
Figure 5. Typical work flow in vehicular distribution work. ........................... 162 
Figure 6. Typical work flow in distribution centre work. ............................... 162 
Figure 7. Augmented reality goggle interface showing turn-by-turn directions. 
“108” denotes location identifiers along floor and shelving. ........................ 242 
Figure 8. Augmented reality goggle interface showing precise item 
identification. ............................................................................................... 243 






Ten years ago, almost to the day, I was starting work at a shooters bar in 
Manchester, about to embark on a first run at higher education that would last 
about three months before I dropped out of my course and returned to my 
hometown, depressed and deflated.  It seems a cliché, but it is no exaggeration 
to say the fact this PhD thesis now exists is the result of layers of contingent 
events and encounters over the course of the last decade, and the fact I am 
submitting it surrounded by so many supportive and loving influences strikes 
me as nothing short of amazing.  Creating this thesis has made me realize I’m 
a person who often needs help more than he lets on, and along the way I have 
done my best to keep a running list of people who have helped me in all sorts 
of ways, even if they don’t know it.  Even so, these acknowledgements are no 
doubt incomplete and I’m thankful to all the friends, family, comrades and 
colleagues who have helped me get to this point. 
 
First among influences within the research process has been my supervisor, 
Nathaniel Tkacz.  From a long-ago trip to Maynooth University in my first week 
at Warwick to my very last supervision, Nate has been a constant source of 
support, both academically and pastorally.  He has always taken my ideas 
seriously and pushed me to do the same.  As a mentor he has been patient 
and thoughtful, and even at my most pessimistic moments his enthusiasm has 
been an incredible source of motivation.  I tend to think I’m probably not the 
easiest person to supervise, but Nate has always found a way to keep me on 
track.  It has been a privilege to be his student and I’m proud to have benefited 
from his guidance. 
 
I am also grateful for the advice and expertise of my second supervisor, Celia 
Lury.  Her insight was especially instructive when I was wrangling with 
methodological issues and really trying to work out what shape the research 
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should take, and she has always been so generous with her time, even when 
I’ve sought it at short notice.  Throughout my time at Warwick, I’ve benefited 
from an excellent academic network full of kind and interesting people.  The 
Connecting Research on Employment and Work network has played a big role 
in my academic enrichment, and I would particularly like to thank Carol 
Wolkowitz and Ania Zbyszewska for creating such a welcome environment.  I 
also feel very fortunate to have been a member of the Centre for 
Interdisciplinary Methodologies.  I’m thankful to all of its faculty and 
administrators, as well as my fellow PhD students and the many MA students 
I have got to know over the years; they have given me a sense of belonging 
within a wider institution that has been somewhat prone to sending out mixed 
messages to students who occasionally find themselves on the contentious 
side of university politics. 
 
This research would not have been possible without the time, generosity and 
trust of its participants, who were gracious and forthcoming with their 
experiences, insight and resources.  I am extremely grateful to them and wish 
them the best of luck in all their struggles.  I also wish to thank the GMB, Angry 
Workers World, Plan C and the Transnational Social Strike platform for their 
help at various stages of the research, and I hope any critiques I have made of 
labour movement actors are understood as being made in good faith and 
solidarity with all those who are trying to do their best to advance the cause of 
our class, usually with few to no resources. 
 
I am fortunate to count some very learned people among my friends and 
comrades, and a number of them have been kind enough to give me their 
research and thesis advice at various points over the last four years or so.  
Among them are Jamie Woodcock, Keir Milburn, Callum Cant, Seth Wheeler, 
Camille Barbagallo, Kate Love, Nick Srnicek, Helen Hester, Benedict 
Singleton, Alan Bradshaw, Vladimir Nikiforov, Nicolas Beuret, Pete Wolfendale, 
Alex Williams, Patrick Levy, Christos Hadjioannou, Sukhdev Johal, David 
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Harvie, Gareth Brown, James Butler, Marina Prentoulis, Nina Power, Robbie 
Fordyce and Manuela Galetto.  There is also a group of people who are 
probably unaware their words or actions have had any particular effect on me 
at all, but all of whom have at some key moment offered me some advice, 
assistance or reassurance that has, unbeknownst to them, made me decide I 
have to keep going and not give up, and I’ve never forgotten: Leighton Evans, 
Nick Gane, Ed Emery, Steve Fuller, Jean Phillipe Deranty, Greg McInerny, 
Geert Lovink, Tressie McMillan Cottom, Jim Merricks White, Delfina Fantini van 
Ditmar. 
 
I would also like to give a special mention to some academic mentors from past 
lives, whose effect on me was such that I’ll probably never stop acknowledging 
them.  Nathan Coombs was the first person who ever gave me any intellectual 
self-esteem. I can hardly believe he was a PhD student himself when he first 
taught me at Royal Holloway, but he has also been ready with open ears and 
a bunch of tips at every stage of my academic progression, from improving my 
second-year essays right through to teaching my own students.  Nathan 
Widder has been a continual source of gentle encouragement since my first 
degree when he supervised my undergraduate dissertation and gave me my 
first lessons in political theory.  I am also thankful to be able to count Andrew 
Bowie among my academic family; Andy instilled in me that philosophy doesn’t 
have to be unconnected from the problems of the material world and is usually 
all the better for engaging with it, and his steady political radicalization over the 
last few years has given me much enjoyment.  Lastly, David Berry is literally 
the reason this PhD research ever happened in the first place, and I’m 
completely indebted to him for so much more than he knows. 
 
Given the topic of research, I feel it would be remiss of me not to acknowledge 
those workers who have assisted in the logistics of this study, especially the 
staff of the libraries at Warwick, UCL, Birkbeck, SOAS, Leeds and the British 
Library.  I’m very grateful to the ESRC for funding this research, and to the 
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administrators of the ESRC Doctoral Training Centre at Warwick, especially 
Paula McBride, who has been so helpful.  Quite unexpectedly, over the last 
year my ‘happy place’ has become a weekly podcast recorded by an Irish man 
who wears a plastic bag on his head.  It’s no understatement to say it’s given 
me great strength at some difficult times, so I’d like to thank Blindboy Boatclub 
for all the podcast hugs.  Finally, I’m eternally grateful to the NHS workers who 
have provided me with so much care throughout the thesis, from asthma 
treatment to counselling.  Of all of them, I would particularly like to convey my 
gratitude to Tracey Hurley, who has been as important in the completion of this 
thesis as all the academic influences listed above.  In the last year especially, 
I have experienced first-hand what a wonderful thing our NHS is; let’s never 
take it for granted. 
 
Much to the Nate’s frustration, I’m sure (at least in the beginning), the whole 
time I have been a PhD student I have also been a senior editor at Novara 
Media.  I’m immensely proud and honoured to be part of such an excellent 
team of bright and talented people, and I’m seriously thankful for their patience 
over the last six months while I suspended my participation to focus on this 
PhD, and for all their ongoing support and faith.  Individually and collectively, I 
can’t say enough about them, but I need to give a special mention to my 
colleague, comrade, co-conspirator and friend Aaron Bastani, who has been 
so supportive in every aspect and whose friendship I cherish. 
 
The last four years have been immensely challenging for a number of reasons.  
The fact I am writing this smiling and healthy is thanks to all the friends, 
housemates, lovers and comrades who have shown me so much care, 
kindness and support over the last four years.  Myka Tucker-Abramson, 
Eleanor Penny, Savva Grinevich, Federica de Pantz, Elisabeth Wallmann, Sam 
Hind, Alexis Moraitis, Antonio Ferraz De Oliveira, Jack Copley, Lorenzo Feltrin, 
Leon Sealey-Huggins, Liz Ablett, Wendy Eades, Ellie Martin, Alice Swift, Ali 
Griggs, Edie Jo Murray, Tatjana Seitz, Wil Hunt, Laura Schwartz, Xanthe 
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Whittaker, Heather McRobie, Marie Dams, Koshka Duff, Joe Bailey, Connor 
Woodman, Lucy Gill, Chris Carter and Barbara Orth have given me such 
wonderful friendship, conversations, check-ins, laughs, consolation and care, 
as have Lisa Tilley and Matthew Chadkirk, who were kind enough to proofread 
sections of the thesis.  I would also like to thank Pablo Velasco González, Lara 
Choksey, Chris Maughan and especially Mara Duer for their help and 
encouragement in securing an immediate future post-submission.  I’m also 
immensely proud to have been a part of Warwick Anti-Casualisation, Warwick 
for Free Education and Warwick UCU — three organizations with whom I have 
been through so much, including a pepper-spraying, two occupations, many 
demonstrations, two strikes, a handful of court appearances and many, many 
wonderful meetings.  I should extend these thanks to the post-2010 student 
movement in general, which has been the backdrop to my entire time in higher 
education so far, as well as the Metropolitan Police, who in fifteen minutes on 
the end of a baton taught me as much about politics as I learned throughout 
my undergraduate studies. 
 
Arianna Tassinari, Clare Hymer, Ellen Webborn, Fred Heine, Hope Worsdale, 
Irene Dal Poz, Julie Saumagne, Luke Dukinfield, Nadia Idle and Sophie Rees 
have at various points been my family and I only wish I could thank them 
enough for being such a big part of my PhD life.  Ruth Nicholson is the best 
friend anyone could hope for; she has had to withstand so much over the 
duration of this research, and I feel truly humbled by her kindness, 
understanding and love.  I couldn’t have finished this dissertation without the 
friendship of Javi Moreno Zacarés, one of the most intelligent people I know, 
whose conversation and company I adore, and who has something been a 
quiet rock for me almost every day for three years.  Lastly, I feel lucky to have 
ended up in a bizarre group chat: beginning as a practical means of organizing 
to go to see a Charlotte Church gig, every day for the last seventy-seven weeks 
‘Thread’ has been there for me in every conceivable way and through every 
conceivable emotion, so thank you to Tabitha D. Bast, Matt ‘Mate’ Dunne, ‘Fit’ 
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Mark Hollingworth, Dr Jess Winterson and Hannah ‘The Troubles’ McClure for 
the laughs, love and all the rest. 
 
I’m incredibly fortunate and grateful to have such a loving, unconditionally 
supportive family, and especially such brilliant parents — Debbie, Rick and 
Lorraine.  Throughout the research they have given ready and generous 
support whenever I’ve needed it, and throughout my life they’ve always 
encouraged me to pursue whatever makes me happy.  You just can’t ask for 
any more than that.  I’d also like to thank my sister, Codie, who is just the 
coolest, smartest and soundest person I’ve ever met, and who I love more than 
anything. 
 
Finally, I would like to dedicate this dissertation to the memory of my friend and 
comrade, Mark Fisher.  In a short space of time, Mark left an enduring mark on 
me and I was privileged to know him.  He made me think about research, writing 
and politics in ways I never had, and everything about him encouraged me.  I 
miss him dearly. 





This thesis was defended on 25th January 2019. Dr Phoebe V. Moore and Dr 
Michael Dieter were the examiners and Dr Emma Uprichard was the 
examination advisor.  I would like to thank them all sincerely for their time and 
commitment to the examination of the thesis, and especially Phoebe and 
Michael for having read the work so attentively and for generating such 
excellent questions and feedback.  I would also like to give further 
acknowledgements to Nate Tkacz and Alan Bradshaw for assisting me in my 
viva preparations. 
Coventry, 18th February 2019 
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This research enquires into the politics of organization, control and resistance 
in distribution workplaces. Situated within an autonomist Marxist conceptual 
framework, I make a case for the restoration of the spirit of the workers inquiry 
to class composition analyses of contemporary workplaces, particularly 
regarding the strategic need to understand the politics of algorithmic 
management.  Although largely lost since the ‘post-autonomist’ turn, I argue 
the ‘interested’ methodological approach of the workers inquiry as developed 
within operaismo is especially pertinent to understanding contemporary class 
struggle within algorithmically-mediated workplaces. 
 
I highlight the political deficit in initial studies of the emergence of algorithmic 
management through engagement with a genealogy of scientific, cybernetic 
and humanistic management approaches.  In doing so, I excavate the class 
politics of knowledge and communication, which remain prevalent in 
softwarized managerial forms.  Combining an interdisciplinary theoretical basis 
with original empirical engagement, the inquiry builds an understanding of the 
technical composition of a number of distribution workplaces, detailing the 
managerial and working processes and highlighting the role of tracking, metrics 
and communication. 
 
Devices such as handheld radio data terminals provide the research with a 
space for thinking about the politics of algorithmic management because they 
mediate informational asymmetry between workers and managers, which I 
examine through consideration of such effects as ‘managerial distantiation’ and 




I argue that workers are politically active in distribution workplaces, often aside 
from trade union involvement, and that there exists an infrapolitical realm where 
workers take advantage of the technologically reshaped terrain of struggle.  
These subversive actions, I argue, are characterised by metis (cunning 
intelligence), which challenges the forms of political action typically found in the 
workplace organizing repertoire by providing an alternative basis of 
commonality and collectivity based on the use of guile despite initially adverse 
conditions.  
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Abbreviations and acronyms 
 
BAME  Black, Asian and minority ethnic 
BBC  British Broadcasting Corporation 
BEIS  Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
BMA  British Medical Association 
CGIL Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (Italian General 
Confederation of Labour) 
CLMS  closed-loop management system 
CPM  cases per minute 
GMB  General, Municipal, Boilermakers and Allied Trade Union 
HGV  heavy goods vehicle 
ICT  information communication technology 
IPH  items per hour 
IWGB  Independent Workers Union of Great Britain 
IWW  Industrial Workers of the World union 
MTurk  Amazon Mechanical Turk 
QC  quality control 
QR  quick response (code) 
SAP Systeme, Anwendungen und Produkte in der Datenverarbeitung 
(Systems, Applications and Products in Data Processing) 
SLAM  scan label, apply manifest (machine) 
SMS  short message service 
TQC  total quality control 
TSS  Transnational Social Strike platform 
TUC  Trades Union Congress 
Usdaw Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers 
Ver.di Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft (German United Services 
Trade Union) 










…emancipatory politics must always destroy the appearance of a ‘natural 
order’, must reveal what is presented as necessary and inevitable to be a 
mere contingency, just as it must make what was previously deemed to be 
impossible seem attainable. 
 




Laboratories of resistance 
 
On a chilly morning in April 2013, over a thousand trade unionists donning high-
vis vests and armed with whistles formed a picket line outside the Bad Hersfeld 
fulfilment centre in central Germany, beginning a campaign of strike action 
which by 2016 had cost over a hundred work days, and marking the first ever 
strike against the e-commerce, entertainment and digital services giant 
Amazon (Boewe and Schulten, 2017: 9).  Facilitated by the Ver.di general 
union, the launch of the campaign was notable not only for being the first of its 
kind, but also for its specifically industrial, proactive character — Amazon 
having crushed trade union ambitions for a decade in the UK by that point (ibid.: 
27-9; see Gall, 2004). 
 
Foremost among the campaign’s aims is a collective agreement between the 
union and employer; a demand echoed by unions across the sector 
internationally, with a clear rationale which links union recognition and 
representation with protections for workers in terms of wages and conditions.  
However, such demands have been met by anti-union tactics either overt or 
implicit.  In Spain and Italy, union campaigns have met with police violence.  In 
the UK, unions have had to deal with a lack of access, a workforce divided 
between employment agencies, employers signing ‘sweetheart deals’ with 
partnership unions, and ambivalence from the political wing of the labour 
movement, which has expressed concern over working conditions in the sector 
while subsidizing companies like Amazon on the promise of bringing jobs to 
deindustrialized areas. 
 
Boewe and Schulten (2017) refer to Amazon as a “laboratory of resistance”.  In 
many senses the metaphor encapsulates the trials of labour movement actors 
and thinkers over the past decade in engaging with a broad but entangled knot 
of emerging working practices and conditions symbolized by Amazon on one 
hand, and the so-called ‘gig economy’ on the other.  Against the backdrop of 
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expanding global logistics networks (Moody, 2017), the rise of ‘platform 
capitalism’ (Srnicek, 2016) and suggestions of the ‘uberization’ of work 
(Warhurst et al, 2017), the position of labour in relation to the combined force 
of capital and unprecedented technological capabilities appears precarious 
both economically and politically.  The precise forms of work emerging from 
this nexus are diverse, but they are united by the highly computerized forms of 
organization and management which have come to be referred to as 
‘algorithmic management’, and are frequently accompanied by contractual 
insecurity, such as some variation on ‘self-employed’ status (as in the gig 
economy) or fixed-term or ‘zero-hour’1 contracts, as well as sectoral norms of 
adaptivity, flexibility and just-in-time provision.2   
 
Labour and social movements have responded to this situation in different 
ways.  Industrial action against Amazon has spread to fulfilment centres in 
Spain, Italy and Poland (Reuters, 2017; Al Jazeera, 2018).  Meanwhile, the gig 
economy has seen its first ‘strikes’ by food platform workers against Deliveroo, 
Foodora and Uber Eats (Cant, 2018; Bloomberg News, 2016), as well as ‘ride-
sharers’ against Uber (Mabuza, 2018; McGinn, 2018), subverting the 
companies’ insistence that its service providers are independent workers 
(rather than employees) by staging organized ‘wildcat’ actions whereby 
workers agree not to log into their work apps.  In response to the increasingly 
logistical character of the organization of global capitalism (Moody, 2017; Dyer-
Witheford, 2015: 81-101, LeCavalier, 2016), social movement actors have 
focused their energies on ‘blocking’ supply chains through occupations or 
blockades (…ums Ganze!: 2017; MSNBC, 2011).  Meanwhile, trade unions in 
the UK have launched media campaigns and legal challenges over working 
                         
1 ‘Zero-hour’ contracts are a controversial provision of British employment law, whereby 
workers are retained by a company as employees without the guarantee of shifts but without 
the right to decline shifts when they are offered. 
2 A lesser used but more descriptive and arguably more inclusive term which has emerged is 
the ‘on-demand economy’. 
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conditions in the ‘digital economy’ (GMB @ Asos, 2016; Butler and Osborne, 
2017).  Combined with the work of investigative journalists, many of the issues 
arising from this moment in labour relations have seeped into popular 
consciousness in the UK.  Following undercover documentaries and some 
high-profile news stories (Panorama, 2013; Dispatches, 2015; Unite the Union, 
2015), issues such as zero-hour contracts and Draconian surveillance 
practices became talking points in the 2015 general election and have 
remained prominent national political and media issues (Goodley and Ashby, 
2015; Grierson, 2015), leading to separate parliamentary inquiries into the 
digital economy and working conditions at Sports Direct’s Shirebrook 
distribution centre, a company whose name has become synonymous with 
poor working conditions in popular discourse (Chakrabortty and Weale, 2016). 
 
The future world of work 
 
On 26th October 2016, the UK parliament’s Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy (BEIS) Committee responded to the spectrum of concerns raised by 
the emerging situation by launching an inquiry into the “future world of work 
and the rights of workers”.  Following the digital economy and Sports Direct 
inquiries, the ‘future world of work’ inquiry sought to address concerns arising 
from news stories regarding the working conditions of distribution warehouses, 
courier delivery services and high-profile ‘gig economy’ companies (Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, 2016; see also Business, 
Innovation and Skills Committee, 2016a, 2016b).3  Although the ‘future world 
of work’ inquiry, like its predecessors, ultimately framed its concerns for 
working conditions in terms of employment security, its rationale was directly 
                         
3 A note on the use of inverted commas (’) and quotation marks (”): Single inverted commas 
are used throughout to denote phrases, concepts, terms which may be considered ‘so-
called’, and paraphrasing, as well as quotations within quotations. Double quotation marks 
are used to denote direct quotations. 
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linked to concerns about the effects of technological change on work.  
Launching the inquiry, Iain Wright MP said: 
 
The nature of work is undoubtedly changing. It will change further with 
growing use of technology and a spreading of automation across the 
economy. This might provide flexibility and choice for some people, but 
unleash insecurity and squeezed working conditions for others. With 
these economic and technological changes shaking up the world of 
work, it’s vitally important that workers are protected. (Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy Committee, 2016) 
 
The confluence of technological changes and employment insecurity pointed 
to by Wright is widely observed across the labour movement, both in the UK 
and beyond (Blakely and Davies, 2018; Runge, 2017).  Yet the response to this 
challenge has tended to focus on resolving employment insecurity, with 
considerably less attention paid to the technological organization of work, 
despite grievances against it.  So far, proposed solutions towards mitigating 
what are perceived as encroachments on workers’ interests have generally 
taken two related forms: legislation and unionization. 
 
The legislative approach entails parliamentary lobbying or participation (such 
as in an inquiry) or advancing test cases through employment courts.  In these 
ways trade unions seek changes either in legislation or case law with a view to 
strengthening workers’ rights at work with respect to the terms and conditions 
of employment.  Recent examples include two test cases successfully brought 
against Uber by the GMB union and then the Independent Workers Union of 
Great Britain (IWGB) (GMB, 2016; BBC News, 2017), and a third brought 
against CitySprint by IWGB (Butler and Osborne, 2017).  Although related, 
unionization refers more specifically to recruiting workers to a trade union, most 
often with the explicit aim of forcing either a voluntary or statutory recognition 
agreement with the employer.  This has taken different forms.  IWGB, a 
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grassroots campaigning union, recruited Deliveroo riders, demanded 
recognition, and facilitated coordinated action using the fact that workers were 
not technically Deliveroo employees to bypass some constraints of trade union 
law, such as balloting procedures (Osborne, 2016a).4  GMB conducted a strong 
recruitment campaign at the global distribution centre of online retailer Asos, 
alongside a media campaign, with the primary goal of achieving a recognition 
agreement (GMB @ Asos, 2016).  In contrast with IWGB at Deliveroo, GMB’s 
focus on achieving a statutory recognition agreement meant focusing primarily 
on contracted workers rather than incorporating the agency workers who make 
up half the workforce at Asos,5 and backing away from the site when the 
company signed a sweetheart deal with the Community union, both because 
of resources and longstanding trade union agreements.6 While joining a union 
is generally accepted as a good principle by those concerned with labour rights, 
it is nonetheless important to remember unionization is not a panacea for 
strategic strength at work and is accompanied by other factors which 
themselves have implications for workers’ interests. 
 
Technology and the ‘deeper unrest’ 
 
Although the unions mentioned so far are all cognisant of the technological 
dimension, they all campaign on a broadly contractual angle.  In other words, 
                         
4 In UK employment law, ‘employee’ is a specific category of worker with statutory 
entitlements and protections. Trade union law in the UK places stringent conditions on 
unions’ ability to call industrial action, but companies are less protected by legislation if they 
use workers who are not employees of the company proper. 
5 Trade unions in the UK are able to force statutory recognition if they recruit 10% of a 
company’s employees. 
6 What is known as the ‘Bridlington agreement’ is a convention among TUC member unions 
by which they agree not to recruit or campaign at workplaces where another union has, or is 
campaigning for, a recognition agreement with the employer. Community broke the 
Bridlington agreement to sign a voluntary recognition agreement with Asos. 
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their campaigns (beyond recognition) are primarily concerned with workers’ 
employment rights, rather than asserting claims on companies’ labour 
processes.  While employment security is certainly important to workers’ 
interests and, arguably, their ability to act collectively, it is curious that 
technological innovation does not register higher in the labour movement’s 
priorities, despite widespread awareness of the technological character of the 
‘future world of work’, and particularly given its significance to grievances about 
working conditions across companies such as Deliveroo, Uber and Amazon.  
Such grievances generally pertain to what is becoming known as ‘algorithmic 
management’ (O’Connor, 2016); a situation whereby the ubiquity of algorithmic 
tracking and decision-making is augmenting or replacing the traditional 
managerial or supervisory function and creating a situation whereby workers 
can be directed in their work by software based on real-time data processing.  
Initially applied in a work context to managerial forms arising in the gig economy 
(Lee et al, 2015), this dissertation extends the use of the term to arguably more 
‘cyborg’ managerial forms such as those found in distribution warehouses, 
where digital tracking technologies which manage the work process are used 
in conjunction with human managers.  Under algorithmic management, typical 
areas of concern span worker surveillance, the development and use of 
performance metrics which intensify work, and the curtailing of worker 
autonomy or influence within the labour process. This dissertation hones these 
concerns to show that algorithmic management represents a substantial 
rearrangement of social and power relations which warrants specific focus 
beyond attributing it to a general “use of technology and spreading of 
automation” (Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, 2016). 
 
This dissertation focuses on the politics of algorithmic management 
technologies in the new world of work.  It addresses oversights in contemporary 
analyses by arguing that the governance of work in the guise of ‘algorithmic 
management’ warrants a class composition analysis which can help us to 
understand the workplace politics emerging in computationally-organized 
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logistics workplaces, specifically in the fast-moving consumer goods sector 
(Baker, 2008).  The research therefore extends interventions such as 
Woodcock (2017a, 2017b), Waters and Woodcock (2017), Moore (2018), and 
Rosenblat and Stark (2016), which have combined technological realities with 
political concerns regarding the situation of workers in heavily mediated 
workplaces.  With a particular focus on customer goods distribution — the 
sector at the heart of contemporary concerns — I use a methodology inspired 
by the ‘workers inquiry’ of 1960s operaismo to ask how algorithmic 
management affects ‘algorithmic workers’, and how they might apply their own 
political agency within the algorithmically-managed workplace.7  In doing so, I 
excavate the politics of workplaces which are generally hard to access, and 
managerial forms which are often considered to be ‘black boxed’, advancing 
an alternative politics of resistance and working-class struggle.8 
 
This politics starts from what in the past has been considered a ‘deeper unrest’ 
within the workplace.  At the beginning of his 1921 thesis The Frontier of 
                         
7 Throughout the dissertation I use the attributive ‘workers inquiry’ rather than the possessive 
‘workers’ inquiry’, although I note both appear in the literature. The discussion is staged at 
length by Wellbrook (2014) and touched on in Chapter 1. The Italian ‘operaismo’ is often 
inaccurately translated into English as ‘workerism’. In contrast with ‘lavatore’ (literally 
‘worker’), the alternative term ‘operaio’ carries political connotations which are not captured 
by ‘lavatore’. ‘Working class’, for example, is ‘la classe operaia’. Operaismo presupposes 
class struggle, in that it suggests alignment with a political entity rather than the blinkered 
preoccupation with a particular sociological strata implied by ‘workerism’. Operaismo is also 
the collective term for the political movements from which the ‘operaisti’ in this thesis 
emerged. 
8 The dissertation does so in the UK context. While there is certainly a case for analysing the 
specificities of the politics of algorithmic management in different national jurisdictions, as 
well as between them and across global supply chains, it is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. Nonetheless, as Blakely and Davies (2018: 7) note, the UK is useful as a 
starting point at least insofar as it has long been regarded a particularly challenging 
environment for workers and working-class institutions, having become something of a 
laboratory of anti-trade union strategy. 
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Control, Carter L. Goodrich quotes William Straker, the general secretary of the 
Northumberland Miners’ Association, in an address to a Coal Commission 
meeting at the House of Lords: 
 
‘In the past workmen have thought that if they could secure higher 
wages and better conditions they would be content. Employers have 
thought that if they granted these things the workers ought to be 
contented. Wages and conditions have been improved; but the 
discontent and the unrest have not disappeared.’ … Mr Straker went 
on:—‘Many good people have come to the conclusion that working 
people are so unreasonable that it is useless trying to satisfy them. The 
fact is that the unrest is deeper than pounds, shillings and pence, 
necessary as they are. The root of the matter is the straining of the spirit 
of man to be free.’ (Goodrich, 1975: 3) 
 
Straker’s choice of words is purposefully evocative, but Goodrich finds it useful 
for distinguishing “the unrest which is concerned more with discipline and 
management than with wages” (ibid.).  For Goodrich, the crux of this form of 
unrest is control, a malleable term he sees used as both a slogan and a 
convenient term in various (sometimes conflicting) corners of the labour 
movement, and by no means “the unified expression of some single impulse” 
(ibid.: 18-9).  Nonetheless 
 
…in actual reference to the facts of industry it breaks up into a 
bewildering variety of rights and claims… Control is no ‘simple central 
objective,’ no one clear-cut thing which people either know they want or 
know they don’t want. The demand cannot be put glibly into a single 
phrase or a single resolution — too many diverse motives are blended 
and crossed in the strivings of many workers for the complicated set of 
things called control. (ibid.: 18) 
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It should be made clear that in raising the issue of workers’ control, Goodrich 
is not straightforwardly raising the prospect of workers’ political governance 
over industry, so much as identifying a contested threshold running through 
workplace relations — the frontier of control, or the point at which the employer 
aims to say “beyond this there shall be no discussion, the rest is my business 
alone” (ibid.: 56) and workers might test the limits of their ability to control or 
shape their work environment. 
 
Glimmers in the algorithmic curtain 
 
Goodrich’s focus on “the complicated set of things called control” (ibid.: 18) as 
a concern aside the more conventional issues of wages and conditions is 
apposite for an inquiry into the politics of algorithmic management, given initial 
concerns about the technologically-enhanced tracking, monitoring and 
intensification of work and the correlative lack of control and transparency 
faced by workers according to studies so far (Lee, 2016; Moore, 2018; Moore 
et al, 2018a; Rosenblat and Stark, 2016; Woodcock, 2017a, 2017b) — in other 
words, issues of discipline and management.  These grievances and concerns 
recur across the labour movement (Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
Committee, 2017a; Blakely and Davies, 2018; UNI Global Union, n.d.), but 
critical engagement with the specificities of algorithmic management 
technologies is, so far, beyond the scope of union engagement.  One might be 
tempted to draw the simple conclusion that without trade union engagement on 
the issue, the technological frontier of control is simply left to the determinations 
of management.  However, Jamie Woodcock’s initial study of Deliveroo 
suggests the extent of managerial control may not be so straightforward, and 
algorithmic technologies may even represent a rather precarious form of 
control on the part of management (Woodcock, 2017a).9  To understand this 
aspect of algorithmic management I engage with the idea of control not only in 
                         
9 Woodcock’s investigations into Deliveroo are ongoing at the time of submission. 
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conventional political terms but also in relation to the cybernetic principles of 
the algorithmic management system.  As I show in Chapter 5, workers are 
already contesting the frontier of algorithmic control quite apart from the 
involvement of trade unions. 
 
Irrespective of the formal balance of power between companies and trade 
unions, this dissertation dives into the ‘deeper’ contest occurring between 
workers and management within ordinary algorithmically-managed 
workplaces.  It contributes to an understanding of what Mark Fisher (2009: 64) 
calls a “political phenomenology” of work by developing a class composition 
analysis of both the technical and political formations which emerge under 
algorithmic management, in which the ‘algorithmic worker’ is presented with 
both obstructions and opportunities to acting politically within the workplace.  
Operating within an autonomist Marxist framework, the dissertation analyses 
technological innovation in terms of the rearrangement of workers and 
management as social forces.  Nonetheless, it also argues for a reorientation 
of the contemporary autonomist perspective towards its earlier methodological 
approach of workers inquiry. 
 
Overall, this dissertation argues that answers to questions of workers’ 
resistance to algorithmic management require further empirical engagement 
with ordinary algorithmically-managed workplaces and the workers in them.  It 
shows that a class composition analysis is the appropriate framework for 
understanding workplace politics in a way that is attentive to the effects of 
technological innovation on the work process and the potential and character 
of workers’ political agency.10  As Scholz (2017: 2-4) notes, beyond a ‘future 
                         
10 Although it is not covered in this research, it is hoped that in arguing for the 
appropriateness of a class composition analysis, this dissertation strengthens calls for further 
inquiry into the ‘social’ dimension of class, particularly in terms of migrant and gendered 
labour, in relation to questions of technical and political composition (Notes From Below, 
2018). 
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world of work’, the technological reorganization of work we are currently 
witnessing may be indicative of the future of capitalism itself.  If that is the case, 
it is imperative that critical scholarship on the topic of digital technology and 
work turns itself towards the changing class composition of algorithmically-
managed workplaces and a closer assessment of the forms of resistance which 
may be available to algorithmic workers. 
 
In 1949, the cybernetician Norbert Wiener tried to persuade Walter Reuther, 
the head of United Auto Workers, to either make cybernetic technologies the 
union’s business or else campaign for their suppression (Dyer-Witheford, 2015: 
39).  In 1964, the co-founder of operaismo, Raniero Panzieri, warned against 
the ‘objectivist’ attitude of unions and workers parties which essentially 
accepted capitalist rationality with respect to the development of workplace 
technologies in favour of struggles over wages (Panzieri, 1980).  By now digital 
technologies have become part of the fabric of everyday life, and in many ways 
the introduction of algorithmic techniques to workplaces seems somewhat 
unremarkable, or even inevitable (O’Connor, 2016).  As Barr (2018) observes 
from his own experience of the supermarket distribution sector, working 
alongside a technology which seems opaque and pervasive can seem to give 
the impression of the suppression of politics altogether, let alone political 
possibility.  In his polemic Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?, Mark 
Fisher (2009: 80-1) writes: 
 
The very oppressive pervasiveness of capitalist realism means that 
even glimmers of alternative political and economic possibilities can 
have a disproportionately great effect. The tiniest event can tear a hole 
in the grey curtain of reaction which has marked the horizons of 
possibility under capitalist realism. From a situation in which nothing can 
happen, suddenly anything is possible again. 
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This dissertation begins a project of identifying such glimmers; events which 
might tear small holes in the curtain of algorithmic management, indicating new 
avenues for workers to advance upon the workplace claims of their own, and 
expanding the horizons of possibility beyond that which was previously 




The thesis does not follow the traditional structure observed by many 
sociological or political dissertations, i.e. discrete chapters which respectively 
contain a literature review, methodology, findings, analysis and so on.  Instead, 
the thesis is organised more thematically into chapters on technology, 
management, algorithmically-managed distribution work, the effects of 
algorithmic management, and resistance to algorithmic management.  The first 
two chapters are literature-focused, each providing something of a political 
history of the core ideas underpinning the thesis, but new literature is 
introduced in later chapters as appropriate. Empirical findings are presented 
and discussed across Chapters 3 to 5. This section of the thesis contains my 
original class composition analysis, moving from an exploration of the 
‘technical’ composition of algorithmic management through to its ‘political’ 
terrain and composition. 
 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 1 begins by explaining how 
different Marxisms understand the role of workplace technology in capitalist 
society, before introducing why autonomist Marxism offers a useful perspective 
for assessing the politics of algorithmic management.  Specifically, I draw out 
its understanding of technology as struggle, the continual aim of locating the 
potential for autonomy or resistance within the working class, the importance 
of ‘class composition analysis’, and the methodological approach of the 
workers inquiry.  A key research tool of operaisti in the 1960s Italian new left, 
the workers inquiry is a worker-centric ‘interested’ methodology which aims to 
25 
develop empirically-grounded theory from a working-class standpoint in order 
to strengthen workers’ political struggles.  While I make the case for an 
autonomist Marxist perspective in broad terms, and a class composition 
analysis in particular, I also acknowledge the more recent ‘post-operaismo’ 
tradition which derives a thesis of immaterial labour from the intellectual 
progenitor of the ‘socialized worker’.  Contrary to much of this tradition, I argue 
that contemporary attempts at class composition analysis actually need to 
reconnect with the historical tradition of the workers inquiry in order to be 
strategically useful, and that living through the so-called ‘digital age’ increases, 
rather than lessens, the need for empirical engagement with specific 
workplaces. 
 
In Chapter 2 I adopt a more genealogical approach to management techniques 
and technologies.  Following a discussion of the problems arising from 
algorithmic management and the limitations of adopting a ‘human-centred’ 
design or transparency-oriented approach to the issues faced by workers, I 
discuss the politics of management within capitalist relations.  Tracing 
developments in the history of twentieth century management theory, I discuss 
the foundational principles of ensuring the cooperation of workers, maintaining 
effective control of the labour process, and enacting strategies which can 
mitigate workplace antagonism.  I examine how these principles operate within 
a system of continuous improvement and put concepts such as kaizen into 
conversation with the ideas behind cybernetic management systems which 
privilege the measurement of performance.  I conclude by considering 
Woodcock’s (2017a) problematization of the idea of ubiquitous management, 
which is an important reminder that management theories need to be assessed 
against their observable incarnations. 
 
In Chapter 3 I turn to the technical composition of distribution work as 
understood through eight cases.  Following a discussion of my approach to the 
workers inquiry methodology and the practical challenges of researching this 
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sector, I describe the labour processes of the cases in some detail.  I then 
analyse the technical class composition of the cases with particular attention to 
the processes of tracking and transmission, crucial as they are to algorithmic 
management practices.  I conclude the chapter by discussing technical 
composition through the idea of what I call the ‘management interface’ as 
represented by real-time spatial tracking, both as a relation or calibration of 
processes, and as a point of juncture between asymmetric forces, such as 
found within screenic devices. 
 
Chapter 4 politicizes the technical composition presented by algorithmic 
management by analysing what algorithmic management means for the 
organization of work and authority.  On the organization of work, I analyse the 
role of algorithmic management technologies in facilitating labour demand; 
structuring the work flow, with consequences for workers’ experience of work; 
producing norms of workplace communication, both through devices and 
between workers; and altering workers’ relationship to space and movement.  
I then consider the rearrangement of authority within the algorithmically-
managed workplace, in particular the production of power through algorithms 
and the elevation of the authority of algorithms.  These aspects of algorithmic 
management create opportunities for what I call managerial distantiation, but 
also result in the epistemological emptying of the supervisory role.  I 
subsequently consider the nature of the political terrain produced by algorithmic 
management: one that resembles an advanced form of Taylorism and which 
has at its core a fundamental informational asymmetry that appears to 
undermine the possibility of workers enacting political agency. 
 
Following Chapter 4’s analysis of the political form of algorithmic management, 
in Chapter 5 I enquire into the actions taken by workers to mitigate managerial 
claims or otherwise maximize their interests.  The chapter contributes an 
understanding of class struggle in algorithmically-managed workplaces by 
developing an account of the political composition of ‘algorithmic workers’.  In 
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contrast with more union-oriented approaches, I show that the technological 
organization of work creates opportunities for workers to engage in acts of 
resistance, presenting four examples of resistance enabled by algorithmic 
management: a slow-down, taking advantage of devices, intentional mistakes 
and snooping.  Introducing an alternative way of thinking about worker 
organization, I argue these forms of resistance are rooted in workers’ guile, and 
make use of both ‘metis’ (‘cunning intelligence’) and an infrapolitical commons, 
which presents the possibility of an alternative mode of resistance I call ‘metic 
commonality’. 
 
In the concluding chapter I summarize my analysis and show how I have 
responded to the research objectives.  I show that this dissertation advances a 
new ‘spirit of approach’ to thinking about the politics of algorithmic 
management, particularly regarding the potential for workers to establish 
‘defensive cordons’ from which to advance their own claims within the work 
process.  Arriving at such a position, I conclude, cannot be deduced from what 
managers (or management theorists) tell us about algorithmic management, 
and is the result of methodological choices which belong to a tradition — the 
workers inquiry — largely lost and much missed within autonomist Marxism. 
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It would be possible to write a whole history of the inventions made since 
1830 for the sole purpose of providing capital with weapons against 
working-class revolt. 
 






Introducing the dissertation’s autonomist approach, this chapter argues for the 
necessity of pursuing a class composition analysis of contemporary 
technological innovations and workplace realities.  Beginning with a discussion 
of different Marxist approaches to questions of work and technology, I argue 
autonomist Marxism — particularly operaismo — offers a unique combination 
of historical tradition, conceptual tools, strategic orientation and methodological 
perspective that is distinctly suited to the interests of this study.  In particular, I 
draw out the tradition of the workers inquiry as developed by Romano Alquati, 
and its practical relation to conceptual and strategic development.  The later 
part of the chapter focuses on the question of a class composition analysis, 
which is fundamental to the autonomist framework.  As there is no commonly 
agreed form or method to a class composition analysis except for the recurring 
notions of technical and political composition, I discuss some of ways 
autonomists have gone about uncovering new political configurations before 
turning to the ideas generated by post-operaismo in light of the perceived crisis 
of the mass worker figure and the onset of the digital age.  Ultimately, I argue 
these perspectives lack strategic applicability due to their largely logical or 
theoretical basis, echoing Comitati Autonomi Operai’s perspective that the 
political significance of changing class circumstance demands more, not less, 
empirical engagement (Rivolta di classe, 1976: 136 in Wright, 2002: 171), or 
alternatively, as Ed Emery (1995) argues: “no politics without inquiry”. 
 




This dissertation is grounded in a Marxist political ontology, by which I denote 
a commitment to the historical persistence of class society and the centrality of 
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a class-based analysis for understanding the socio-political-economic 
phenomenon of capitalism.  To the question ‘why Marxism?’, Nick Dyer-
Witheford offers a compact response: “The short answer is: because of 
capitalism” (Dyer-Witheford, 1999: 9). In other words, Marxism is the one 
sustained intellectual and political project solely committed to understanding, 
criticizing and overcoming class society.  Most pertinent to the interests of this 
dissertation, it is also a project which has throughout most of its traditions 
sustained specific analyses of both work and technology as crucial to 
understanding the social totality (ibid.).  As I will argue in Chapter 2, 
fundamental conflicts of class interest are at the heart of workplace relations 
between management and the workforce, and the development of 
management technologies can be understood through the framework of class 
politics as a site of struggle and contestation. 
 
The language of class struggle will doubtless evoke for some readers the worst 
excesses of a rigid, brittle and deterministic Marxism.  I share Harry Cleaver’s 
frustration that wide-reaching texts such as Capital have “often been 
interpreted in an objectivist and determinist fashion to justify reactionary 
politics” (Cleaver in Negri, 1991: xix), but likewise I feel compelled to mount a 
defence of both the unique usefulness of Marx’s analyses and at least part of 
the nomenclature which has followed from his writings.  In this dissertation, 
class struggle is the basic frame I use to make sense of how digital 
management technologies indicate, enable and curtail a range of political 
tactics on the part of managers and workers.  It is the lens through which I will 
articulate the politics of the implementation of algorithmically-mediated 
management techniques, and the persistence of workers’ resistance to it.  
Similarly, Dyer-Witheford (2015: 7-8) articulates the importance of retaining the 
concept of class struggle: 
 
A Marxist concept of class designates the division of members of society 
according to their place in a system of production: today, as capitalists, 
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various fluid intermediate strata or ‘middle classes’, and proletarians. 
But this is not a mere observation that societies are divided into 
economically in-equal strata, a bland sociological truism. The point is 
that a dominant stratum exploits all the others. Since the concept of 
class identifies a process of predation, it is unsurprising that no message 
is more frequently transmitted through the intellectual organs of society 
than that class does not exist. Or that it once existed, but has now 
passed away. …that because working-class communities no longer 
have the close knit solidarity they did in the industrial city, class is no 
longer important … that, if class is to be mentioned at all, it should only 
be to affirm that we are all, every last one of us, ‘middle class’. To name 
class in an any more critical sense is to be condemned as, at best, 
reductionist, inhumanely insensitive to the rich textures of everyday life, 
committed to unearthly clinical abstraction, and, at worst, actively hostile 
towards social harmony, if not inciting civil war…11 
 
Yes, class does not today present itself in the same way as it did in 
Marx’s era. But there is a difference…between saying that something 
has ceased to exist, and saying that it has mutated, become more 
complex… Class has become ontologically not less, but more real, more 
extended, entangled, ramified and differentiated…and yet preserves its 
simple, brutal algorithm. 
 
I will address the matter of how to account for changes in internal class 
formations in a later section introducing the concept of class composition.  First, 
I want to discern between the Marxist approaches which have most closely 
                         
11 Dyer-Witheford (2015: 8) argues ‘civil war’ is precisely the spirit in which to insist on class 
analysis, for its denial, “the insistence that the world be understood only as a set of individual 
projects, is one of the most powerful and destructive weapons in that war.” 
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sought to theorize the role of technology in the “brutal algorithm” of class 
society within the organization of work. 
 
Marxisms on technology 
 
In his reflection on the actions of the Luddites and their successors, Marx 
(1976: 554-5) states: “it took both time and experience before the workers 
learnt to distinguish between machinery and its employment by capital, and 
therefore to transfer their attacks from the material instruments of production to 
the form of society which utilizes those instruments”.  This comment evokes 
what Langdon Winner (1980: 122) calls a social determination theory of 
technology — the idea that the politics of technology are determined by the 
society in which they exist rather than owing to any properties inherent in the 
technology.  Within Marxism, this position is most commonly seen in Leninism, 
particularly with regard to the historical experience of Lenin’s support for Fordist 
production techniques being used to accelerate the early USSR’s 
industrialization.  The argument goes that although Fordist techniques may 
have undermined workers when implemented under the capitalist social 
relations of the USA, Fordist techniques would have a different political 
character within the context of the socialist ambitions of the early Soviet Union.  
As Marxists of different stripes have noted, if the aim was to transcend 
exploitative labour relations, the move to Fordism was miscalculated, with the 
result instead being “a new discipline of work and maximised production” 
(Cleaver, 1979: 16; see also Harvey, 2010: 218). 
 
Winner’s theory of technological politics goes some way to explaining why the 
suggestion of technology’s political neutrality is inadequate and why 
technologies can appear to produce effects different to those which may have 
been socially intended.  The theory of technological politics, Winner (1980: 123) 
argues, “draws attention to the momentum of large-scale sociotechnical 
systems, to the response of modern societies to certain technological 
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imperatives, and to the all too common signs of the adaptation of human ends 
to technical means.”  He continues: “Rather than insist that we immediately 
reduce everything to the interplay of social forces, it suggests that we pay 
attention to the characteristics of technical objects and the meaning of those 
characteristics.  A necessary complement to, rather than a replacement of, 
theories of the social determination of technology, this perspective identifies 
certain technologies as political phenomena in their own right” (ibid.).  For 
Winner this position amounts to “[taking] technical artifacts seriously” (ibid.) by 
focusing on the relationship between technological objects and society, 
observing how the scale of certain technical arrangements (either as object or 
organization) can engender technological imperatives which command 
particular social responses. 
 
For readers of science and technology studies, Winner’s argument may initially 
evoke something approaching an actor-network theory position, but for Winner 
the pertinence of the theory of technological politics is expressly political-
normative: “In our times people are often willing to make drastic changes in the 
way they live to accord with technological innovation at the same time they 
would resist similar kinds of changes justified on political grounds” (ibid.:  135).  
It is not that Winner wishes to replace a social determination theory with a 
technological determination theory, rather he points to the way some 
technological objects can have a dual character which makes them more or 
less flexible depending on both social and technological factors.  David Harvey 
similarly argues it is necessary to capture something of the flexibility of 
technology while ensuring due focus is given to its capitalist context.  For 
Harvey this means understanding what he calls the open and dialectical 
relation between technologies and a number of terrains which are crucial to 
capitalist development (2010: 196). 
 
Reflecting on Chapter 15 of Marx’s Capital, ‘Machinery and Large-Scale 
Industry’, Harvey describes the technologies discussed by Marx as being 
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“suited” to capitalist production (Harvey, 2010: 218).12  Harvey leaves his 
meaning ambiguous, only indicating these are the “technologies through which 
capitalism has found its own basis” and they are therefore “the technologies of 
a capitalist mode of production” (ibid., emphasis added).  It is important to 
understand that technologies here are understood within a historical-materialist 
framework, requiring attention to the historical conjuncture in any analysis of 
technological politics.  In an idiosyncratic reading of Marx’s chapter, Harvey 
identifies six elements ‘revealed’ by technology, which form the general 
framework, he says, of dialectical and historical materialism: the relation to 
nature, social relations, mental conceptions, the reproduction of social life, and 
the actual process of production.  The six elements (technology being the sixth) 
 
coevolve and are subject to perpetual renewal and transformation as 
dynamic moments within the totality. But it is not a Hegelian totality in 
which each moment tightly internalizes all the others. It is more like an 
ecological totality, what Lefebvre refers to as an ‘ensemble’ or Deleuze 
as an ‘assemblage’, of moments coevolving in an open, dialectical 
manner. Uneven development between and among the elements 
produces contingency in human evolution. (Harvey, 2010: 196, 
emphasis added)13  
 
For Harvey, it is crucial to examine technological forms through the prism of 
this ecological totality.  “Technologies and organizational forms do not descend 
from the sky,” he argues.  “They get produced out of mental conceptions. They 
also arise out of our social relations and concretely arise in response to the 
                         
12 As Harvey (2010: 218) notes, this raises the question of what the “technologies appropriate 
to a socialist or communist mode of production” are. 
13 Here Harvey is attempting to move a dialectical-materialist framework beyond a narrow 
Hegelian dialectic between contradicting forces. Whether or not it is possible for such an 
amended framework to still be considered ‘dialectical’ is contestable. Personally, I am not 
invested in the structuralism implied by ‘dialectical’ Marxisms. 
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practical needs of our daily life or of labor processes” (ibid.: 195).  Although 
Harvey acknowledges the space that exists for political engagement to occur 
across these elements, his analysis generally remains at the structural level of 
the relations between them.  Notably, he asserts that “no one moment 
[element] prevails over the others” (ibid.: 196), and particularly argues against 
what he calls ‘class-struggle determinism’.  This is a problematic position for a 
Marxist analysis which fundamentally understands capital as a class relation 
(Cleaver, 1979: 53), and I would caution that Harvey is conflating the view that 
one element can ‘prevail’ over the others (insofar as it can be a dominant 
condition) with a deterministic position.  As I will argue, a Marxist analysis which 
maintains a commitment to the principle that the working class is a unique and 
recurring problem for capital (i.e. an autonomist Marxist analysis) is able to 
maintain that the class relation is the ‘motor’ of capitalist development whilst 
remaining mindful of the wealth of contingencies involved in such a process. 
 
Labour process theory 
 
Before explicating the autonomist position on technology in class society, it is 
important to acknowledge another Marxian field which has made attempts to 
foreground class relations in its understanding of technologies and 
organizational forms.  Lamenting that there is “no continuing body of work in 
the Marxist tradition dealing with the capitalist mode of production in the 
manner in which Marx treated it in the first volume of Capital”, Harry Braverman 
(1974: 9) attempts to reorient Marxist analysis towards a “critical analysis of 
capitalist production” (ibid.: 8).  In doing so, Braverman marks the generally 
agreed beginning of the diverse tradition of labour process theory (Smith, n.d.: 
2-3; Thompson, n.d.: 2; Thompson, 1983: xi).  
 
While Braverman often uses the language of social determination, his position 
is closer to Harvey’s, arguing that although “technology…is produced by the 
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social relation represented by capital” (Braverman, 1974: 20), social 
determinacy 
 
does not have the fixity of a chemical reaction, but is a historic process. 
The concrete and determinate forms of society are indeed ‘determined’ 
rather than accidental, but this is the determinacy of the thread-by-
thread weaving of the fabric of history, not the imposition of external 
formulas (ibid: 21). 
 
Nonetheless Braverman does bestow upon technology — particularly 
machinery, i.e. industrial production technology — a special role within the 
functioning of capitalist social relations, arguing, “The ideal toward which 
capitalism strives is the domination of dead labor over living labor” (ibid: 227).  
He continues: 
 
[Capitalism] brings into being this system of the domination of living by 
dead labor not just as an allegorical expression, not just as the 
domination of wealth over poverty, of employer over employed, or of 
capital over labor in the sense of financial or power relationships, but as 
a physical fact (ibid: 228). 
 
There are aspects of labour process theory which coincide with the analysis in 
this dissertation, most centrally the notion that capitalists must struggle to 
overcome the indeterminacy of labour power, making the productive process a 
contested terrain.  This idea informs Chapter 2, which discusses a range of 
forms this struggle takes.  Likewise, labour process theory attempts to 
understand the changing realities of work and trajectories in forms of control 
because they are important for understanding the direction of capitalist 
development more broadly.  A key caveat within labour process theory is the 
principle of the relative autonomy of the labour process from wider political 
economy (Jaros, 2005: 6-7).  In my own work my interest in this idea has less 
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to do with the degrees of separation between working life and macroeconomic 
factors, and more to do with asserting the ongoing contingency of class 
struggle within paid work aside from any structural principles or tendencies one 
may wish to claim.  Indeed, this point has been recognized by later proponents 
of labour process theory; while Braverman famously neglected to discuss the 
agency of workers against machinic regimes in the workplace, tending to 
assume managerial ideals tend to play out more or less as intended, others 
have incorporated worker resistance as an important factor of the capitalist 
employment relation (Thompson, n.d.: 5-7). 
 
Nonetheless, it remains the case that labour process theory’s understanding of 
this tension tends to remain predicated on conflicting economic interests 
between classes.  As Burnes, Knights and Willmott (1988: 6) summarize: 
 
Occupying a dominant position, the agents of capital are able to impose 
a technological transformation of the workplace in pursuit of the 
extraction of surplus value from a workforce that has little or no power 
and knowledge to resist the unquestioned demand for ‘technological 
progress’. 
 
Instead, this dissertation looks at managerial innovation through the political 
lens of circumventing antagonism rather than the economic lens of maximizing 
surplus value.  This is a difficult issue to navigate in the labour process theory 
literature, and I do not want to suggest labour process theorists do not see 
these economic ‘imperatives’ as political, but there appears to exist a shared 
commitment to tying workplace politics to the rationality of productivity and 
profit.  As Burnes et al (ibid.) go on to argue: “In so far as the new technology 
extends the division of labour and specialisation, it becomes apparent that 
improved productivity will increasingly depend upon the strength and quality of 
labour’s co-operation and interdependence.”  In coupling improvements in 
productivity with labour’s cooperation, Burnes et al (ibid.: 7) take the apparent 
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lack of “the kind of resistance usually associated with threats of standard 
(restrictive) practices in the workplace” e.g. overt workplace organizing, or 
active trade unions, as a sign of “labour’s compliance” or “shopfloor 
acceptance”.  As I explore throughout this dissertation, I take a different view, 
drawing on a ‘continuing body of work’ Braverman initially failed to locate, 
namely the autonomist tradition of operaismo.  Nonetheless, I recognize the 
role of labour process theory and particularly Braverman in affirming the 
political value of researching workplaces and changes to work (Braverman, 
1974: 30).14 
 
Operaismo and autonomist Marxism (autonomism) 
 
Like labour process theory, autonomist Marxism has historically sought to 
understand changes in working processes and conditions.  But, autonomism is 
primarily interested in the ability of the working class to struggle.  Although 
within autonomism struggle is understood and located on various terrains, in 
various forms and at various scales, this preoccupation is explicitly political, 
stemming from Marx’s idea that the working class is the class that will abolish 
itself and class society (Marx and Engels, 1967: 105).  For autonomists it is 
therefore necessary to understand the ways that class can struggle against its 
exploitation and the conditions within which it struggles.  Two crucial elements 
arise: the centrality of the working class to an understanding of work, and the 
need for what autonomists refer to as a class composition analysis.  As I will 
discuss later in this chapter, the latter is the theoretical and practical insurance 
against the ossified and dehistoricized romanticization of the former. 
 
Central to autonomism in all its forms is the notion that the working class is not 
merely “a spectator to the global waltz of capital’s autonomous self-activating 
                         
14 And, indeed, its influence on initial critical studies of algorithmically-mediated work (see 
Moore, 2018; Whittaker, 2018; Woodcock, 2017b) 
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development” (Cleaver, 1979: 26).  Rather, autonomism upholds the principle 
that the working class has political agency regardless of the conditions imposed 
upon it by either capital, the state, or traditional political ‘vehicles’ such as trade 
unions or workers parties.  Although in coining the term Cleaver is drawing on 
diverse movements such as the Johnson-Forest Tendency in the USA and the 
operaismo and autonomia tendencies of the Italian new left, both of whom will 
be discussed later in this chapter, a central point of reference for understanding 
a specifically autonomist Marxism is Mario Tronti’s ‘Lenin in England’, in which 
he argues: 
 
We too have worked with a concept that puts capitalist development 
first, and workers second. This is a mistake. And now we have to turn 
the problem on its head, reverse the polarity, and start again from the 
beginning: and the beginning is the class struggle of the working class. 
At the level of socially developed capital, capitalist development 
becomes subordinated to working class struggles; it follows behind 
them, and they set the pace to which the political mechanisms of 
capital’s own reproduction must be tuned. (Tronti, 1964) 
 
Commonly referred to as Tronti’s ‘Copernican inversion’ (or the ‘Trontian 
inversion’), the insistence on the primacy of working-class struggle within the 
development of capitalism is the fundamental basis of autonomism.  For 
Cleaver, the starting point is therefore that capital is a fundamentally political 
relationship, hence political relations should be at the centre of an analysis of 
capitalism.  Cleaver separates the notion of a ‘political analysis’ from what he 
refers to as economistic or philosophical Marxist accounts of capitalism, 
arguing that “Capitalist power over labor is the ability to force people into the 
labor market, to force people to work for capital in production, and to coerce 
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surplus labor in the labor process” (Cleaver in Negri, 1991: xxiii).15  This raises 
the issue of the conflict of the labour-capital relationship, in particular the 
problem of actualizing labour power, which I will discuss in depth in Chapter 2.  
But crucially for Cleaver, “it serves little purpose to study the structures of 
capitalist domination unless they are recognized as strategies that capital must 
struggle to impose” (Cleaver, 1979: 42-3) — i.e. against an active working 
class.  Implicit within this position is an understanding of Marx’s (1976: 508) 
observation that machinery generally “operates only by means of associated 
labour, or labour in common” which is to say workplace technology represents 
an ongoing intervention of sorts into the “cooperative character of the labour 
process”.  In other words, whereas Braverman tends to understand machinic 
regimes as largely enacting managers’ will, Cleaver argues we should 
understand this process not as a fait accompli but as the enactment of strategic 
objectives with varying degrees of success. 
 
It is not a novel point to say technology is used against workers for political 
ends.  As Marx (1976: 562) notes: 
 
…machinery does not just act as a superior competitor to the worker, 
always on the point of making him superfluous. It is a power inimical to 
him, and capital proclaims this fact loudly and deliberately, as well as 
making use of it. It is the most powerful weapon for suppressing strikes, 
those periodic revolts of the working class against the autocracy of 
capital. 
 
However, Cleaver argues Marxist political economy has too often “analyzed 
capitalist growth and accumulation independently of working-class initiative” 
                         
15 For Cleaver, ‘economic’ readings include those of Bolshevism and structuralist Marxists 
such as Louis Althusser, while ‘philosophical’ readings include critical theory and in particular 
the Frankfurt School. 
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(1979: 15).  This is to say the capitalist use of technology is not merely about 
the domination of living labour by dead labour, but rather a struggle and 
moreover a response to working-class power.16  As Cleaver (1979: 28) states: 
“We are presented with elaborately detailed critical interpretations of this self-
activating monster in a way that completely ignores the way actual working-
class power forces and checks capitalist development.”  What is instead 
demanded by means of an autonomist analysis is an account of the political 
dynamics (i.e. class relations) that are immanent to technology (Mancini, 1977 
in Wright, 2002: 44). 
 
The prime theorist of this position within autonomism is Raniero Panzieri.  For 
Panzieri, organizational progress is about power rather than rationality, with 
arguments to the contrary making it too easy to depoliticize technology (Wright, 
2002: 42).  As such, Panzieri complements Tronti’s key insight that all relations 
of production are first and foremost relations of power (ibid.: 40) — meaning 
                         
16 This is how Marx frames the period of technological recomposition following the working-
class struggle for the shortening of the working day: “[It] gives an immense impetus to the 
development of productivity and the more economical use of the conditions of production. It 
imposes on the worker an increased expenditure of labour within a time which remains 
constant, a heightened tension of labour-power, and a closer filling-up of the pores of the 
working day, i.e. a condensation of labour, to a degree which can only be attained within the 
limits of the shortened working day” (Marx, 1976: 534).  In other words, the struggle forces 
capital to shift its focus from absolute surplus (the length of labour time) to relative surplus 
(the ‘condensation’ of labour within a given time, i.e. productivity), which it does through 
technological development to the detriment of workers’ conditions: “As soon as that 
shortening [of the working day] becomes compulsory, machinery becomes in the hands of 
capital the objective means, systematically employed, for squeezing out more labour in a 
given time” (Marx, 1976: 536).  This is an algorithm (to use Dyer-Witheford’s metaphor) we 
also see in the surge in manufacturing innovations in West Germany in the 1970s; the 
eventual result of “trade-union power…on sustained high wage rates, which produced a 
strong incentive for technological innovation” (Harvey, 2010: 213-4).  In particular it would be 
interesting to relate the ‘new production techniques’ analysis by Kern and Schumann (1987) 
to this point (see Tomaney, 1994). 
42 
capital does not develop because of any self-contained logic but rather in 
relation to the ongoing struggle between classes (Dyer-Witheford, 1999: 66-7).  
Panzieri is of particular importance to a political conception of technology17 
because he develops a specific account of the “revolutions of capitalist 
technology and workers’ organization within the dynamic of class struggle” 
(Cleaver, 1979: 53).  Within this account, Panzieri argues technological 
progress does not stand apart from class relations (Wright, 2002: 41), and there 
is a responsive element to changes in the use of technology and workers’ 
modes of resistance within the work process. 
 
For autonomists, the purpose of developing a specifically political account is 
not only to better understand the dominative power of capital, but — as Dyer-
Witheford (1999: 62) argues — to emphasize people’s capacity to contest it.  
Further still, the autonomist research agenda aims at equipping workers with 
the weapons to do so.  For Cleaver (1979: 4), for example, the use of returning 
to Marx and continually re-evaluating Marxist concepts is to develop a 
simultaneously political and strategic account in light of the material 
circumstances of the present, insofar as doing so can put a “political tool in the 
hands of workers”.  Political, in that the analysis is able to integrate technology, 
capitalist strategy and working-class autonomy into an account of class 
struggle (ibid.: 56); strategic, in that an account should be developed as if 
intervening in a war and trying to work out allegiances, as opposed to an 
ideological assessment or “critical interpretation” (ibid.: 10).  The autonomist 
perspective, then, has alternative commitments than merely understanding the 
changing organization of work (i.e. the self-organization of capital).  In order to 
understand this impetus and the potential for autonomism’s application today, 
it is important to understand the history and frameworks developed within its 
heterodox tradition. 
 
                         
17 I am using Cleaver’s definition of ‘political’ here. 
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The offer of autonomy 
 
A political tradition 
 
I now consider the theoretical and practical benefits of situating this dissertation 
within an autonomist political-philosophical framework.  First, I will consider the 
particular tools developed by autonomist thinking historically, before 
considering the perspectives of autonomist accounts which have attempted to 
reorient Marxist analysis towards the digital age, through which I will argue what 
form an autonomist analysis should take today. 
 
The combined project of autonomism — intellectually and practically — is and 
always has been oriented towards developing a new Marxian praxis 
appropriate to the latest technological innovations shaping work and the actual 
material conditions of the present.  Dyer-Witheford (1999: 69) sums up the 
basic autonomist outlook on technology succinctly: 
 
Its perspective on technology…has two aspects. The first is an analysis 
of technoscience as an instrument of capitalist domination — a 
rereading aimed at shattering scientific socialism’s myth of automatic 
scientific progress. The second, however, looks at the situation from the 
other side and analyzes the ways in which struggles against class can 
overcome capital’s technological control. 
 
However, the thinkers and ideas Cleaver groups under the banner of 
autonomist Marxism are brought together not just by a theoretical perspective 
but rather an actually existing political tradition with a traceable, definite and 
traumatic history.  It is against this history that autonomists have tested their 
ideas and sharpened their intellectual ‘weapons’. 
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The writings of the early operaisti in Italy in the early 1960s were generally 
responding to a dual frustration with the capitalist reorganization of factories 
(particularly the introduction of Taylorist methods) on one hand, and the 
impotency (and collaboration) of the official trade unions which were dominated 
by the Communist and Socialist parties.18  Prompted by the political problem of 
trade union officials often being in cahoots with factory managers, operaisti 
developed a theoretical toolkit which could both challenge the dominant 
orthodox Marxist accounts of technology and work, and empower workers 
directly outside the apparatuses of the unions and parties by recognizing the 
breadth of political action and agency within the working class at the time.  As 
well as being an intellectual movement to reinvigorate the Marxist project, 
operaismo (and particularly autonomia, which followed) was an actually 
existing social movement.  It should be noted here that although operaismo 
(growing out of the Quaderni Rossi and Classe Operaia publications and 
centred around the political group Potero Operaia) and autonomia (the 
subsequent flourishing – especially in the 1970s – of groups such as 
Autonomia Operaia, Lotta Continua, Lotta Femminista and the Radio Alice 
pirate station) were distinct movements with notable internal bifurcations,19 
here I find their commonalities strong enough to continue to group them 
together, as Cleaver does, under the term ‘autonomist Marxism’.  In a different 
context this move might appear inappropriate, but given the open political 
pluralism and shared theoretical framework of both operaismo and autonomia, 
I find their grouping together unproblematic here, although I will clarify 
differences with post-operaismo’s conceptual developments in the last section 
of this chapter.  Most crucially, autonomism offers a political framework that 
contends technology is always subject to ongoing class struggle, and 
furthermore provides a set of well-defined conceptual ‘weapons’ that may help 
                         
18 In the English language the most attentive history of this movement is Wright (2002). 
19 See, for example, Bologna (2005a). 
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us develop an account of technology at work: a strategic framework, an 
ontological framework, and a methodological toolbox. 
 
Political framework: technology as struggle 
 
Historically, Panzieri’s main contribution was to challenge the dominant view 
among Marxists that technological development could be separated from class 
relations (Wright, 2002: 41).  On the contrary, in Panzieri’s view “machinery 
was determined by capital, which utilised it to further the subordination of living 
labour” (ibid.).  In his attempt to weave technology and class domination, 
Panzieri’s intervention involved a reappraisal of the growth of Fordism in Italy, 
alongside a rereading of Marx’s account of technological domination.  Starting 
from the idea that the organization of work is, at some level, about the control 
of the working class, Panzieri formulated an account of the technological 
evolution of capital in terms of such innovation representing a response to 
working-class struggle (Cleaver, 1979: 52), complementing Tronti’s idea of 
capitalist development being driven by the double helix of working-class 
resistance and capitalist planning. 
 
The notion of planning is central to Panzieri’s conceptualization of the active 
role of capital on its side of the class struggle, as the means by which capitalists 
can ensure “certainty of result” and ensure control over the productive process 
over time (Panzieri, 1976: 8).  Notably, for Panzieri the only ‘unplannable’ 
element of capital is the working class itself (Cleaver, 1979: 53), which by virtue 
of its autonomy is never fully captured by capitalist strategy, forcing capitalists 
to similarly engage in struggle by continually developing alternative ideas and 
mechanisms to better ensure productivity on their terms.  This takes the form 
of conscious decisions to ensure the capitalist class gains the upper hand 
through the construction of new technologies (Harvey, 2010: 219).  As Marx 
(1976: 563) reflects on the technological developments just within his own 
lifetime: “It would be possible to write a whole history of the inventions made 
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since 1830 for the sole purpose of providing capital with weapons against 
working-class revolt.”  Yet crucially within the autonomist analysis, the working 
class struggles back against the capitalist use of technology (Cleaver, 1979: 
53). 
 
The understanding of technology as a key site of class struggle stands as an 
important challenge to the fallacy that technological development can be 
explained solely in terms of efficiency savings.  While efficiency can be a 
legitimate capitalist target, particularly in the pursuit of maximizing relative 
surplus against the workforce, as Winner (1980: 124) notes, technological 
change can also be motivated by the desire to have dominion over others, for 
which efficiency can sometimes be sacrificed.20  He goes on to outline the case 
of the McCormick factory in 1880s Chicago, where hugely expensive 
pneumatic moulding machines were introduced despite their inferiority to 
skilled labourers.  They were abandoned three years later, but by then had 
successfully destroyed the skilled workers’ union.  It is important to note that 
such a success in capitalist planning is never absolute or final in the autonomist 
analysis.  Even though the union was undermined by the moulding machines, 
the workers are still present and remain a political problem for the production 
calculation.  As Jamie Woodcock (2014: 498) observes, “behind observable 
institutional phenomena are the actions of an actually existing working class” 
which retains the capacity to act on its own initiative against the desired 
consequences of capitalist planning.  This puts the working class in an active 
position with a productive role in the life of technology: 
 
Unlike scientific socialists, autonomists find no inherently progressive 
logic in technological development. But unlike neo-Luddites they do not 
perceive only a monolithic capitalist control over scientific innovation. 
                         
20 Cf. Simon’s discussion of the factors considered by managers when introducing new 
technologies (Simon, 1977: 18). 
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Rather, their insistence on the perpetually contested nature of the labor-
capital relation and the basic independence of human creativity tends 
away from attribution of fixed political valencies to machinery and toward 
a focus on possibilities for counterappropriation, refunctioning, and 
‘detournement’. If machinery is a ‘weapon’ then it can, as Cleaver says, 
be stolen and captured, ‘used against us or by us’. Or — to use 
Panzieri’s perhaps richer and less instrumental metaphor — if capital 
‘interweaves’ technology and power, then this weaving can be undone, 
and the threads used to make a different pattern. (Dyer-Witheford, 1999: 
71) 
 
Strategic framework: locating the potential for autonomy 
 
The indeterminacy of technology — or at least the recognition that political will 
does not always translate into the satisfaction of that desire in terms of the 
social effects of a technology enacted (Noble, 1979: 38) — leaves open the 
possibility of workers’ ability to contest managerial techniques as implemented 
through specific technologies.  Winner (1980: 127) observes two stages of 
choice in the introduction of new technologies: first, the decision of whether or 
not to introduce a technology; second, the set of design choices made in the 
implementation, invoking consideration of the logical and temporal 
consequences of those choices.  Antonio Negri outlines two modes of working-
class contestation (Dyer-Witheford, 1999: 70-1) which broadly map onto 
Winner’s stages: sheer refusal, as in sabotage or non-compliance; and 
‘invention power’, or what Dyer-Witheford frames above as the creative ability 
to explore the possibilities for the subversion of a technology’s design. 
 
This is not to deny the situation Winner (1980: 125-6) warns of, whereby “the 
technological deck has been stacked long in advance to favor certain interests”, 
but rather to indicate the strategic opportunism of the autonomist project.  Such 
a framework aims at an assessment of the potential for the activation of 
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working-class power which sees “technology as a particular division of working-
class power produced through struggle” (Cleaver, 1979: 63), an in-depth 
discussion of which will take place in Chapter 5.  For Cleaver (ibid.: 25), a 
strategic orientation draws a distinction between what he calls “an exercise in 
necromancy in which one or another long-dead spirit is summoned from the 
grave to direct the battles of the present” and a strategic approach, which he 
describes as “something like an exercise in archeology designed to uncover 
the nature of the political weapons developed in the history of class conflict with 
an eye to their possible usefulness today.”  It should be said here that there 
remain differences of perspective on the application of the idea of ‘invention 
power’ in relation to working-class strategy against the capitalist use of 
technology.  The advent of digital communication technologies in particular led 
many autonomists to explore the idea of ‘reappropriating’ technologies21 (Dyer-
Witheford, 1999: 71) through a reinterpretation of their technical capacities, but 
others questioned the extent of their flexibility and therefore the extent to which 
such a focus really offers a viable strategy (Wright, 2002: 43).  The idea is still 
keenly explored within the contemporary left accelerationist tradition, which 
shares some commonality with autonomist discourse (see Gent, 2014), but this 
thesis proposes an alternative assessment of the potential for workers to wield 
autonomy (see Chapter 5). 
 
Beyond a sustained intellectual focus on sociotechnical class relations, we can 
begin to see autonomist research has a firmly normative edge in that it is 
interested in the political advancement of a particular set of social actors, which 
is in many ways the overarching aim of the research.22  In this sense, 
autonomist research sees itself as playing a role in workers’ struggles, as 
contributing to the creation of space which a strategic orientation relies upon; 
                         
21 The reappropriation of technology in this instance should not be confused with the ‘reuse’ 
of a technology within a different socio-economic setting, as with the USSR’s adoption of 
Taylorism. 
22 To change rather than interpret, as Marx’s famous epitaph puts it. 
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the making-possible of knowledge by providing a place from which to think 
strategically (de Certeau, 1984: 36).  Indeed, this was the aim of the premier 
autonomist journal Quaderni Rossi, which was established to create a political 
space with a view to helping workers in struggle acquire new intellectual 
weapons where the official trade unions and mass workers parties were 
becoming inadequate.  In particular, Quaderni Rossi’s prominent focus on the 
reorganization of workplaces came about in part because Italian factories were 
being so thoroughly restructured by bosses and the parties were unable to 
develop an instructive account for how workers should relate to the introduction 
of new technologies or the changing character and shape of the workforce.  As 
we will see, this sense of ‘interestedness’ imbues both the core conceptual and 
methodological innovations of the autonomist tradition. 
 
Ontological framework: class composition 
 
The implementation of machine technology at the McCormick factory had two 
effects: it deskilled a previously skilled workforce, and it destroyed the 
moulders’ union.  In autonomist terms there was a shift (recomposition) in the 
technical composition, which created a crisis for the incumbent political 
composition.  Similar courses of action were instituted in factories across 
Chicago in the wake of the Haymarket riot,23 whereby new technical 
arrangements of industrial working processes challenged the modes of political 
articulation through which the working class could express itself.  Craft unions, 
generally comprised by skilled workers and organized by specific trade, were 
no longer appropriate to a new technical composition characterized by 
deskilling.  This does not mean the political articulations of the working class 
were stopped dead; in the following years, Chicago became the engine room 
                         
23 The Haymarket riot (1st May 1886) was a pivotal moment in the struggle for the eight-hour 
day. It led to five innocent anarchist labour organizers being sentenced to death, and is 
commemorated by International Workers’ Day (Libcom, 2006). 
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of a political recomposition: the development of ‘industrial unionism’24 — an 
expression of the need for the working class to organize across skill levels and 
types, i.e. to respond to the technical recomposition of the class with a political 
recomposition.25 
 
‘Class composition’ is a fundamental concept in autonomism.  As a body of 
thought that shares a sense of the ‘open-endedness’ of social relations and 
class struggle in particular, the value of ‘class composition’ for autonomism lies 
in its ability to take into account the changing constitution, behaviours, 
experiences, courses of action and material conditions of the working class 
over time.  In particular, it allows for — indeed, strives for — a description of 
the working class which takes into account both subtle and major changes in 
the forms and organization of work, as well as political expressions of what 
some Marxists understand as the ‘class for itself’ (see Andrew, 1983).  As 
indicated by the prior example, generally a ‘class composition analysis’ will aim 
to understand two vectors — technical composition and political composition 
— and the relationship between them.  Here the technical composition refers 
broadly to the organization of the working class on capital’s terrain, especially 
the workplace as a site of accumulation, while the political composition refers 
to the contours of class antagonism, often understood as shaped or determined 
by the technical composition (Battaggia, 1981).26 
                         
24 The most well-known industrial union from this time is the Industrial Workers of the World 
(IWW), but the principles underlying the model can be found in the amalgamation of many 
trade unions into general unions in the UK in the 1970s, and more recently in the ‘Unite 
Community’ initiative which aims to organize the precarious and unemployed. 
25 The example above is historically-specific, and it should not be inferred that a self-activated 
political recomposition will automatically follow any shift in the technical composition of the 
working class, but the point is that when the composition of the class changes, it does not 
mean the potential for the class to act has been taken away, even if the specific means to act 
are no longer present, adequate or appropriate. 
26 I take issue with overdetermined formulations of this relationship, as I will discuss later in 
this chapter. 
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The key intellectual originator of class composition analysis is the Johnson-
Forest Tendency.  A US-based heterodox Trotskyist grouping taking its name 
from the pseudonyms of its key members, C.L.R. James (Johnson) and Raya 
Dunayevskaya (Forest), the Johnson-Forest Tendency was a political 
forerunner to projects like Quaderni Rossi, one of the key journals of 
operaismo.  The group’s primary concern was the proliferation of Taylorist and 
Fordist organizational arrangements in the post-war period, which James 
argued “heralded a new phase in the class struggle” (Cleaver, 1979: 46).  In 
particular, James was concerned with the totalitarian tendencies of Taylorism, 
yet in contrast to the Frankfurt School, he “also saw workers’ power and he 
was well aware of the fundamental importance of this recognition” (ibid.).  The 
focus on Taylorism had a particular resonance for operaisti in Italy, as demands 
for increased wages had resulted in the widespread introduction of productivity 
targets and the subsequent individualization of wages — a settlement actually 
concocted with the input of the official trade unions (Cleaver, 1979: 55).27  This 
was a visible attempt by Italian capitalists (and the trade unions) to ‘answer’ 
working-class demands in such a way as to undermine them (see Virno, 2004: 
110-1).28  In particular, Romano Alquati’s contributions to Quaderni Rossi 
included the observation of the relationship between the introduction of new 
technologies into the workplace and the changing class composition of the 
workforce (Wright, 2002: 46-7).29 
                         
27 This process and its political tensions are the subject of Elio Petri’s 1965 film ‘La classe 
operaia va in paradiso’ (’The working class goes to heaven’). 
28 Virno explores the idea that the epochal shift he marks out (not unproblematically) as the 
transition to ‘post-Fordism’ is capital’s answer to the ‘defeated revolution’ of the 1970s, 
whereby capital delivered – in a deformed way – many of the demands typical of 
communism. 
29 Similarly, Lotta Femminista observed the effect of changes to the formal work process 
upon sections of the working class outside of ‘the factory’, particularly working-class women 
(Cleaver, 1979: 59). Dyer-Witheford (1999: 58) makes the useful point that workplace-
oriented focuses of technology in general tend to ignore the effect of technological 
development on the wider class. These notions are most recently being reintroduced into 
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Set against the ‘monolithic’ conceptualization of class upheld to ever-limited 
effect by orthodox Marxists, the idea of ‘class composition’ has been developed 
to provide an appropriate account of the way classes (and class politics) mutate 
and develop internal complexities through history.  As a conceptual tool, class 
composition allows us to recognize the differences and continuities between 
the working-class ‘figure(s)’ — figura operaia (Battaggia, 1981) — of the 1800s, 
the 1900s and the 2000s, throughout the various technological revolutions in 
that space of time.  In the 1800s, Marx (1976: 545, emphasis added) observed 
the way the machine deskilled and reorganized the workforce, with implications 
for the gendering of the division of labour: 
 
Along with the tool, the skill of the worker in handling it passes over to 
the machine… This destroys the technical foundation on which the 
division of labour in manufacture was based. Hence, in place of the 
hierarchy of specialized workers that characterizes manufacture, there 
appears, in the automatic factory, a tendency to equalize and reduce to 
an identical level every work that has to be done by the minders of the 
machines; in place of the artificially produced distinctions between the 
specialized workers, it is natural differences of age and sex that 
predominate. 
 
Since the declaration in the 1970s of the ‘social worker’ (operaio sociale), 
autonomists have continued attempts to understand changes in class 
composition in the (debated) ‘post-Fordist’ era, particularly since the 
‘computerization’ of work.  Berardi (2009: 74-5) notes that digital technology is 
still “opening new perspectives” on what it is to work, creating an arguably more 
tech-savvy, ‘intellectual’ workforce (Dyer-Witheford, 1999: 71).  By adopting the 
                         
class composition analyses by the UK project Notes From Below, which is attempting to add 
a third vector of ‘social composition’ to contemporary perspectives (Notes From Below, 
2018). 
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framework of class composition, we are able to take the accounts of two 
thinkers, who provide political accounts of the relationship between 
technological innovation and workforce organization over a century apart, in 
such a way that we can consider their accounts of the changing form of the 
working class as both related and divergent.  Instead of resorting to dogmatic 
orthodoxy about ‘authentic’ working-class experience, we can say that Marx 
and Berardi are both discussing a common referent across time, while also 
accounting for the historical internal mutations of that referent. 
 
However, there remain competing ideas within autonomism about how to use 
the framework of class composition and what it means to do class composition 
analysis.  These issues and their methodological implications are best explored 
in relation to a clearer set of research objectives, and as such I will discuss 
them at greater length later.  First, I turn to autonomism’s contribution of the 
workers inquiry: a politically-interested methodology which aims to both gather 
primary findings and forge those findings into new ‘weapons’ for working-class 
struggle.  Inspired by the Johnson-Forest Tendency’s publication of Paul 
Romano and Ria Stone’s ‘The American Worker’, which detailed and reflected 
on the state of the technical class composition in US auto factories, workers 
inquiries conducted by Romano Alquati at the Fiat and Olivetti factories were 
fundamental to the conceptual development and refinement of operaismo, and 
the para-factory workers inquiries conducted by Lotta Femminista were crucial 
to the development of the concept of the ‘social factory’ which became so 
fundamental to autonomism in the 1970s. 
 
Methodological history: the workers inquiry 
 
In his essay ‘The Capitalist Use of Machinery’, Panzieri (1980) details his 
exasperation at the ‘objectivist’ position being taken by left-wing trade unions 
in relation to the proliferation of Taylorist organizational methods, which have 
“a direct impact on how the working-class struggle is conceived; on the way in 
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which the actual protagonists of this struggle see it” (ibid.: 7).30  Although he 
notes the attention being paid to the technological changes by the unions, he 
despairs at the way such changes are being framed as “the ‘new realities’ of 
contemporary capitalism” (ibid.: 5).  In essence, he is arguing for a what 
Cleaver will later term a ‘political reading’ of the technological development of 
Italian workplaces.  Against the fatalism of the trade unions, whose 
“‘objectivism’ accepts capitalist ‘rationality’ at enterprise level and downplays 
the struggle within structures and development points” (ibid.: 10), Panzieri 
points to Alquati’s workers inquiry at Fiat, published in Quaderni Rossi, and 
argues for the need to excavate the role of “working-class autonomy in forcing 
the transformation of capitalist technology and planning” (Cleaver, 1979: 63). 
 
Panzieri’s frustration with the inadequacies of the ‘official’ political vehicles of 
the working class — both in accounting for the politics of technological 
development and the agency of the working class where new technologies are 
concerned — is fairly representative of the historical motivations of workers 
inquiries, and indeed the project of autonomism in general, from Alquati’s 
second inquiry at Olivetti, published in Classe Operaia, to the more recent 
‘Hotlines’ inquiry into call centres in Germany.  In Italy in particular, and 
pertinent to the interests of Chapter 2, the development of workers inquiries 
was “an attempt to understand the use of Taylorism and the new forms of 
supervision and control in the factories” (Woodcock, 2014: 503).  As I will now 
discuss, the methodological character of the workers inquiry has been a matter 
of ongoing contestation since Alquati’s Sulla Fiat was first published, 
particularly in terms of its relationship to sociology.  That said, while there is no 
‘one way’ to pursue a workers inquiry — reflecting the internal pluralism of 
                         
30 These internal conflicts were to come to a head in Italy’s ‘hot autumn’ of 1969, which 
“brought out the growing separation between the struggles [of industrial and immigrant 
workers, students and women] and the Communist party/trade union hierarchies” (Cleaver, 
1979: 18). As we know, similar divisions were apparent in the sewing machinists’ struggle at 
Ford in Dagenham, UK, and the struggles in Paris in May 1968. 
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autonomism — throughout its operational history as a methodological 
approach it has been defined by “its emphasis upon building a composite 
picture of the technical and political dynamics of the workplace” (Wright, 2002: 
25, emphasis added)31 with an acknowledgement that capital and the working 
class are specific but relational, and therefore must be studied together 
(Mancini 1977: 107 in Fasulo, 2014: 318). 
 
Class composition analysis 
 
Uncovering the political 
 
Marx argues the technological development and reorganization of work is a 
political process whereby capital asserts its power over the workforce by 
means of control. He notes: 
 
Owing to its conversion into an automaton, the instrument of labour 
confronts the labourer during the labour process in the shape of capital, 
dead labour, which dominates and soaks up living labour-power. The 
separation of the intellectual faculties of the production process from the 
manual labour, and the transformation of those faculties into powers 
exercised by capital over labour, is, as we have already shown finally 
completed by large-scale industry erected on the foundation of 
machinery. The special skill of each individual machine-operator, who 
has now been deprived of all significance, vanishes as an infinitesimal 
quantity in the face of the science, the gigantic natural forces, and the 
mass of social labour embodied in the system of machinery, which, 
                         
31 As Wright (2002: 25) notes, this ‘composite’ approach was probably first thought through in 
Marx’s ‘Enquête ouvrière’ idea, which would probably have constituted the earliest attempt at 
a workers inquiry had it gone ahead. 
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together with those three forces, constitutes the power of the ‘master’. 
(Marx, 1976: 548-9) 
 
This political power is naturalized as being inherent within capital, as 
recognized by Panzieri (1980: 3): “the worker is brought face to face with the 
intellectual potentialities of the material processes of production as the 
production as the property of another and as a power which rules over him 
[sic].”32 
 
Crucially, the obfuscation of these processes of control is as much a factor of 
capitalist strategy as the development of new technical arrangements. The 
purpose of the workers inquiry is therefore to uncover the conflictual political 
interests that have been concealed, circumvented or naturalized by capital 
through what Marx (1976: 549) has called the “technical subordination of the 
worker”.  Importantly within both autonomist theory and the praxis of the 
workers inquiry, this kind of knowledge of the working class cannot just be 
derived negatively from the activity of capital; it has to be generated through 
specific engagement with workers (Fasulo, 2014: 232).  In a workers inquiry, 
“workers are not considered simply as passive subjects to be researched; 
instead they are positioned as the only people who can describe their own 
conditions, and more importantly as the only ones who can transform them” 
(Woodcock, 2014: 496). 
 
A workers inquiry therefore requires empirical engagement, and although there 
is no one way of carrying out a workers inquiry, Alquati’s inquiries demonstrate 
two differing approaches.33  In his inquiry at Fiat, Alquati focused on interviews 
with workers (Cleaver, 1979: 54) in order to understand the political nature of 
                         
32 This is despite the productive knowledge embodied by the machine having first been 
expropriated from the working class, as I will discuss at length in Chapter 2. 
33 In addition to Rieser (2001) these approaches are discussed in depth by Wellbrook (2014) 
and Notes From Below (2018). 
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their daily problems34 (Wright, 2002: 50) and develop an account which could 
cut through the rational account of workplace reorganization being upheld by 
bosses.  By contrast, the inquiry at Olivetti was focused on ‘co-research’ 
(conricerca) — a participative method concerned with drawing out the political 
character of workers’ experiences through alternative knowledge production 
(Fasulo, 2014: 323).  As Vittorio Rieser notes, although co-research is one of 
the key methodological approaches in autonomism, it “requires being in a 
condition where you are pursuing enquiry with workers that you are organizing 
or workers that are already organized and therefore in either case [it is] strictly 
related to political work” (Rieser, 2001).  In the absence of an already-existing 
common project between researcher and worker, it is more common to rely on 
a combination of more traditional research methods (ibid.), such as in Alquati’s 
study of Fiat. 
 
On this basis alone, it would be fair to ask whether the kind of research 
generated by sub-disciplines such as labour process theory or the sociology of 
work also constitute workers inquiries.  But workers inquiries are not solely 
marked out by their object of research; were that the case we might also include 
a range of investigations from those of government agencies to those of 
muckraker journalists, of indeed the sort of social inquiry advocated by Elton 
Mayo, whereby workers’ experiences are developed in management strategy 
to be turned back against workers through intervention in the ‘human relations’ 
of the workplace (see Mayo, 1975).  Rather, the attribute which marks the 
workers inquiry out is a primary concern with trying to draw out the shape of 
power relations within an organization through mapping out points of conflict 
and antagonism (in each direction), not only to understand them (as in much 
                         
34 Wright (2002: 50) acknowledges the methodological risk that collections of subjective 
perceptions will just reflect capitalist social relations. The point is discussed in Form’s (1976) 
Blue-Collar Stratification. 
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labour process theory), but for the eventual purpose of empowering workers in 




Woodcock (2014: 505) notes: “Marxism contains within it a political suspicion 
of certain forms of sociology, whereas sociology contains a suspicion of politics 
— especially in terms of a political conception of the working class.”  While the 
larger question of sociology’s suspicion of the political conception of the 
working class can be bracketed, the Marxist political suspicion of sociology is 
of interest.  This suspicion ran through the operaisti, with key figures on each 
side of the debate over whether sociological methods had anything to offer the 
political project of generating new ‘weapons’ for working-class struggle.  In 
some ways the terms of the debate reflected the historical debate over 
technology within Marxism more broadly: the foundation of the suspicion 
among operaisti was the fact that sociology, particularly industrial sociology, 
received so much investment from firms such as Olivetti, which was leading 
the way in Taylorist innovation in northern Italy (Wright, 2002: 54-6).35  I should 
make it clear that the suspicion did not arise so much from the ‘contamination’ 
of sociological methods, but that the operaisti were cautious of reproducing 
what they saw as knowledge theft being exercised by the bourgeois sociology 
of the time, which “aimed at integrating the working class into the planning of 
capital” (Fasulo, 2014: 319). 
 
Whereas Danilo Montaldi favoured engagement with sociological techniques, 
having been impressed by Romano and Stone’s ‘The American Worker’, 
Alquati was perhaps the biggest opponent of that approach (Wright, 2002: 24).  
                         
35 Indeed, it was precisely the resulting quiescence of the workforce at Olivetti (highly unusual 
for such a prominent factory at the time) that made Alquati so adamant about conducting an 
inquiry there. 
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Despite his professional training in the field, he “had come to see the use of 
sociology as at best a stopgap” (ibid.) on the way to the self-research 
demanded by the autonomous organization of the working class which Tronti 
(1971: 37 in ibid.: 29) labelled “the real process of demystification, because it 
is the material basis of revolution.”  This goes some way to explaining Alquati’s 
own dramatic shift in method from an interview-based study at Fiat to the co-
research model used in the Olivetti inquiry.36  Notwithstanding, workers 
inquiries have tended to adopt many sociological methods, particularly in 
combination with a political ‘interestedness’ that is sometimes posed as an 
ideological counterbalance to a perceived sociological discourse averse to the 
political situation of living labour (Panzieri 1976: 91 in Fasulo, 2014: 320).  
Indeed, subsequent developments in the sociology of work — most notably 
labour process theory — included a strong engagement with the precisely the 
issues indicated in the early debates within operaismo (in particular see 
Burawoy, 1979: 3-13). 
 
Using inquiry to develop strategy 
 
Following Cleaver, developing a strategic understanding of technology, 
organization and the state of workplace politics means directing research and 
analysing findings with a view to assessing the potential of the working class to 
exercise power.  In other words, a workers inquiry approach aims to understand 
the class composition in a given context with a view to better understanding the 
shape and character of political struggle.  The benefit afforded by this approach 
is that it allows us to see how the land lies through direct engagement with 
workers involved in an actually-existing workplace rather than deriving theories 
of action from presumptions about the shape of power relations or the flexibility 
of technologies.  Indeed, Panzieri has been criticized (as has Braverman) for 
                         
36 In which, incidentally, workers at Olivetti discuss their disdain for sociologists for 
“experimenting on us” (Alquati, 1975). 
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relying too heavily on the Taylorist ‘ideal’ without enough consideration of the 
messier (existing) reality resulting from the struggle to impose techniques 
(Cacciari, 1975: 190-1 in Wright, 2002: 43).  Although Panzieri drew heavily 
from Alquati’s empirical study of Fiat in his theorization of technological 
developments, Alquati actually had little to say on the specific topic of 
technology in that inquiry (ibid.: 52).  Cacciari’s criticisms are valid, especially 
given Panzieri’s stated aims, but particularly because they build the case for 
the need to conduct empirical inquiries. Indeed, although initially formed 
without the benefit of empirical engagement, Panzieri’s ideas about 
technological arrangements and class recomposition were later vindicated by 
Alquati’s findings in his Olivetti inquiry — a rich study which Wright argues 
shows the potential of the workers inquiry as a methodological approach (ibid.: 
54-8). 
 
At its most insightful, the workers inquiry “sheds light on the never completely 
realised real subsumption of labour to capital” (Ferrero et al, 2006: 42 in Fasulo, 
2014: 327); that is, the reach and limitations of capitalist planning and attempts 
at the “wholesale reorganization of work” (Dyer-Witheford, 1999: 39), and the 
degree and character of working-class contestation against that imposition.  
Inspired by the workers inquiry approach, in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 I use my own 
‘interested’ methodology to analyse the technical and political class 
composition of a set of contemporary workplaces.  First, I outline some of the 
parameters of my engagement by means of an overview of how autonomist 








Class composition today: immaterial inquiry? 
 
Labour in cognitive capitalism 
 
The workplaces I analyse in this dissertation are notable for the degree to which 
they depend on computationally-mediated management practices, but 
computation is by no means a new phenomenon to workplaces and the issues 
arising from computation, and especially digital media, have been a 
preoccupation of autonomist analyses in recent decades.  Autonomist 
engagement with the idea of ‘cognitive capitalism’ (related to and sometimes 
conflated with the notion of ‘semiocapitalism’) has been accompanied by an 
acceptance of the argument that the present mode of capitalist production can 
be considered ‘post-Fordist’ (Vercellone, 2005), with the implication that 
different analytical tools are required to understand the present than those 
which were sufficient in an earlier ‘Fordist’ era.  The framework of cognitive 
capitalism groups together a range of phenomena from labour flexibilization, 
precariousness, and the rise of the service sector and creative industries, and 
understands them through the lens of new communications technologies — 
particularly mobile phones and the internet (Moulier Boutang, 2011; Standing, 
2011; Lazzarato, 2014).37  It is the object of inquiry of what is often referred to 
as ‘post-operaismo’ or post-autonomism.38 
 
Understood through a more theoretical approach to class composition analysis, 
particularly upheld by Negri, Lazzarato, Virno and Vercellone (see Pasquinelli: 
                         
37 I am not dismissive of many of the phenomena grouped under the banner of cognitive 
capitalism, such as the centrality of knowledge to capitalist production, but I do find myself in 
agreement with Tomaney (1994) in objecting to the historical periodization and idea of 
‘industrial divides’ associated with ‘post-Fordist’ discourses. 
38 I use these terms interchangeably to refer to the dominant strands of contemporary 
autonomist thought, particularly as upheld by Negri, Lazzarato, Virno and Terranova. 
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2015a: 58-61), two concepts become central to the post-operaista diagnosis.  
Immaterial labour is understood as the essential character of work arising from 
the technical class composition of post-Fordism.  Perhaps most notably 
developed by Maurizio Lazzarato (1996), ‘immaterial labour’ refers to two 
aspects of labour: labour which produces the “‘informational content’ of the 
commodity” “where the skills involved in direct labor are increasingly skills 
involving cybernetics and computer control”, and “activity that produces the 
‘cultural content’ of the commodity”, i.e. pertaining to “cultural and artistic 
standards, fashions, tastes, consumer norms…public opinion” (ibid.: 133).  
While there are strands in Lazzarato’s thesis I will return to later in the 
dissertation, particularly regarding the codification of informational 
communication (ibid.: 135), he combines the rise of immaterial labour with a 
trajectory of work which is becoming more intellectual, self-directed, 
independent and entrepreneurial (ibid.: 134, 138-9), “defined as the capacity to 
activate and manage productive cooperation” (ibid.: 135).  Far-reaching in its 
purview, it is possible to ascribe the qualities of immaterial labour to an 
extraordinarily wide range of labour roles (Nunes, 2007: 186).  Nonetheless, 
more recent uses have tended to focus on the forms of labour involved in the 
production and reproduction of and on digital networks, especially the internet 
(see Terranova, 2004). 
 
The immaterial labour thesis extends from the figure of the socialized worker 
(Dyer-Witheford 2005: 151 in Nunes, 2007: 193).  In contrast to the industrial 
worker, the socialized worker is “the new social subject” (Negri, 1971: 137) 
produced when “work has become diffused throughout the entire society” 
(Negri, 1989: 77).  Predicated on the “very high degree of cooperation” that 
characterizes post-Fordist work (ibid.: 79), Negri says that contrary to 
Taylorism, the “socialized worker is now recombining conception and execution 
within a universal horizon” (ibid: 78).  I discuss the relationship between the 
separation of conception and execution in Taylorism at length in the next 
chapter, but for the moment it will suffice to indicate that I instead find myself 
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in agreement with Tomaney (1994: 157) that we are in fact witnessing an 
“intensification of existing tendencies”. 
 
The socialized worker — “said to be the fruit of the colossal project of 
restructuring undertaken by capital to resume the process of accumulation” 
(Battaggia, 1981) — is defined by its spatial decomposition and lack of internal 
homogeneity compared with the figure of the mass worker, understood as “a 
section of the labour force made materially homogenous by a particular 
relationship to capitalist technology (the assembly line) and a consequent 
political behaviour: the demand for wages as income, the refusal of work and 
sabotage” (ibid.).  Initially thought to contain “a plurality of class segments often 
very distant from each other: decentralised factory workers, young unemployed 
proletarians, inhabitants of marginalised neighbourhoods, housewives, 
women, homeless students, underemployed intellectuals…”, the theory of the 
socialized worker “is unable, precisely because of its tendentially totalising 
character, to bind together the contradictory and centrifugal class situations we 
see today” (ibid.).  For Battaggia, this tension ought to have warranted a new 
wave of scientific (empirical) class composition research rather than 
extrapolating a “univocal theorisation of class conflict” (ibid.).  However, in the 
age of the increased digitization of work, the theory of immaterial labour 
arguably provides a coagulant for understanding this new class subject. 
 
As Nunes notes, Hardt and Negri (2001: 293) group under the common name 
of ‘immaterial labour’ three forms of labour: informatized, cognitive-symbolic, 
and affective. 
 
We are thus speaking of a category that encompasses the different 
realities of the software programmer and the production engineer, the 
call centre worker and the nurse, the loan manager and the waitress, 
the shop assistant and the ‘IT guy’, the teacher and the filmmaker, even 
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(pushing the boundaries between production and reproduction) the 
student and the parent. (Nunes, 2007: 186) 
 
However, the use of the concept of immaterial labour in practice, particularly in 
terms of its supposedly emancipatory potential, appears to draw generalized 
conclusions from “very specific and clearly delimited cases such as that of 
software production” (ibid.: 190).  Although post-autonomists have made efforts 
to emphasize the immaterial labourer need not be highly skilled in the 
conventional sense (Lazzarato, 1996: 136) or employed in the knowledge 
industry (or even employed at all) (Terranova, 2004: 88), use of the concept 
seems to keep returning to the archetypal labouring figure of a modern, mobile, 
creative worker.  As Nunes (2007: 190) notes, this account “seems to fail to 
grasp the productive realities of most workers apart from a few, unevenly 
distributed across the globe and circuits of production”.  Even Bologna, who is 
hardly a ‘Negrian’ (Bologna, 2005b), falls into this trap, imagining the 
‘knowledge worker’ — “the person in front of the personal computer” — as one 
“of many self-employed laborers who provide their services, even if they have 
only one client, working at home or in ‘coworking’ spaces or in Starbucks” 
(Bologna, 2014). 
 
While this particular imagined type of worker may possess “an increased 
capacity to determine the form and content of their productive activity” (Nunes, 
2007: 186), this capacity cannot be said to be shared by the workers who 
actually staff any given Starbucks — “the fact that production is more and more 
organised in networks does not make Starbucks workers any more capable of 
communicating with each other across different shops” (ibid.: 187).  And yet it 
is a fact Starbucks workers interact with ICTs regularly and many coffee chains 
are now introducing elements of performance tracking to their shops.  Nunes 
(ibid.) argues that if “Starbucks baristi are involved in the production and 
reproduction of social networks, it is not because this is the way in which their 
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work is organised” but because social networks are a bigger part of social life 
than ever before in general.  In other words: 
 
In less autonomous, less computer-dependent work, speaking of an 
increasing becoming-network is a conflation of two different factors: the 
present state of technological development; and how much this 
intensifies and reconfigures the being-network that has always been part 
of social life. In this case, it seems one could only speak of a hegemony 
if one were ascribing these two factors to the reshaping of power of 
(some forms) of immaterial labour over the rest of social life — which 
seems like a rather exaggerated claim to make. (ibid.) 
 
I would argue this is also the case in less autonomous, more computer-
dependent work, but the point remains that if Starbucks workers are now more 
able to find each other via social networks, this is not a result of the degree to 
which their work is networked, and is generally independent of the degree to 
which their work is networked by information systems at the level of company 
logistics. 
 
Political organization in the digital age 
 
It is not my intention to engage with the socialized worker/immaterial labour 
theses much further in this dissertation; I largely concur with the arguments and 
diagnoses of Nunes (2007) who has already interrogated these ideas on their 
own terms at great length and with great care.  In referencing them here my 
point is not to invalidate the arguments, but to raise a more political and 
strategic question of their applicability (ibid.: 184), particularly taking into 
account Bologna’s (2014) testimony that “workerism has never been indulgent 
to simplifications” and ‘workerist’ research has “the duty of improving these 
tools of knowledge to the maximum extent, of reaching the highest levels of 
scientific production, and of putting their knowledge at the disposal of all, and 
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in particular the workers” as “cells of a service infrastructure” on a “collective 
journey of liberation”.  In that sense it is important to understand the 
organizational systems which provide the “real leaven” to workplace struggles 
(Bologna, 2005b).  As Nunes (2007: 200) states: “The problem with these 
abstract points of recomposition is that conceptual development and logical 
rigour can at best give indications as to where to move. They do not solve, or 
even pose, problems of organisation.”  The aim of this dissertation, in short, is 
to explicate those organizational forms and problems. 
 
Of course, digital technologies are not unconnected from questions of political 
organization, and a cursory examination of social movements over the last 
twenty years suggests new communication technologies in particular are, if not 
a determinant, then at least a prominent feature of contemporary political 
action.  Indeed, it could be argued Negri’s later focus on social movements (in 
his writings with Michael Hardt) demonstrates an outgrowth of his turn towards 
the socialized worker, and that the mediatized modes of political action which 
have characterized the former have been filtered, as if by reverse osmosis, 
back into Negri’s understanding of the latter.  To Negri, networked technologies 
mean labour has “gained a powerful transversality” (Negri, 2017a), and the 
emergence or unearthing of immaterial labour “made it possible to take Marx’s 
‘general intellect’ as the object of inquiry [inchiesta]” (ibid.), the general 
intellect’s “reappropriation by the collective worker” being the orientation of 
struggle today, given it has become the raw material of capital’s value creation 
(Negri, 2017b).39   
                         
39 Negri’s use of Marx’s concept of the ‘general intellect’ is typical here.  First appearing in the 
‘Fragment on Machines’ in Marx’s Grundrisse (1973: 690-712) — a text with near-prophetic 
value to a subset of contemporary autonomists — the general intellect is understood as the 
culmination of inherited social knowledge (Marx, 1973: 706).  A problematic concept variously 
interchanged with “‘culture’, ‘socialisation’ or ‘society’” (Hanlon, 2016: x) and “science” (Wark, 
2014), its use within later autonomism broadly correlates with the experience of the period of 
technological development characterized by the proliferation of personal telecommunications 
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While Virno (2004: 100) cautions the “realization of the tendency described by 
Marx” has failed to deliver “any emancipating consequences”, Hardt and 
Negri’s (2001) Empire is more optimistic about the direction of digital travel, 
proclaiming an era in which the multitude — taking the place of the working 
class — “immersed in immaterial labour” might engage in “digital subversion 
and supersession” through a newly networked global society (Dyer-Witheford, 
2015: 10).  As Dyer-Witheford (ibid.: 11) notes, initial optimism about the 
internet age has now largely subsided, particularly since the 2008 global 
financial crisis.40  While the idea that network society has displaced industrial 
society may fit more easily with Negri’s socialized worker hypothesis, the issue 
remains that computer-dependent work does not necessarily entail more 
mobile or self-determined work, and, as we will see, the idea of ‘computerized’ 
work is just as easily applied to those who work in warehouses and delivery 
vans. 
 
Moreover, the idea that the widely observed mediatization of popular protest 
(ibid.: 4-6, 10) indicates any turn towards ‘connective action’ (Bennett and 
Segerberg, 2013) within workplaces is misplaced.41  As this dissertation will 
show, the ubiquitous fluidity of social media is seldom reflected in distribution 
workplaces, which, while they may occupy a place within a logistical network, 
are typically characterized by local, proprietary media systems only accessible 
within the workplace through controlled means and unable to connect to the 
internet at large. 
                         
technologies and in particular the internet.  Negri (2008: 103) describes it as “an immaterial, 
intellectual, linguistic, and cooperative work force that corresponds to a new phase of 
productive development based on the excess of work, or, in other words, on the creativity of 
living work”, while Virno (2004: 100) goes as far as to say “Post-Fordism is the empirical 
realization of the ‘Fragment on Machines’”. 
40 And even more so with the rise of the alt-right (Nagle, 2017). 
41 As Peters (2015) argues, digitally-mediated ‘connective action’ is no organizational 
panacea for political movements in any case. 
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No politics without inquiry 
 
It is not my intention to deny the possibility of categories such as the socialized 
worker a priori.  As Negri (1982: 209) states: “All concepts that define the 
working class must be framed in terms of this historical transformability of the 
composition of the class.”  Certainly, viewed within its initial historical moment, 
the idea of the socialized worker came about because of the apparent dead 
end of the idea of the mass worker, as well as legitimate pressure to develop a 
conception of the working class which extended to the labour of reproduction: 
 
As we used to put it: ‘from the mass worker to the social worker’. But it 
would be more correct to say: from the working class, i.e. that working 
class massified in direct production in the factory, to social labour-power, 
representing the potentiality of a new working class, now extended 
throughout the entire span of production and reproduction — a 
conception more adequate to the wider and more searching dimensions 
of capitalist control over society and social labour as a whole. (Negri, 
ibid.) 
 
But within Negri’s analysis, particularly when it later melds with the idea of 
immaterial labour, there appears to be an overdetermination between a 
perceived shift in the technical composition in the class (logically or politically 
inferred, rather than empirically observed in any robust sense) and the 
projected political composition of this new class subject.  Although an initial 
‘sense of direction’ may serve as an appropriate impetus for a re-examination 
of class composition, post-operaismo tends to place a prescriptive weight on a 
presumed new class composition whose political capacities and opportunities 
appear lacking upon any closer examination.  In an historical moment following 
the deflation of the initial excitement over the revolutionary potential of the 
internet, in which technologies such as interfaces — as I will argue in later 
chapters — problematize the way we need to think about control and resistance 
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in the workplace, it is inadequate to be stuck in the outmoded language of 
‘computerization’ or merely rely on assumptions about the organizational 
potential of computationally-mediated work (Negri, 2017a, 2017b). 
 
Negri’s initial frustration with the political insights of operaismo stemmed from 
the fact that while successful in individual factories, their methods were not able 
to keep pace and scale with capital’s development, that is, “involving the entire 
sociality of the relations of production and reproduction” (Negri, 1982: 207).  
However, a shift of focus from the class composition as found in particular sites 
of struggle to the composition of the class at large has meant the post-operaista 
methodology largely takes the form of ‘immaterial inquiry’, jettisoning the 
methodological strategy of workers inquiries into actually observable 
workplaces.  Instead, post-operaismo after the immaterial labour thesis 
“derives its farthest conclusion from some very specific labouring figures” 
(Nunes, 2007: 190), presenting “a conic perspective that starts as an adequate 
response to how transformations taking place affect what is ‘close’ to it – but 
then…shows objects with more distortion the farther they are” (ibid.). 
 
This conceptual approach has been contentious within autonomist Marxism 
since its inception.  In the 1970s, Bologna argued that with the theory of the 
operaio sociale Negri had merely abandoned recent factory struggles in order 
to retreat into theory (Bologna, 1976: 27-8 in Wright, 2002: 170-1).  Meanwhile 
Comitati Autonomi Operai (the Roman chapter of Autonomia Operaia) pointed 
to the methodological weakness of Negri’s perspective on the new class 
composition: 
 
precisely the undeniable political importance of these phenomena 
demands extreme analytical rigour, great investigative caution, a 
strongly empirical approach (facts, data, observations and still more 
observations, data, facts) (Rivolta di classe, 1976: 136 in Wright, 2002: 
171). 
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As stated above, my aim in discussing the theses of post-operaismo is not to 
invalidate them so much as to build the political and strategic case for empirical 
engagement.  So far, while autonomist Marxism has enjoyed a resurgence of 
interest in the ‘information age’, autonomist analyses are yet to be fully 
reconnected with the methodological tradition of the workers inquiry which 
characterized the earlier years of operaismo.  While I note recent attempts — 
such as Kolinko (2002), Woodcock’s call centre inquiry (2017c), and the 
nascent ‘Notes from Below’ project in the UK (2018) — this dissertation 
strengthens the case further yet, and argues for a particular orientation towards 
workplace technologies as both a prism through which to understand 
contemporary class struggle and an under-studied component of regimes of 
‘control’ in contemporary workplaces.  As Emery (1995: 2) states: 
 
The new class composition is more or less a mystery to us (and to 
capital, and to itself) because it is still in the process of formation. … 
Before we can make politics, we have to understand that class 
composition. This requires us to study it. Analyse it. We do this through 




This dissertation aims to uncover the politics of technologies of work, both in 
their imposition and in the political forms taken by workers to mitigate them.  To 
that end, this chapter has argued for a class composition analysis which 
remains open to unexpected class configurations while keeping in sight the 
situation of technology in class society — i.e. as a site of struggle.  Moreover, 
I have argued for an autonomist perspective with a strategic orientation which 
seeks to locate the potential for working-class political action.  Having argued 
for the importance of the workers inquiry methodology for this kind of theoretical 
development, the dissertation now builds a case for the conceptual benefits of 
greater empirical engagement through the examination of actual technologies 
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in real workplaces.  Before introducing these workplaces in Chapter 3, I first 
turn to the political nature of management in order to explicate the ideological 
character of different managerial forms, which will inform my own conceptual 
development throughout the rest of the dissertation. 
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Control is important only because people want it. 
 






An inquiry into workplace technologies necessarily invokes questions of 
management.  In this chapter I discuss management ideas and techniques 
whose influence can be seen in a variety of contemporary workplaces, and 
which provide a route into discussing the politics of management technologies.  
Beginning with a discussion of the contemporary managerial techniques known 
as algorithmic management, I argue that the social effects of algorithmic 
management need to be understood through a more political lens than has 
been the case so far, which can be achieved by drawing out the genealogical 
strands which inform this managerial mode.  I examine the ways scientific, 
humanistic and cybernetic approaches to management have conceived of 
communication and control within a workplace context.  In particular, I conduct 
a reading of selected influential management theorists and ideas on the basis 
that their contributions can be understood as interventions into workplace 
politics.  My intention is not to provide a comprehensive history of management 
thought throughout the twentieth century to the present day, but rather to draw 
out key approaches to fundamental political issues such as the actualization of 
labour power and the circumvention of workplace antagonism.  In considering 
their implications for class politics, I provide the dissertation with a conceptual 
framework through which to understand managerial principles and motivations, 
which will assist my reflections on contemporary managerial struggle and 
strategy in later chapters.  Finally, I warn against the temptation for critical 
accounts of algorithmic management to take stated managerial ideals (or 
political will) at their word when assessing the power or control they exert over 
workers and the work process, continuing my wider argument about the need 






Algorithmic management: a problematic term 
 
In this chapter and throughout the dissertation I refer to algorithmic 
management as a way into thinking about issues of workplace politics.  
Following a study of Uber and Lyft drivers by Min Kyung Lee et al (2015), the 
term ‘algorithmic management’ has come to be used within academic, 
journalistic and activist parlance as a catch-all term to denote an organizational 
taxonomy across the so-called ‘gig economy’ (or ‘sharing economy’)42 — where 
algorithms are imagined as the broker between workers and consumers — 
through to modern distribution centres (Rosenblat and Stark, 2016; O’Connor, 
2016; Claburn, 2016; Plan C, 2017a).43  Although Srnicek (2016) has noted the 
formal distinctions between various companies within this field, the fact they 
are consistently grouped together in popular discourse reflects a common set 
of perceptions about the nature of the work (e.g. precarious, digitally-
dependent).44  But it is important to note there is not a clear overlap between 
work in the ‘sharing economy’ and work which is algorithmically-managed.  This 
is implicit in the forms of work which are often referred to in relation to 
algorithmic management, but before discussing the issues raised by the 
contemporary literature on algorithmic management I want to do some 
definitional work to in order to make the term more useful. 
 
Work in the ‘sharing economy’ can take many forms — from something like 
micro-tasking, which would have been impracticable before the internet, to 
more familiar types of work such as ‘ride-sharing’ (in practice, taxi driving) and 
                         
42 Although in other contexts it would be appropriate to draw a distinction, in this dissertation I 
use ‘gig economy’ and ‘sharing economy’ interchangeably. 
43 I note there is a different, older usage of the term ‘algorithmic management’ in scholarly 
debates in medicine and healthcare. 
44 See the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee (2017a) inquiry ‘The future 
world of work and rights of workers’, which ran from 2015 until 2017, when it was prematurely 
concluded by an early UK general election. 
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food deliveries.  In some sense they are both algorithmically mediated, in that 
the purchase of labour power is facilitated by layers of software, but there are 
distinctions between them.  An obvious difference would be that micro-tasking 
with Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is conducted through a website rather 
than an app.  In this sense although the service advertises itself in terms of 
‘crowdsourcing’, it functions more like an online labour market, where 
employers are the vendors and workers shop for tasks.  ‘Algorithms’ remove 
the need for the task-vendor to employ or search for anyone, while offering 
‘taskers’ (workers) a choice of assignments.  An app-based counterpart is 
found in TaskRabbit.  While MTurk focuses on the brokering of ‘human-
intelligence tasks’, TaskRabbit allows people to advertise odd-jobs and errands 
they need doing offline to a pool of workers who make up their wages through 
a range of small assignments.  Again, ‘algorithms’ here facilitate advertising, 
job allocation and payment functions. 
 
However, while both understood as part of the ‘gig economy’, working for 
MTurk and TaskRabbit is qualitatively different from other ‘gig economy’ labour 
service providers.  Uber and Deliveroo, for example, are characterized by the 
intimate involvement of operation-specific software technologies (in these 
cases, apps) as a key feature of activities constituting the task-to-task labour 
of the worker.  As with MTurk and TaskRabbit, payment functions are facilitated 
by the software provider, that much is similar, but Uber and Deliveroo differ in 
that they set the payment rate for workers across the platform.  Workers are 
connected with jobs too, but unlike MTurk and TaskRabbit (where workers can 
pick and choose), Uber drivers and Deliveroo riders face consequences for 
turning down ‘assignments’.  But moreover, algorithms supervise the ‘gig’ and 
determine whether to flag the worker for disciplinary mechanisms to be carried 
out either by the program itself or by a manager.  This is the context in which 
ideas such as “when your boss is an algorithm” arise (O’Connor, 2016), and it 
is in this sense that algorithmic management practices extend to workplaces 
outside of the gig economy. 
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In particular, the distribution warehouses behind e-commerce sites such as 
Amazon or Asos have been subject to media investigations into the use of 
algorithmic management techniques, particularly understood through the 
concepts of targets and surveillance (Panorama, 2013; Channel 4 News, 2016; 
Spary and Silver, 2016).  While these workplaces do not share the spatial 
dislocation or wage systems of Deliveroo and Uber, this dissertation finds 
common threads across workplaces on the basis of workers’ experiences of 
algorithmic management.45  I explore the observable effects of these 
techniques later, but in this chapter I want to discuss management ideas largely 
on their own terms (which is not to say apolitically, by any means).  Although 
in general scholarly discussion of algorithmic management has placed less of 
an emphasis on distribution centres than on the gig economy, I argue that an 
account of the politics of distribution centres requires engagement with their 
management technologies and the histories which inform those technologies.  
In this chapter, I consider the idea of management, approaches from 
management history which may help us understand shopfloor realities today, 
and what the idea of ‘algorithms’ means for management. 
 
Humans at the centre of the algorithm? 
 
Instead of attempting to arrive at a definitive conceptual account, it is more 
politically insightful to view managerial insights as solutions to problems, or 
approaches to scenarios.  It is in this spirit that Lee, Kusbit, Metsky and Dabbish 
(2015: 1603) state their interest in assessing “the impact of algorithmic, data-
driven management on human workers” with a view to encouraging what Lee 
(2016: 44) calls “human-centered algorithmic workplaces”.  Drawing on a 
qualitative study involving interviews with Uber and Lyft drivers, their 
                         
45 Lee et al (2015: 1603) note the similarities in algorithmic work allocation, optimization and 
evaluation across warehouse workers, subway engineers, Starbucks baristas, delivery 
drivers and the ‘crowd-sourced’ workers of Uber, TaskRabbit and Amazon MTurk. 
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passengers, and archival analysis of driver forums and company 
communications, Lee et al identify a number of flaws in the relationship 
between algorithmic management and human workers, and argue for existing 
algorithmic management practices to afford greater consideration to the 
workers using the platform if algorithmically-managed workplaces are to 
“support human workers to work with intelligent machines not only in an 
effective, but also a satisfying and meaningful way” (Lee at al, 2015: 1611).  In 
this section, I will discuss Lee and her co-authors’ findings and diagnosis before 




Lee et al (2015) identify three key human-app interactions in the work process 
of a driver: work assignment (the moment when drivers are offered a job), surge 
pricing (which dictates what drivers can earn in various locations at certain 
times based on the relative scarcity or abundance of drivers at that time), and 
customer ratings (which drivers rely on to keep using the platform).  Of these 
‘moments’ in the work process, they focus on worker assignment and surge 
pricing to draw out the key problem areas they find within the logic of 
algorithmic management as deployed by Uber and Lyft.46  On the allocation of 
assignments — that is, the process by which drivers are assigned to 
passengers — Lee et al find that a problem of cooperation is initiated by the 
lack of transparency drivers encounter in relation to the assignments they are 
offered: “not only the source of the assignment (i.e., human versus algorithm), 
but also how the assignment was presented and regulated, influences worker 
cooperation with the assignment” (ibid.: 1609).  Based on a set of interviews 
with drivers, Lee et al explain that drivers receive an assignment offer with 
                         
46 While Lee et al (2015: 1610) do discuss what a better-designed driver evaluation system 
might involve, and while evaluation can affect employment in a broader sense, evaluation 
does not factor into the ongoing organization of work in the same way as the other two 
aspects of the work process. 
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limited geographical information, no rationale, and a short time frame within 
which to decide to accept or reject an assignment. 
 
Furthermore, Lee et al raise issues with the practice of surge pricing (the act of 
raising ride prices in areas where there are fewer drivers, giving drivers a 
financial incentive to service those areas).  The mechanism used by the two 
companies, they argue, is built on “economic and rational assumptions” which 
are unrepresentative of workers’ motivations and experiences, such as driving 
for social reasons over financial incentive, feeling (like passengers) that surge 
pricing is an unfair practice, or simply that surge pricing algorithms can be 
unpredictable or ill-suited to the pace of driving work and it is perhaps better to 
rely on one’s own knowledge (ibid.: 1608).  In this sense, Lee et al argue a 
shortcoming of the “supply-demand control algorithms” is that they “were 
originally designed to solve mathematical optimization problems that involve 
non-human entities” rather than human behaviour (ibid.: 1610), the result being 
that more than half the drivers Lee et al spoke to did not allow their work to be 
informed by the surge pricing algorithm (ibid.: 1607). 
 
Trust through transparency 
 
These computational ‘moments’ highlight the aspects of algorithmic 
management Lee is most concerned about: workers’ cooperation and trust in 
managerial decisions.  These, she argues, are the prerequisites for effective, 
human-centred algorithmic governance (2016: 44).  She states: “My research 
suggests simply applying algorithms to a situation won’t automatically result in 
decisions that elicit cooperation, inspire trust, or feel motivating and fair” (ibid.).  
Lee’s main suggestion is to raise the importance of “algorithmic transparency”, 
principally “explaining the reasoning behind assignments” (ibid.: 45).  As an 
example of how a lack of transparency can lead to loss of trust and a 
breakdown in cooperation, Lee (ibid.) refers to the way Uber and Lyft drivers 
interact with the job assignment function of the app: 
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The lack of transparency didn’t only influence workers’ attitudes. It also 
influenced their behaviours around algorithmic decisions. When 
assignments were undesirable or seemed to make no sense, drivers 
simply attributed them to errors and rejected them…when the 
assignment actually could have been made for a legitimate reason. 
 
In this scenario, Lee understands the drivers to have mistrusted what the 
algorithm had intended, instead using their own sense, apparently 
misunderstanding that the instruction could have been given for good reason 
based on information outside of the worker’s knowledge.  On this account, the 
app requires drivers to bracket their own judgement in favour of the instructions 
they are provided with because in following their own initiative drivers stop 
cooperating with the app (therefore the algorithm, therefore the company) in 
the intended way, which goes against the aims of the process as it has been 
constructed by the platform.  In lieu of transparency and a rationale for the 
information given to them, drivers are therefore inadvertently liable to act in 
ways the system finds sub-optimal. 
 
For Lee, these scenarios build the case for specific engagement with 
algorithmic management in contemporary workplaces.  A more recent study 
suggests algorithmic management decisions elicit different responses 
compared with human managerial decisions depending on the nature of the 
tasks in question (Lee, 2018: 1).  Furthermore, Lee notes a change in context 
since prior engagement with computationally-supported work: 
 
the recent trend of algorithms assuming managerial roles puts people 
into a different power structure than when they are ‘users’ or 
‘consumers’ of algorithmic systems. For consumer applications, people 
can decide to use algorithmic decisions or not; when those decisions are 
incorporated into managerial and governance processes, however, it is 
much more difficult for people to reject or refute them (ibid.: 2). 
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 Read one way, this new context could read like a dream scenario for 
managers, but drawing on Skarlicki and Folger (1997), Lee cautions that “if 
organizational and managerial decisions are perceived as unfair, the affected 
workers experience resentment and anger and may engage in retaliation and 
acts against the organization” (Lee, 2018: 2).  This is one of two ways Lee hints 
at a political tension between managers and workers, the second being in her 




Lee wants to improve the workplace through improving the design of 
“algorithms to better support human values, motivations, and unique 
capabilities” (Lee, 2016: 42) in order to “enable more productive, fair, and 
enjoyable work” (ibid.: 44).  Moreover, she argues increased transparency over 
decisions “may create workplaces where power structures are more equally 
balanced between workers and managers” (ibid.: 47).  Yet the question of 
algorithmic transparency also reveals a tension between workers and 
managers.  As Lee et al (2015: 1609-10, emphasis added) state: 
 
The stakeholders involved with work platform apps (companies and 
workers) complicate providing transparency. … Algorithmic work 
assignment offers new challenges in design transparency where fully 
disclosing the algorithm may not be a viable solution. Companies may 
be unwilling or unable to share the underlying mechanisms of their 
assignment algorithms, as they might be patented or proprietary assets. 
Companies may also desire a degree of user ignorance to prevent the 
system from being gamed. 
 
Here, Lee et al are demonstrating an awareness that managers and workers 
may hold different interests, which comes to the fore in Lee’s concern about 
workers ‘gaming’ the system.  She states: “full transparency might not work to 
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the company’s benefit, as workers may use their knowledge to game the 
system, maximizing individual benefit at the expense of group optimization” 
(Lee, 2016: 46).  The challenge, as Lee (ibid.) sees it, is: “How do we promote 
transparency to earn workers’ trust but also prevent workers from gaming the 
system?” 
 
Lee’s account is seeking a solution that works in both workers’ and managers’ 
interests, but her concern over ‘gaming’ shows that the technical solution of 
transparency is not enough to resolve what is in fact a political problem of 
control, in that too much transparency may cede to workers too much control 
over their own actions at the expense of managers’ fundamental control over 
the system.  Although she wants to improve the quality of work, gain workers’ 
trust and balance the power structures that exist between workers and 
managers, she is unable to say exactly how much transparency workers should 
or should not have access to, precisely because workers and managers have 
different stakes in the company.  She notes: 
 
With Uber and Lyft, drivers have limited power to refuse incoming 
requests, and there are financial motivations to accept rides — the more 
they accept, the more they generally earn. In other contexts with 
different power structures and incentives, finding the right level of 
transparency would be even more critical (ibid.). 
 
My research aims are different from Lee’s.  But the tension she identifies at the 
centre of the question of transparency raises for me the need for a political 
analysis which is able to transcend the impulse to find a technical solution to 
the problems workers face in algorithmically-managed work.  A political 
analysis encourages us to think about the ways in which humans are already 
centred within algorithmic management — i.e. as workers — such as the way 
‘user ignorance’ can be desired by companies (Lee et al, 2015: 1610), and 
therefore intended or planned.  Seeing the workplace as a site of contestation 
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between conflicting interests gives us a route into these questions.  It allows us 
to see the tension between algorithmic instructions and workers’ compliance 
as more than just a misunderstanding or design flaw; it forces us to ask if 
workers are in fact ignorant of the rationale behind decisions, or whether they 
are acting intentionally.  Lee’s framing of the problem of transparency assumes 
the human-centredness we should be pursuing does not involve humans (i.e. 
workers) centring themselves in their own decisions — “maximizing individual 
benefit” (Lee, 2016: 46) — but instead privileging “group optimization” (ibid.).  I 
note the moral overtones of this framing, but argue there needs to be further 
interrogation of what is implied by group optimization.  Does group optimization 
mean the most optimal set of arrangements for the ‘system’, the drivers 
collectively, or the company?  It may be the case that workers have no 
particular desire for direct control of algorithms (Lee et al, 2015: 1610), but the 
study did note the loss of agency felt by workers who had been taxi drivers 
before joining Uber or Lyft (ibid.; Lee, 2016: 47), so there is room to ask what 
managers gain from obscuring decision processes, or indeed to interrogate the 
role of managerial secrecy in the first place. 
 
Without a political analysis it is possible to be lured into a sort of algorithmic 
tunnel vision, whereby a desire to see the algorithmically-managed workplace 
improved leads to a presumption that appropriate algorithmic adjustments will 
lead to a friction-free workplace.  Lee hopes increasing algorithmic 
transparency will overcome workers’ problems of trust and cooperation.  In 
exploring the thought of infusing the work process with more transparent 
mechanisms she makes visible the problem of finding a degree of transparency 
which would be permissible to managers before igniting fears about workers 
taking too much control.  What is missing is a question about whether the 
current degree of opacity (i.e. the withholding of information) is in fact a 
considered approach on the part of the company.  Moreover, current acts of 
worker noncompliance are assumed to be due to a breakdown of algorithm-
worker communication.  If it is in fact the case worker noncompliance is a result 
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of something like refusal, then the problems Lee identifies may not be solved 
by greater transparency anyway — we can imagine a scenario in which Uber 
or Lyft made their processes more transparent and yet workers decided to 
make the same decisions as they do now, unswayed by overtures to ‘group 
optimization’.  In such a case, we can imagine the ‘need’ that would arise for 
stronger managerial intervention in order to ensure workers act as they are 
intended to within the newly ‘human-centred’ managerial system.  In any case, 
we can see the need to understand the relationships between algorithms, 
workers and managers not just in terms of ‘interaction’ but how algorithms work 
as a “social software” by existing “as part of assemblages that include, 
hardware, data structures (such as lists, databases, memory, etc.), and the 
behaviours and actions of bodies” (Terranova, 2014: 384).  To ground this 
perspective, we can consider for example Trebor Scholz’s comment that 
“currently, digital labor appears to be the shiny, sharp tip of a gargantuan spear 
of neoliberalism made up of deregulation, inequality, union busting, and a shift 




Questions regarding the role of information and its relation to issues of workers’ 
agency and cooperation have been central to the idea of what we have known 
as ‘management’ since at least the beginning of the twentieth century.  This 
period has provided a rich history of managerial innovations that are now 
frequently taken for granted, but in examining this history we can observe the 
political impulses that have informed key managerial ideas.  In this section I 
revisit selected foundational management ideas and their political implications.  
                         
47 This leads Scholz to his position that the actual alternative to the “individualist ethos of the 
‘sharing economy’” is for workers to control platforms themselves without managers (ibid.: 2). 
Scholz (2017) calls this idea ‘platform cooperativism’, as an alternative to the idea of ‘platform 
capitalism’ (see Srnicek, 2016). 
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In subsequent sections I connect these ideas to cybernetic principles in order 
to develop an account of the managerial politics of ‘data-driven’ workplace 
governance.  The principles and techniques I cover are instructive for furthering 
an understanding of algorithmic management in terms of political 
considerations beyond those discussed by Lee et al (2015), and provide a 
groundwork for a class composition analysis of algorithmically-managed 
workplaces. 
 
The indeterminacy of labour power 
 
Although the organization of work and even large bodies of workers by an 
overarching authority far predates capitalist social relations (Braverman, 1974: 
64-5), the development of what we can now think of as ‘management theory’ 
and its associated structures is generally credited with a series of innovations 
beginning with the industrialist Frederick Winslow Taylor (Hanlon: 2016: 6).  As 
Marx (1976: 677) notes, within capitalist social relations, labour power 
purchased by the capitalist needs to be turned into actual labour.  This is to say 
labour power is a commodity unlike others such as raw materials, in that the 
capitalist purchases from the worker a potential for labour, which then needs to 
be actualized in the process of production in order for the capitalist to make 
profit.  As Braverman (1974: 54) states: 
 
…the worker does not surrender to the capitalist his or her capacity for 
work. The worker retains it, and the capitalist can take advantage of the 
bargain only by setting the worker to work. It is of course understood 
that the useful effects or products of labor belong to the capitalist. But 
what the worker sells, and what the capitalist buys, is not an agreed 
amount of labor, but the power to labor over an agreed period of time. 
This inability to purchase labour, which is an inalienable bodily and 
mental function, is so fraught with consequences for the entire capitalist 
mode of production that it must be investigated more closely. 
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The labour process and the issue of “realizing the ‘full usefulness’ of the labour 
power” thus become the responsibility of the capitalist (ibid.: 57).  Where 
management enters is in the endeavour to realize cooperative actual labour, 
which is to say labour that conforms to productive needs (ibid.: 59; Hanlon, 
2016: 26).48  Alongside notions of economic incentive (namely piece work), 
Taylor’s idea of scientific management involved the deskilling of manual labour, 
a radical separation of the conception and execution of labour (as I will 
discuss), and the introduction of productivity targets based on time studies.  
Along with the Gilbreths’ work on movement, this early period of scientific 
management is particularly notable for introducing the idea of ‘time and motion 
studies’.49  Taylor envisioned a transformation of the entire managerial 
endeavour, which he argued ought to be responsible for applying scientific 
measurement to each element of work, and training and disciplining workers to 
ensure work is being carried out “in accordance with the principles of science” 
(Taylor, 1911: 15).  In Taylor’s estimation, the central innovation of scientific 
management would be the “task idea” (ibid.: 17), by which 
 
The work of every workman is fully planned out by the management at 
least one day in advance, and each man receives in most cases 
complete written instructions, describing in detail the task which he is to 
accomplish, as well as the means to be used in doing the work. … This 
task specifies not only what is to be done but how it is to be done and 
the exact time allowed for doing it. (ibid.) 
 
It is important to clarify here that my use of the terms ‘management’ or 
‘manager’ denotes a function within the capitalist work process in relation to 
                         
48 Cooperation here refers to compliance more than collaboration. As Bendix (1963: 281) 
notes, ‘cooperation’ became a favoured slogan of employers during the industrial conflict of 
the post-first world war era. 
49 The origins of these studies and their resonance for contemporary work design have been 
discussed by Gregg (2015). 
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the actualization of labour power.  The manager, in this sense, is defined by 
the task of overcoming what labour process theory calls the ‘indeterminacy of 
labour power’.  In this sense, management exists to serve the interests of 
capital, but managers are not necessarily defined by their own sociological 
demographic or economic relation to production.50  Practically speaking, it is 
worth noting the interviewed workers featured in later chapters generally made 
little distinction between the job roles of ‘team leader’, ‘supervisor’ and 
‘manager’, viewing their general purpose and interests to be aligned.  In this 
chapter and in others, I occasionally refer to the ‘managerial endeavour’ to 





A discussion of the foundational ideas of management, even on their own 
terms, necessarily involves reference to workplace politics.  Early management 
theories in particular were responding to real-world political contexts, and 
theorists were often explicit about their motivations.  However, I first outline 
some of the mechanics of these early management ideas before situating them 
politically. 
 
Born into a well-heeled Quaker-Puritan family in 1856, by the age of thirty-one 
Frederick Winslow Taylor had been promoted to chief engineer at the Midvale 
Steel Works in Pennsylvania (Wren and Greenwood, 1998: 134, 138; Barnes, 
1980: 14).  Having passed up a place at Harvard Law School, Taylor began 
work at Midvale as a lathe operator before being promoted both rapidly and on 
a regular basis, ultimately becoming a prominent management consultant and 
lecturing at Harvard (Wren and Greenwood, 1998: 135-40).  During his time in 
                         
50 Many managers can fairly be considered ‘workers of the means of production’ in the vulgar 
sense, but that description alone would belie their relation to other workers. 
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industry, Taylor identified a persistent problem of poor supervision by 
managers who neither understood the work process (ibid: 136) nor what ought 
to constitute a proper days’ work (Moore, 2018: 47), exacerbated by what he 
viewed as the ‘interference’ of collective bargaining (Nadworny, 1955: 49).  
Central to Taylor’s solution to ensuring effective management and workers’ full 
cooperation is the argument that it is possible to create a workplace without 
antagonism, where interests are aligned.  In this unitary vision of the workplace, 
outputs do not need to be increased through the intimidating presence of shop 
foremen.  Rather, workers work according to targets based on piece work, 
receiving individual merit pay for high productivity.  Famously, by timing how 
long tasks require to be carried out, managers in Taylor’s system are able to 
‘scientifically’ produce rationalized targets which can be understood by all 
workers.51  Taylor worked in correspondence with Lillian and Frank Gilbreth, 
who regularly attended lectures at his house (Gilbreth, 1926: 34), dedicating a 
few pages of his Principles of Scientific Management to their studies.52 
 
Frank Bunker Gilbreth began his working life as a bricklaying apprentice, later 
becoming an accomplished building contractor (ibid.: 16; Price, 1992: 58).  By 
all accounts obsessed with efficiency even in his personal routines (Wren and 
Greenwood, 1998: 143), Gilbreth first became known within engineering circles 
for devising a ‘bricklaying system’ devised to reduce waste, conserve ability, 
and reduce costs (Gilbreth, 1926: 27).  Central to Gilbreth’s commitment to 
scientific management was a focus on managerial research methods and 
planning, in particular the use of the motion study, which he and his wife, Lillian, 
argued would help “increase the efficiency of the worker” (ibid.: 28).  The 
Gilbreths’ approach to increasing efficiency, they argued, aimed to increase 
outputs less through intensifying work and more through the reduction of 
wasted energy — and therefore fatigue — and increasing workers’ accuracy 
                         
51 Leading Taylor to call his system ‘scientific management’ (1911). 
52 Albeit only Mr Gilbreth was credited. 
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(ibid.: 21; Price, 1992: 61).  Where Taylor focused on measuring activities in 
terms of the time they took in order to calculate how much work a person should 
be able to complete, the Gilbreths used inventive methods, such as filming 
workers in self-constructed “laboratories” (Gilbreth, 1926: 41), to focus on 
workers’ motions.  By observing how different motions could affect productivity, 
they devised the idea that there was ‘one best way’ to execute the work.53  This 
notion developed something of a mythological dimension in the Gilbreths’ self-
publicity as consultants, with Lillian promoting the notion for its alleged health 
benefits — even exalting its benefits to married life, referring to her matrimony 
with Frank as the ‘one best marriage’ (Gilbreth, 1926: 25) — and Frank arguing 
that unions ought to view the Gilbreths’ proposed system as a step forward for 
workers (Price, 1992: 60-1).  Compared with the stopwatches used in time 
studies, the Gilbreths’ preference for using cameras was arguably more 
methodologically robust (Wren and Greenwood, 1998: 143), but it should be 
noted that the fact the one best way principle advocates improvement through 
consistent adherence to a productive ideal means it relies on the labour 
process being stable over time and the external and internal environment being 
constant. 
 
The one best way principle is, however, less prescriptive on the issue of 
cooperation.  On this matter, Lillian Moller Gilbreth, an early pioneer of 
industrial psychology, argued for the need for scientific management to 
consider the human factors of the labour process.  Taylor was not oblivious to 
this blind spot: in recognizing that primary knowledge of the labour process lay 
with the worker he touched on how supervisors ought to talk with workers to 
develop an affable relationship with them, and he remarked that “There is 
another type of scientific investigation…which should receive special attention, 
namely, the accurate study of the motives which influence men” (Taylor, 1911: 
                         
53 The classic example is the study of bricklayers, which observed there were numerous ways 
to physically lay bricks — some of which were more efficient than others. 
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62) — although he did not explore these ideas much further.  Although it has 
been argued the Gilbreths’ preoccupation with combining scientific 
management with a ‘human’ focus (along with their attention to fatigue) was at 
least in part driven by business competition with Taylor (Price, 1992: 63-4), 
Lillian Gilbreth certainly contributed a focus on the idea of group scenarios 
(such as teams) and put the spotlight on the techniques that manage the worker 
rather than just the work, hinting at the ‘humanistic’ management tradition that 
would later emerge. 
 
In 1924, the General Electric Company sponsored studies at the Hawthorne 
plant of the Western Electric Company with a view to establishing a link 
between illumination and workers’ productivity (Wren and Greenwood, 1998: 
171).  No such link was found, with output increasing in both the control and 
variable groups.  Despite the fact the participants themselves attributed their 
higher performance to the increased pay, more pleasant working conditions 
and the novelty associated with participating in the study (ibid.: 172-3), the 
official summation, led by the Australian management consultant Elton Mayo, 
was that the test subjects’ increased productivity could be attributed to their 
cohesion as a “social unit”, along with the study observer, as a by-product of 
the research exercises themselves (ibid.: 175).  Foundational to a humanistic 
management approach, Mayo’s notion of human relations, arising from his 
interpretation of the Hawthorne studies, has at its core “cooperation and group 
activity” (Hanlon, 2016: 137), focusing on the sociality of workers, which he 
argued is their main source of motivation.  Mayo’s key contribution is in his 
articulation of the ‘social person’ in contrast to homo economicus, and his 
arguments against what he calls the ‘rabble hypothesis’ — whereby managers 
view workers as a horde, rather than as a group which is often well-knit.  
Indeed, 
 
…the problem as Mayo saw it…is to restore to the individual the sense 
of intimate and spontaneous co-operation with the members of the basic 
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unit of organization, the primary working group, with whom he passes 
his working hours and his feeling that the work of that unit is contributing 
to some common purpose (Urwick, 1960: 14-15; emphasis added).  
 
For Mayo, it is at this point that a scientific approach to the management of 
people runs up against its limitations, and, he argues, risks sabotaging 
management control altogether, unless managers can develop ways to 
stimulate ‘spontaneous cooperation’ through seeking “an effective relationship 
between the worker and his work” (Hanlon, 2016: 143).  As we will see, the 
principle of cooperation recurs in contemporary technological ecologies of 
management, especially when we arrive at cybernetic managerial techniques 
which rely on workers’ communicative relationship with computational devices. 
 
Control: the early years 
 
Aside from appeals to shared interests, Taylor was explicit about his motivation 
for developing the Principles: organized labour agitators (1911: 5), who he 
argued had led workers to the belief their interests were not reconcilable with 
the interests of management.  Taylor was led to the importance of finding the 
optimal productive time-scale for the completion of tasks because, in essence, 
he did not think workers were being productive enough.  Taylor identifies two 
key problems in then-modern workplaces.  The first is a problem of antagonism 
in the workplace, which is a threat to capitalists’ interests.  The second, which 
is the principal manifestation of the first, is what Taylor calls ‘soldiering’ — the 
tendency for workers not to work to their full capacity in case it becomes 
injurious to their own interests; a practice for which Taylor accuses union 
organizers.  In short, Taylor’s problem precisely echoes that identified by Marx: 
the need to turn labour power into actual labour (Hanlon, 2016: 104).  Creating 
a workplace with a better alignment of interests — in fact bringing workers’ 
individual interests in line with capitalists’ interests — in the first instance means 
knowing how much work a person should be expected to do.  The problem 
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Taylor identifies is that factory owners are largely ignorant of the precise 
productive processes which occur on the shopfloor, giving workers a great 
amount of control over production (1911: 13).  Taylor aims to wrest control 
through the formulation of targets that employees can be expected to achieve 
on the basis of managers’ own empirical inquiries into the workplace.  In order 
to introduce targets which can then become the basis of managerial control, 
Taylor argues it is necessary to separate the conception and execution of 
labour.  Conception refers to the knowledge and planning of the labour process, 
the development of strategy and so on, and execution refers to the work being 
carried out.  In separating the two, Taylor advocates a novel division of labour 
between managers (who deal with conception) and workers (tasked with 
execution). 
 
Crucially, the conception stage does not happen independently of the workers’ 
execution — the knowledge put into the process by the managers is initially 
gleaned from the workers themselves.  As Taylor (1911: 15) puts it: 
 
The managers assume…the burden of gathering together all of the 
traditional knowledge which in the past has been possessed by the 
workmen and then of classifying, tabulating, and reducing this 
knowledge to rules, laws, and formulae. 
 
To facilitate this mechanism, he advocates the deployment of employment 
specialists (unfortunately termed ‘shop disciplinarians’, despite emphasizing 
being friendly with the workers as part of their role) who can be tasked with 
keeping records of employees.54  As Hanlon (2016: 95-6) notes, Taylor’s case 
for this type of functional management has at its centre “subjectivity, knowledge 
and what we might now call ‘organisational culture’. Before management could 
manage or leaders could lead, workers’ knowledge had to be expropriated and 
                         
54 A function later to be carried out by what we now know as human resources management. 
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the division of labour made even finer.”  Through gleaning workers’ knowledge, 
the idea is that managers are able to generate general rules and targets which 
will govern the work process.  Through a combination of targets, piece work 
and merit pay, solidaristic practices such as soldiering can be undermined 
through introducing incentives for productive workers and disciplinary 
measures for those who fall behind. 
 
Scientific management was met with eager objection from organized labour 
(Price, 1992: 59, 62).  But while Frank Gilbreth had attempted to induce and 
persuade workers by drawing on his own history of having been a union 
member (Nadworny, 1955: 22), Taylor thought unions destructive and 
antithetical to his system, which relied on appealing to workers’ individual 
ambitions (ibid.: 5), even advertising the reduction of strikes as part of his 
consultancy work (ibid.: 23).  Like Taylor, Mayo sought to “close the gap 
between turning labour-power into actual labour and [solve] the employment 
contract’s indeterminacy in the interests of capital” through enforcing 
cooperation, the division of labour and deploying bureaucratic forms (ibid.: 
163).  Similarly, Mayo was scathing of union organizers, judging them to be 
socially inept to the point of mental illness (Mayo, 1975: 23-4).  However, Mayo 
locates the potential for managerial control in the social aspects of the 
workplace, arguing that too heavy an emphasis on efficiency from an 
engineering perspective actually prevents the labour process from being as 
optimal as it could be, “pushing the social needs of individuals into the 
background and thereby reducing people’s capacity for collaboration in work” 
(Wren and Greenwood, 1998: 175), and for all its claims to science such a 
narrow approach leaves the social or human aspect of work to “dogma and 
tradition, guess, or quasi-philosophical argument” (Mayo, 1975: 61).  Mayo’s 
approach then is to systematize management’s approach to those areas of 
work previously neglected by Taylorist methods, by focusing on the worker as 
Lillian Gilbreth advocated.  In this way, Mayo hoped, it could be possible for 
“management to gain greater control of the informal work culture of the 
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organisation through the creation of small-group camaraderie in the workplace 
and by encouraging workers to communicate their discontent” (Hanlon, 2016: 
153). 
 
Management as strategy 
 
It is not the case that Taylor and Mayo had uniquely ambitious designs on the 
work process, or especially idiosyncratic preoccupations with the power of 
organized labour.  Their ideas provided the groundwork for decades of 
managerial innovation, but were ultimately based on the idea that it is 
imperative that capital has a strategy for achieving “certainty of result” — i.e. 
control — over the productive process against the notoriously ‘unplannable’ 
workforce (Panzieri, 1976: 8).  This is what Hanlon (2016: 202) means when 
he calls management “neo-liberal class struggle from above” (ibid.: 3) and a 
response “to labour, to its knowledge, to its collectivity, to its soldiering and to 
its refusal” (ibid.: 11).  Hanlon identifies in management the centrality of the 
control of knowledge to the control of production, and the aim of achieving 
“reconciliation between workers and their roles so that they willingly present 
the gift of ‘spontaneous cooperation’ to their co-workers and employers” (ibid.: 
14) — in other words, to minimize the potential for labour power to go wasted 
by uncooperative workers. 
 
Collaboration, in this sense, “appears as the management expertise of the 
capitalist” (ibid.: 25); a method for breaking down class solidarity in order that 
the flow of actual labour runs with certainty and without interruption.  Nick Dyer-
Witheford (2015: 51-2) identifies this pattern in the introduction of automated 
technologies to the US auto industry in the 1970s and 80s: 
 
In North America, union militants understood the new production 
technique, with its demand for teamwork and participation, as a 
challenge to class solidarity that blurred the lines between labour and 
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management, and broke down job descriptions and time demarcations, 
drawing labour into a self-administered exploitation in the name of 
company identification. 
 
Dyer-Witheford also notes that the new production technique entailed a 
coupling of such social methods with the increasingly logistical, ‘just-in-time’ 
nature of production in the automotive industry, whereby companies could 
separate groups of workers from each other across a range of sites by breaking 
down sections of the labour process, to be coordinated more centrally by senior 
managers (ibid.: 52-3). 
 
Management could therefore be understood as strategy deployed against the 
tactical actions of workers in their effort to mitigate and manage their own work.  
Following de Certeau’s (1984: 34-7) notions of strategy and tactics, within 
which strategy is understood as “the calculation…of power relationships that 
becomes possible as soon as a subject with will and power…can be isolated” 
(ibid.: 35-6), we can see Taylor and Mayo’s early approaches (indeed perhaps 
even the development of management theory per se) as attempts to generate 
a strategic place for managers by creating privileged positions in the 
governance of information and sociality which become managers’ business 
alone (see Goodrich, 1975: 56).55  By observing the tactics of workers to control 
the work process to their own ends, Taylor and Mayo create a new role for 
                         
55 A strategy, for de Certeau, “postulates a place that can be delimited as its own and serve 
as a base from which relations with an exteriority composed of targets or threats…can be 
managed” (1984: 36). He continues: “As in management, every ‘strategic’ rationalization 
seeks first of all to distinguish its ‘own’ place, that is, the place of its own power and will, from 
an ‘environment’” (ibid.). This is different from a tactic, which is “a calculated action 
determined by the absence of a proper locus. … The space of a tactic is the space of the 
other” (ibid.: 37). He argues “a tactic is an art of the weak” (ibid.). 
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management — a steady hand moving purposefully and rationally, and firmly 
if necessary.56 
 
From continuous improvement to adaptive 
systems 
 
The foundational origins of management go some way to illustrating the logic 
underpinning contemporary management ideas, but as a ‘data driven’ 
approach, algorithmic management also entails notions of improvement and 
performance, as well as relations between humans and information systems.  
To situate these ideas within management thought, I first discuss how the 
Japanese management tradition augments the innovations of Taylor and Mayo, 
before introducing management cybernetics as a way to connect ideas such 





A frequent correspondent with Frank Gilbreth, Yoichi Ueno was instrumental in 
promoting systematic management thinking to Japanese academics and 
managers.  Having founded the Japanese chapter of the Taylor Society, in 
1912 he wrote On the Efficiency, a book which drew on Gilbreth and Taylor’s 
work and applied their principles to Japanese modes of management thinking.  
In particular he emphasized Taylor’s focus on fostering a workplace culture of 
“mutual interest, cooperation and harmony”, which he argued were compatible 
with traditional Japanese values (Wren and Greenwood, 1998: 151).  Ueno’s 
ideas were most significantly taken up by Taiichi Ohno, who joined Toyota after 
                         
56 Braverman (1974: 67) notes the verb to manage comes from the Latin for hand, manus, via 
the French manège, a riding hall for training horses. 
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the second world war.  Generally credited as the architect of Toyota’s distinctive 
management approach, Ohno was a pioneer of both just-in-time production 
and kaizen (改善) — frequently translated as ‘continuous improvement’.  
Kaizen is not just about refinement over time, but rather everyday/everybody 
improvement, requiring discipline and commitment to self-reflexivity.  The focus 
is on reducing waste and costs by streamlining processes; each time 
something is improved, steps are taken to improve again.  Within Toyota, 
kaizen entailed the participation of both management and workers across the 
organization, as well as attempts at “redefining the worker” through getting rid 
of fixed times and workloads and making “worker suggestions for improving 
efficiency mandatory” (Dyer-Witheford, 2015: 50).  The idea remains influential, 
as reflected in Amazon’s ‘Kaizen programme’ (Amazon, n.d.): 
 
We continuously work to streamline our processes and eliminate defects 
and we empower all our associates to innovate to help achieve this. … 
Through the Kaizen programme, associates, working in small teams, 
can identify areas for improvement giving them the opportunity to 
influence their working environment and streamline processes. 
 
As I was informed on a public tour of an Amazon fulfilment centre, which I 
elaborate on in Chapter 3, the company’s idiosyncratic approach to kaizen is 
to hold events where working groups work through the productive process to 
identify as many ‘kaizens’ (improvements) as possible. 
 
Total (quality) control 
 
Kaizen widens its focus from the actions of workers to the idea of system 
improvement.  Conceptually, it marks a break with the one best way principle, 
in that it rules out the notion of an unimprovable system.  Instead, continuous 
improvement signals a more holistic view of the workplace and its processes, 
extending managerial control and creating a specific role for communication 
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within its functioning.  This approach is exemplified in the work of Kaoru 
Ishikawa, who argues managers need to foster a system which can continually 
adapt based on experience.  In his critique of the short-lived so-called ‘zero 
defect’ movement in the USA, Ishikawa put its failure down to the overbearing 
influence of Taylorist methods, in which, Ishikawa (1985: 151) states: 
“Engineers create work standards and specifications. Workers merely follow. 
The trouble with this approach is that the workers are regarded as machines. 
Their humanity is ignored.”  Ishikawa’s solution is the development of the ‘total 
quality control’ (TQC) industrial philosophy.  Incorporating kaizen and elements 
of Mayo’s thought (Hanlon, 2016: 161), at the centre of TQC is the quality 
control (QC) circle: a regular, encouraged but voluntary meeting of work teams 
and managers designed to discuss issues ranging from the technicalities and 
specificities of the work process and current projects, to sources of workplace 
antagonism arising from either professional or personal issues.  As an 
adaptive, continuous system, TQC retains scientific ideas about the 
reformulation of knowledge to produce targets but adopts a more holistic and, 
arguably, cybernetic form: beyond work rates, TQC is concerned with 
managing work relations through communication and delivering company-wide 
control to management through attention to intra- and inter-department 
dynamics.  Aside from incremental system improvements, TQC also aims at 
the diffusion of antagonism and promotion of harmony, as Ishikawa (1985: 64) 
notes: “A conclusion thus obtained can be understood and accepted by all.” 
 
The ethos of TQC is in adapting the company’s future processes based on past 
processes and results.  As a company-wide circuitry of control — what Ishikawa 
calls the ‘control circle’ (distinct from the quality control circle) — managers are 
supposed to keep track of processes through six key stages: determine goals 
and targets, determine methods of reaching goals, engage in education and 
training, implement work, check the effects of implementation, take appropriate 
action (ibid.: 59).  The QC circle provides a forum for managers to engage 
workers’ “intimate knowledge of the workplace” (ibid.: 64) on these aspects.  
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The motif of a staged feedback loop is reflected in the QC circle, which follows 
a ‘story’ to break down aspects of the productive process for workers and give 
structure to the forum (ibid.: 147).  What we can see in TQC is Taylor’s principle 
of gleaning workers’ knowledge, albeit in a more participatory manner which 
frames antagonism as constitutive of improvement and harmonization.  
Fundamentally, the QC circle is intended to become a mode of sociality for the 
workers (ibid.: 27).  But while it is a social space, the QC circle is not a gift of 
respite to break up the working day.  Although the idea of the circle might 
conjure images of the support circle or a horizontal space, its purpose is to 
solve problems of control by means of research into workers’ experiences; 
indeed, the progenitor to the QC circle was in the “workshop quality control 
study groups” of shop foremen (ibid.: 5).  The control of the QC circle does not 
follow a foreman-based ‘I say, you do’ command structure, and nor is it based 
on the scientific approach’s implementation of key performance indicators.  
Rather it is the means by which management can control various aspects of 
the work process through direct communication and encouraging cooperation, 
fulfilling what both Mayo and Lillian Gilbreth understood to be lacking from the 
scientific approach, and enabling, as Mayo advocated, “management to gain 
greater control of the informal work culture of the organisation through the 
creation of small-group camaraderie in the workplace and by encouraging 
workers to communicate their discontent” (Hanlon, 2016: 153). 
 
Elements of the QC circle approach can be seen in the kaizen activity of gemba 
(現場) walks.  Where the QC circle tightens the feedback loop between 
conception and execution, likewise gemba walks aim to give managers greater 
exposure to ‘the job’.  From the Japanese meaning ‘the actual place’, gemba 
activities see managers walking the shopfloor (for example, following a 
productive process) in order to spot ‘cracks’, identify waste and find ways to 
simplify processes.  Alongside kaizen ‘events’, gemba walks are a part of the 
managerial strategy of Amazon warehouses: 
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the site leadership team holds a daily Gemba and will walk around the 
fulfilment centre together. The General Manager and all heads of 
department are required to attend. They stop at each of the key 
processes (dock, receive, stow, pick, pack and ship) to review the top 
issues in the area. 
… 
Mark Elsey explained to the managers that he had noticed that, on 
occasion, the shoes put into plastic bags for delivery were getting stuck 
at the top of the chutes used to sort parcels for delivery. This was 
causing jams on the chutes which meant our computer systems found it 
harder to read the barcodes identifying each order. This in turn meant 
more orders needed to be checked and manually sorted. 
 
During the Gemba Walk Mark said he thought the solution to this 
challenge would be as simple as polishing the chute to make it more 
slippery and to encourage the plastic bags to move more quickly down 
the chute. 
… 
Regular Gemba participant and Senior Operations manager, John 
Hayes, said: ‘Mark’s advice was the first thing we sought… His idea was 
so simple but it came from him knowing the process inside out: he was 
the perfect person to recommend a solution and his quick thinking has 
made the job easier for everyone in the outbound sortation team.’ 
(Amazon Operations, n.d.) 
 
Through gemba and QC activities, we can see how the kaizen approach 
predicates managerial control on its ability to take a proactive stance to the 
workplace which is also responsive to contingencies as they emerge.  In 
contrast to the implication we see in Taylor and the Gilbreths — of the task of 
management being to detail a masterplan with which to govern work and 
workers — kaizen combines scientific and humanistic approaches to develop 
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a strategic approach which is simultaneously able to intervene at a tactical level 
by reacting to (and, crucially, accommodating in some sense) events or 
circumstances which were unanticipated.  As I will now discuss, it is an ethos 
which shares key traits with a cybernetic managerial approach. 
 
From knowledge to performance 
 
Despite the differences between kaizen and Taylor’s vision of scientific 
management, there persists the central Taylorist principle of the separation of 
conception and execution, which acts as the foundational organizing principle 
of modern workplace management within capitalist social relations, acting as a 
feedback loop which governs the workforce and determines the standards by 
which its cooperation is measured.  However, although it is arguable that 
contemporary management still exists within a Taylorist paradigm, we can 
nonetheless observe key differences in its operation, especially in 
computationally-mediated workplaces.  Negri (1989: 106) observes that 
“control in the literal sense is no longer a necessary condition for production: 
today control is provided by book-keeping”, but as Pickering (2010: 253) notes 
“most of the information that one can collect on an organization is useless and 
can be discarded”.  The point may sound flippant, but in an era of the 
unprecedented ability to amass data from work and workers, it might be 
reasonable to expect more data could be collected than anyone could 
reasonably find a use for.  The substantial point underpinning Pickering’s 
comment is that within a context so information-rich as a modern workplace or 
company, it is more appropriate to assess performance and effects than to try 
to know or learn everything there is, the idea being that “information is not about 
knowing but doing” (Dyer-Witheford, 2015: 42).  This perspective is strongly 
reflected within the cybernetic management approach. 
 
Underpinning the cybernetic approach is what Pickering calls an “ontology of 
unknowability”, an aspect of cybernetics that “tries to address the problematic 
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of getting along performatively with systems that can always surprise us” when 
particularly complex systems elude representation (Pickering, 2010: 23).  This 
implies a different sense of control to that which is hierarchical, linear and “flows 
in just one direction in the form of instructions for action”; instead, “in line with 
its ontology of unknowability and becoming, the cybernetic sense of control was 
rather one of getting along with, coping with, even taking advantage of and 
enjoying, a world that one cannot push around in that way” (ibid.: 383).  In 
relation to the idea of ‘black boxes’ — processes which do something but 
whose internal workings are not observed — Pickering details the different 
impulses of scientific versus cybernetic stances: where the scientific stance 
wishes “to understand their inner workings in a representational fashion”, the 
cybernetic stance sees the scientific impulse as “entailing a detour, away from 
performance and through the space of representation, which has the effect of 
veiling the world of performance from us” (ibid.: 20).  He continues: 
 
the hallmark of cybernetics was a refusal of the detour through 
knowledge — or, to put it another way, a conviction that in important 
instances such a detour would be mistaken, unnecessary, or impossible 
in principle. The stance of cybernetics was a concern with performance 
as performance, not as a pale shadow of representation. (ibid.: 21) 
 
By way of a simple illustration, we can think of performance in this sense as in 
the “satisfactory performance relation” we have with door handles, where we 
are able to anticipate effects and actualize a desired series of actions without 
having to understand the precise mechanism (ibid.: 23).  As I now discuss, 
within an organization such a relation relies on effective processes of 
communication and feedback which can produce a more generative, 






The ontology of unknowability is demonstrated in Stafford Beer’s notion of the 
‘exceedingly complex’ system.  Beer says the world can be thought of in terms 
of three types of system or entity: simple, complex and exceedingly complex.  
While simple and complex systems “are in principle knowable and predictable, 
and thus susceptible to the methods of the traditional sciences” (ibid.: 222), 
exceedingly complex systems (the economy, the brain, the company) are 
probabilistic in nature and have to “function in and adapt to an endlessly 
surprising, fluctuating and changing environment”, which is to say they are “not 
fully knowable or adequately predictable” (ibid.: 223).  These are systems 
which are “so complex that we can never fully grasp them representationally 
and that change over time, so that present knowledge is anyway no guarantee 
of future behavior” (ibid.: 23), presenting fundamental problems for 
management.  For Beer (1981: 17), this means management (as the profession 
of control) ought to be considered in relation to cybernetics (as the science of 
control), given that in each case there exists an aim to negate the effect of 
disturbances to the functioning of a system.  For the company this means 
“[developing] techniques for survival in a changing environment”, particularly 
its ability to “adapt itself to its economic, commercial, social and political 
surroundings, and it must learn from experience” (Beer, 1959: 17). 
 
Beer observed that companies tended to lack an accurate understanding of 
their actual internal workings.  As Pickering (2010: 253) states: 
 
What organizations had…was organization charts of hierarchical power 
relationships running downward from the board of directors through 
vertical chains of command devoted to production, accounting, 
marketing, and so on. Beer’s claim was that such charts did not, and 
could not, represent how firms actually worked. They functioned, at 
most, as devices for apportioning blame when things went wrong. 
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Beer argued organizations based on probabilistic systems risked ataxia if they 
were not sufficiently adaptive to changing circumstances, such as system 
disturbances which cannot be determined before they occur.  As such they 
must not only continually improve, but they must be robust enough that they 
can adapt and change course quickly (ibid.: 273).  One proposal was what Beer 
termed a ‘viable systems model’ (VSM), an organizational form based on the 
idea of the self-regulation and adaptivity of a system across a variety of 
components that are in conversation with each other, with managers 
“positioned within purposefully designed information flows” (ibid.: 244) such 
that they can steer the firm by balancing interlocutory processes. 
 
For Beer, the VSM presented the possibility of reorganizing the firm around the 
computer “to effect a transformation that was social as well as technological, to 
rearrange the human components as part of an adaptive technosocial system 
of information flows and transformations” (ibid.: 253).  Within this set-up, 
managers could exercise effective control by virtue of their position among 
communicative flows.  In this sense, managers in the VSM occupied a 
‘servomechanical’ role by virtue of their ability to “use feedback processes to 
cancel out the effects of disturbances on their operations” (Dyer-Witheford, 
2015: 42).  A critic of capitalist managerial practices, Beer sought to undo 
hierarchies of command and control through “adaptive couplings between 
levels” which would distribute decision-making ‘authority’ through the system, 
but as Pickering (2010: 267) notes, “these adaptive couplings could easily be 
‘switched off’ and replaced by asymmetric ones”, meaning the VSM was not 
necessarily a particularly “potent bulwark against the institutional arrangements 
that Beer wanted to obviate.” 
 
A more explicitly asymmetric version of a company-wide adaptive management 
system is Robert Kaplan’s ‘closed-loop management system’ (CLMS).  Based 
on the influential ‘balanced scorecard’ model (Kaplan and Norton, 1996), the 
CLMS aims to extend managerial control beyond a primary focus on the 
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financial bottom line towards a better distributed and more systematic 
architecture of control by incorporating strategy and operations (Kaplan, 2010: 
28).  The closed loop resembles the repeated stages of the TQC model.  In six 
stages, the CLMS threads together: the development of strategy, translation of 
strategy, aligning the organization, planning operations, monitoring and 
learning, and testing and adapting (ibid.: 27-8).  Kaplan (ibid.: 29) states: “The 
integrative and comprehensive closed-loop management system has many 
moving parts and inter-relationships, and requires simultaneous coordination 
among all organizational line and staff units”.  Despite somewhat euphemistic 
references to translation, aligning, monitoring and learning, what the CLMS 
demonstrates is a cybernetic approach to management whereby managers are 
able to account for and control external and internal disturbances through the 
effective communication of productive and organization processes — which is 
to say the various labour processes within the company — from workers to 
managers, which is then channelled into strategic ‘alignment’ directives. 
 
The CLMS demonstrates what Pickering (2010: 274) calls the “democratic 
fragility of the VSM”.  Beer aimed to distribute decision-making within the 
functioning of the system, relying on adaptive couplings to act as checks and 
balances across operational and managerial levels, but the extent to which 
adaptive couplings are integrated into the system — to keep it “genuinely 
cybernetic” (ibid.: 267) — appears to be a normative decision based on 
managerial prerogative.  As Pickering (ibid.: 273) concedes, without adequate 
adaptive couplings VSMs could become “rather effective systems of command, 
control and surveillance” used to curb workers’ demands rather than 
incorporate them.  Werner Ulrich (1981: 35 in ibid.: 268) presses this line of 
argument in his critique of Project Cybersyn, which was largely designed by 
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Beer.57  Ulrich criticized the model for being ‘purposive’ rather than ‘purposeful’, 
meaning that without substantive built-in goals the system would end up 
implementing whatever ambitions were brought to it in a top-down fashion.58  
Although adaptive couplings were built into Cybersyn as reciprocal (rather than 
one-way) devices, there remained an asymmetrical relationship with regard to 
goal-formation, which generally came ‘from above’.59  In this sense, it could be 
said that while the adaptive couplings of the VSM mediate performance, the 
disciplinary aspect of the model (ensuring ‘certainty of result’) remains top-




Both the VSM and CLMS demand adherence to ‘the system’; a tenet which is 
further fused with tracking technologies in algorithmic management and one 
which, as I will discuss at length in Chapter 4, has its own political effects.  
Phoebe V. Moore refers to the contemporary managerial epoch as one of ‘agile 
management systems’, agile being an intentionally slippery term invoking 
leanness and adaptivity as well as flexibility and insecurity.60  She states: 
                         
57 Project Cybersyn was the name given to a planned cybernetic economic management 
system developed during Salvador Allende’s socialist premiership. It was destroyed following 
Augusto Pinochet’s military coup in 1973. See also Medina (2014). 
58 Pickering (2010: 268) clarifies: “a ‘purposive’ system is a means to some extrinsically 
specified end, while a ‘purposeful’ one can deliberate its own ends”. 
59 To his credit, Beer did attempt to address this question in his later work on ‘syntegration’. 
60 Moore’s conceptual use of ‘agile’ here transcends that of the ‘Agile manifesto’ (Agile 
Alliance, 2001). Situating contemporary management practices against older managerial 
forms such as scientific management and continuous improvement, she posits agile 
management as “a form of total quality management and a high-performance work system” 
(Moore, 2018: 63). The condition of ‘agile workers’ produced by this managerial form is 
reminiscent of Mark Fisher’s (2009: 34) description of contemporary work: “As production and 
distribution are restructured, so are nervous systems. To function effectively as a component 
of just-in-time production you must develop a capacity to respond to unforeseen events, you 
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Agility both intensifies management responsibilities seen in the era of 
scientific management and escalates the role of the engineer and 
technician, also seen in Taylor’s recommendations. The primary 
difference between scientific management and agility is the even-
greater emphasis placed on technology, to the point that we are 
symbolically asked to ‘serve’ the machine (Moore, 2018: 59). 
 
The object of the engineer, in this case ‘the machine’, is notable for the great 
precision with which it can track workers’ performance — spatially, temporally, 
and in the case of ‘quantified self’ style wearables, even physiologically (ibid.: 
21).  The range of tracking technologies available to managers means they 
“can know more than ever before about workers as technology constantly 
tracks second by second information of their movements and internal 
functioning” (ibid.: 10-1), producing “new ‘knowns’” through the massive 
accumulation of data (ibid.: 10).  And yet, the vast amount of data produced61 
and the real-time nature of its transmission problematizes the idea that any 
manager can now ‘know’ everything; instead, there persists an ontology of 
unknowability, complemented by a managerial system which is able to help 
managers ‘get along performatively’ (to use Pickering’s earlier phrase) with the 
wider organization as an exceedingly complex system.  In other words, 
management is computationally supported in establishing a “satisfactory 
performance relation” (Pickering, 2010: 23) with the company by virtue of an 
advanced infrastructure of tracking technologies which connect processes and 
workers’ actions. 
 
Within this formulation, Moore suggests machines may begin to look more like 
tool bearers than humans do, their tools being “seemingly ever more precise 
                         
must learn to live in conditions of total instability”, although it should be noted Moore retains a 
distinction between just-in-time and agile (Moore, 2018: 63). 
61 Moore (2018: 8) refers to an experimental project where a single employee was able to 
produce over thirty gigabytes of data per week via three tracking devices. 
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calculations about human labour”, put to use in the management of the 
workplace (Moore, 2018: 3).  A key principle in sustaining this arrangement is 
that “Data is treated as a neutral arbiter and judge, and is being prioritised over 
qualitative judgements in key performance indicator management systems and 
digitalised client-based relationships” (ibid.).  Klipfolio, a company specializing 
in team performance dashboards, asserts that “data doesn’t lie”, claiming its 
data visualizations “provide an objective view of current performance and can 
effectively serve as common ground for further dialogue” (Klipfolio, 2015).  
Here ‘data’ echoes Ishikawa’s (1985: 64) notion of the conclusion which “can 
be understood and accepted by all”, and is intended to act like a managerial 
instruction presented rationally and the result of empirical monitoring.  The 
labour relations involved in this tactic are well-understood; citing an unnamed 
senior manager, Eckerson (2011: 187) writes once “workers [question] the 
validity of this metric or that data and you begin debating the accuracy of the 
data…it’s a downward spiral from there”. 
 
In this chapter I have discussed a range of management approaches which 
have sought, in different ways, to intervene in the politics of work with a view 
to enhancing managerial control.  By focusing on key interventions in the 
scientific and humanistic traditions, I have been able to show how informational 
and social techniques can be used to ensure “certainty of result” (Panzieri, 
1976: 8) from workers, such as through the alignment of interests between 
managers and workers.  The principle of managers occupying a key position in 
information flows is reflected in the cybernetic perspective on management, 
which understands the company as an incredibly complex entity to the point 
that there exists an ‘ontology of unknowability’, meaning control needs to take 
a more computational form based on the massive collection of data.  These 
ideas are particularly relevant for understanding the politics of algorithmic 
management, such as the effect of algorithmic management on workers and 
the organization of authority, which I will discuss in Chapter 4.  Drawing on 
Robert Kowalski’s idea that “algorithm = logic + control”, Goffey (2006: 18) 
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argues that “Algorithms obviously do not executive their actions in a void. It is 
difficult to understand the way they work without the simultaneous existence of 
data structures, which is also to say data.”    As such, and as I explain at the 
beginning of Chapter 4, my analysis does not focus on the specificities of 
particular algorithms, but rather the “physics of real processes” (ibid.: 16) that 
algorithmic management implies.62 
 




Speaking of the Motorola WT4000 wearable scanner, which will feature in 
Chapter 3, Applin and Fischer (2013: 3) discuss how “The sensors within them 
can be used for surveillance of worker movement and further, for monitoring 
compliance to script processes. This type of surveillance moves the rationale 
from tracking of data, to tracking of behavior.”  Meanwhile Motorola (2008, 
2009) markets to buyers the real-time capabilities of its tracking devices.  Within 
devices such as these we can see elements of a range of managerial 
approaches, from the separation of conception and execution advocated by 
Taylor to the continuous improvement impulse of kaizen, to the performance-
oriented feedback loops of cybernetic management and the real-time tracking 
practices which emerge in ‘agile’ management.  All these aspects of the 
managerial endeavour have consequences for workers, whether generating 
data to be used in disciplinary situations or monitoring cooperation with ‘the 
system’ or internalizing the performance expectations generated by 
                         
62 In this sense, Goffey (2006: 17) argues alongside Foucault that “the algorithm as a 
statement…is not analytically reducible to the syntactic or semantic features of a language; it 
refers instead to its historical existence and the way that this historical existence 
accomplishes particular actions”. 
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management, displayed as a reflection of the worker in the handheld or 
wearable device.   
 
The history of management ideas I have discussed here raises political 
questions of algorithmic management beyond those of transparency and 
optimization indicated by Lee et al.  Rather, it encourages us to think about how 
principles such as cooperation, knowledge and performance operate within a 
work context.  But algorithmic management also introduces new aspects to the 
workplace which encourage us to think about communication and mediation 
within the context of labour relations — the way managers (as the custodians 
of technology) are aided, and the way workers negotiate their position as media 
users.  If, as Lash (2007: 71) proposes, “A society of ubiquitous media means 
a society in which power is increasingly in the algorithm”, then the proliferation 
of managerial digital media technologies leads to questions about the character 
of algorithmic power at work and its consequences for class composition.  We 
know workplace technologies are becoming increasingly intimate (Moore, 
2018; Gregg, 2011), and we know the power of digital media can be leveraged 
against users in other contexts (Schüll, 2012), so it indeed might be reasonable 
to ask whether managers are now coming for what Franco Berardi (2009) calls 
“the soul” — the proliferation of digital media such as wearables, extending 
managerial power to every corner of an algorithms’ reach, and by extension 
every cognitive and corporeal action of its diligent user.63 
 
Drawing on his research on Deliveroo, Jamie Woodcock suggests the idea of 
an ‘algorithmic panopticon’.  In his words: 
 
                         
63 Berardi (2009: 21) clarifies: “The soul I intend to discuss does not have much to do with the 
spirit. It is rather the vital breath that converts biological matter into an animated body. I want 
to discuss the soul in a materialistic way. What the body can do, that is its soul, as Spinoza 
said.” 
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The use of automation to manage the labour process creates what can 
be conceptualised as an algorithmic Panopticon [sic]. It starts from the 
sense that ‘it’s the algorithm that’s the boss’, automatically collecting and 
comparing data across the entire company (Woodcock, 2017a). 
 
The result is that in the absence of a physical supervisor or manager (or 
‘augmented supervisor’), the ‘algorithmic panopticon’ provides a means of 
governing the workplace without physical presence (Woodcock, 2017b). 
 
But Woodcock problematizes the idea that the consequence is a lop-sided 
settlement which places the ‘frontier of control’ (Goodrich, 1975) squarely in 
managerial hands.  Rather, his insistence on the panopticon metaphor relates 
to what he argues is Deliveroo’s reliance on an “illusion of managerial control, 
albeit backed up with evidence of detailed supervision and occasional 
disciplinary acts” (Woodcock, 2017a).64  Owing to Deliveroo’s limited capacity 
for carrying out disciplinary measures (in part due to Deliveroo’s lean model; in 
part due to workers’ “bogus self-employed relationship with Deliveroo”), 
Woodcock argues the company relies on close monitoring via a digital control 
infrastructure (including GPS and user interface interactions) to maintain 
practical control within the work process despite managers’ spatial distance 
from the work place, noting that “The appearance of an omnipresent and 
automatic method of supervising and disciplining workers is a cost effective 
method of control” (ibid.).  This form of organization inculcates “the feeling of 
being constantly tracked or watched” among workers but belies a “precarity for 
the platform itself” (Woodcock, 2017b).  The crucial point is that the appearance 
of control is illusory, founded on a “precarious assemblage” of managerial 
                         
64 Woodcock notes and responds to the objections which have been raised to the application 
of the panopticon metaphor to workplaces by McKinlay and Taylor (1998) and Taylor and 
Bain (1999). Further reading on that issue can be found in Woodcock (forthcoming). I have 
decided not to dwell on the precision of Woodcock’s terminology in relation to Bentham or 
Foucault’s uses of the term, but rather the substance of Woodcock’s contribution. 
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techniques within which Deliveroo relies “on an algorithmic Panopticon to 
manage the indeterminacy of the labour process” (Woodcock, 2017a).  In this 
sense, Woodcock problematizes the suggestion of a fairly incidental lack of 
transparency, such as identified by Lee, by identifying a strategy of opacity on 
the part of the company, albeit with uncertain results. 
 
The management theories discussed in this chapter give little impression of the 
potential of workers’ resistance after the theories’ implementation, but 
Woodcock’s research suggests management algorithms alone do not 
overcome the indeterminacy of labour power.  His work on Deliveroo prompts 
us to consider, for example, what information won’t be gathered into 
performance data, what knowledge will be retained by workers, and whether 
algorithms may in fact conceal data from managers.  In other words, Woodcock 
reminds us of the gaps that remain in the real-world application of managerial 
models, which, to paraphrase Cleaver (1979: 42-3), “it serves little purpose to 
study…unless they are recognized as strategies that capital must struggle to 
impose”.  As this chapter suggests, such a struggle involves considerations of 
ensuring workers’ cooperation.  Moreover, the increasingly complex systems 
indicated by algorithmic management raise questions of the persistence of 
unknowability as a condition of managing a cybernetic environment, despite 
the increase in tracking capabilities.  As de Certeau (1984: 40) suggests, the 
strategic “expansion of technocratic rationality” could make itself vulnerable to 
a scene of “Brownian movements of invisible and innumerable tactics”, which 
opens up the prospect of workers’ resistance, which I explore in Chapter 5.  
First, I continue the present study by turning to empirical cases through which 
to further discuss the politics of algorithmic management and lay the basis for 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
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Only by understanding the actual conditions of life and the actual strivings of 
an actual working class at a certain stage of its development, can the 
problems of humanity as a whole be understood. 
 






This dissertation has made the case for autonomist engagement with the 
politics of new managerial technologies and examined the theoretical 
perspectives within which their use can be situated.  In this chapter, I describe 
the labour processes of a range of computationally-supported distribution work 
settings in order to draw out some of the conceptual issues presented by 
‘algorithmic management’, broadly construed.  In doing so, I begin the class 
composition analysis proper by rooting it in the experiences of workers I have 
spoken to, as I advocated in Chapter 1.  After outlining the significance of 
logistics work, I introduce my methods before presenting a series of case 
studies based on interviews, documentary sources, photographs and a tour.  I 
arrive at a discussion of what I call management interfaces, the politics of which 
becomes the conceptual focus of Chapter 4.  This chapter therefore serves to 
describe the technical class composition of algorithmic management in 
distribution work, providing a basis for the political analysis of algorithmic 
management in Chapter 4 and, ultimately, the inquiry into the political forms 
available to workers in Chapter 5.   
 
Logistics of inquiry 
 
From warehouse to their house 
 
As discussed in the introduction, the logistics sector has in recent years 
attracted political attention on a variety of fronts, from its association with ‘zero-
hour’ contracts in the UK to its status in (or as) the infrastructure of globalized 
capitalism.  This dissertation homes in on the work processes and class 
relations of distribution work from warehouses, such as those which fulfil 
internet shopping orders and replenish supermarket stock, to algorithmically-
mediated delivery services, such as those where ‘self-employed’ drivers and 
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riders deliver parcels and food to customers’ houses.  The cases that comprise 
this chapter do not follow one particular supply chain, although some of them 
are practically sequential (for example, a supermarket ‘online shopping’ 
department and a supermarket shopping delivery), and I have broadly ordered 
them to complement these relations where they exist.  The cases detail the 
work of a ‘picker-packer’ in a supermarket distribution warehouse, an overview 
of an Amazon ‘fulfilment centre’ based on a guided tour, and the experience of 
pickers in an e-commerce distribution centre.  As Rushton et al (2014: 303) 
note, in outbound distribution “order picking typically accounts for about 50 per 
cent of the direct labour costs of a warehouse”.  Also featured is the work of a 
Christmas temp ‘packer’ at another e-commerce warehouse and a 
supermarket ‘shopper’ who collects online shopping orders.  Finally, I outline 
the work of a supermarket online shopping driver, an e-commerce delivery 
platform driver, and riders for a food delivery platform.  As I will show, each of 
these jobs has its specificities, but they also correspond and diverge with one 
another in interesting ways that help us understand the technical composition 
of algorithmically-managed distribution work.  Of the cases I discuss, the food 
delivery platform is the odd one out by virtue of its lack of contact with 
warehouses in any sense,65 but, as I will show, it provides a useful point of 
reference both in elevating the ‘algorithmic’ component of the types of work 
discussed throughout this dissertation, and in demonstrating the managerial 
continuum between warehouse-oriented work and the forms of work usually 




                         
65 Albeit we could point to the growth of so-called ‘dark kitchens’ in the service of Deliveroo, 
which problematizes any sharp distinction between restaurant deliveries and other forms of 




In its ‘Hotlines’ inquiry into call centres in Germany, the communist inquiry 
group Kolinko (2002) sums up what it argues is the historical importance of 
examining the work process: “The way people work in a call centre is neither 
an accident nor the product of a master plan. Rather it is a result of the class 
conflicts over the last decades and has to do with workers’ behaviour.”  Their 
statement broadly encapsulates the autonomist perspective on technical class 
composition, introduced in Chapter 1 as the component of class composition 
analysis that focuses on the organization of labour within the work process.  An 
inquiry into technical composition, says François Matheron (1999), is an 
“analysis of the labor process, of the technology, not in sociological terms but 
rather as sanction of the relations of force between classes”, which is to say 
the labour process as it arises generatively from the balance of power between 
labour and capital.66  The technical composition analysis in this chapter 
therefore provides an exposition of the fundamental labour processes of the 
different cases, before clarifying aspects that provide a route into teasing out 
the class relations (as political composition) over the following two chapters. 
 
It should be noted that the departure from what Matheron refers to as the 
sociological composition does not arise from a hard-headed attitude towards 
the discipline of sociology, historical debates notwithstanding.67  Rather, a class 
composition analysis is in fact concerned with avoiding the pitfalls of formal 
descriptions of class as prescribed by orthodox Marxist tendencies; namely, it 
intends to explain the practical relations of workers to the productive process, 
and therefore the possibility of exercising power, rather than classifying 
workers purely as “‘non-possessors’ of the means of production” (Kolinko, 
                         
66 The unusual use of the word ‘sanction’ likely arises from its translation into English. The 
Larousse dictionary gives the French sanction as ‘conséquence naturelle d'une acte’; i.e. 
natural consequence of an act. 
67 See Chapter 1. 
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2002).  Particularly given the ‘interest’ in working-class organization and 
liberation hanging over the workers inquiry and political accounts (in Cleaver’s 
sense of the term),68 it would be philosophically problematic if autonomist 
praxis were to define the situation and characteristics of the working class as a 
remainder to capitalist structures, such as in classical terms of the relation to 
the means of production.  Chapter 2, for example, reviewed a number of 
management theory positions whose implementation envisions little room for 
autonomous working-class organization; the benefit of a class composition 
analysis is it understands the organization of work as a practical scramble for 
the ‘frontier of control’ (Goodrich, 1975).  For Kolinko, this is a crucial point: 
“The possibility of self-organization can only be derived from the fact that 
workers have a practical relation to each other and to capital: they are working 
together in the process of production and they are part of the social division of 




Chapter 1 made the case for a reconnection of autonomist analysis to the 
methodological approach of the workers inquiry.  Others have likewise argued 
for a revivification of the workers inquiry (Woodcock, 2017c; Notes From Below, 
2018; Figiel et al, 2014), but as with the 1960s operaisti, there remains an open 
question over the actual methods entailed.  The workers inquiry is a 
fundamentally ‘interested’ methodology, in that it attempts to capture what is at 
stake in the research site and does not hesitate to commit the research to a 
political objective.  In this vein, Woodcock (2017c: 32) notes: “It is important to 
stress that the workers’ inquiry was not seen solely as academic method; 
instead it formed an important component of a political project.”  Certainly, there 
is a tension between the norms of much academic research and the more 
explicitly political ambitions of those who pioneered the workers inquiry in 
                         
68 i.e. With a primary focus on the fundamental power struggle within capitalism. 
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1960s Italy, as discussed in the section on ‘proletarian sociology’ in Chapter 1.  
Wellbrook (2014) argues the formalities of contemporary academia mean it is 
simply unsuited to generating meaningful contributions to workers’ struggles.  
Part of Wellbrook’s perspective reflects a longstanding debate about workers 
inquiries having two types: inquiry ‘from above’ or ‘from below’ (Reiser, 2001; 
Woodcock, 2014; Notes From Below, 2018).69  In large part owing to two 
contrasting approaches adopted by Romano Alquati for his inquiries into Fiat 
and Olivetti, the ‘inquiry from above’ is generally characterized as involving an 
external researcher engaging with a workplace through methods such as 
interviews or surveys, whereas an ‘inquiry from below’ privileges ‘co-research’ 
between participant-observers and other workers.  Although a caveat is often 
made that an ‘inquiry from above’ is welcome if the conditions do not permit an 
‘inquiry from below’, current researchers in this area are quite unequivocal that 
an ‘inquiry from below’ is always the preferred methodology where possible 
(Notes From Below, 2018). 
 
My sense is that the distinction between the two is overstated.  While I 
appreciate the democratic impulse that accompanies the preference for inquiry 
‘from below’, the implication that inquiry ‘from above’ carries a lesser strategic 
benefit appears misplaced.  Although it is fair to acknowledge that the criteria 
and norms of some types of research project (such as a doctoral dissertation) 
may hinder direct application to workers’ struggles within the framework of the 
research itself, the usefulness of the research to those struggles arguably has 
as much to do with dissemination as method.  Alquati’s initial interview-based 
inquiry at Fiat constitutes an inquiry ‘from above’, but nonetheless it has passed 
into labour movement lore.  More influential yet is Paul Romano and Ria 
Stone’s ‘The American Worker’ (1947).  Produced through the Johnson-Forest 
Tendency, it is an inquiry of two halves, with Romano’s autoethnography as a 
                         
69 It is in this sense Wellbrook (2014) poses the attributive ‘workers inquiry’ and the 
possessive ‘workers’ inquiry’ against one another. Both appear in the literature. 
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car factory worker followed by Stone’s Marxist analysis.  While ‘The American 
Worker’ is characterized by Romano’s direct testimony and descriptions of his 
workmates, the conceptual development is carried out by Stone, and the 
project was neither produced in conjunction with other workers nor conducted 
(in itself) as an organizing project — so it is a workers inquiry neither ‘from 
below’ nor ‘from above’.  It should also be noted that inquiries which are 
genuinely ‘from above’ have been advocated by Taylor (1911), Mayo (1975) 
and others; that is, inquiries seeking to maintain the position of those who 
already find themselves ‘above’ in the capitalist social hierarchy.  By contrast, 
a workers inquiry however it is carried out is properly defined by its normative 
commitment to the political advancement of the working class against the ruling 
class. 
 
Approach and challenges 
 
Inspired by Alquati’s inquiries at Fiat and Olivetti, Kolinko’s (2002) ‘Hotlines’ 
inquiry, and Woodcock’s (2017c) inquiry into the call centre sector, this 
dissertation is the product of a number of methods that have been used to 
gather insight into the current state of algorithmically-managed distribution 
work.  As Fantasia (1989: 248) notes, contestation in workplaces does not tend 
to “‘stand still’ long enough for a researcher to arrive…and compile a record as 
detailed as one that might be compiled in a settled community, for example.”  
With this in might, I adopted a flexible approach to data collection which 
generated eight ‘cases’ comprising oral evidence, documentary evidence, and 
(in one case) observation.  Case studies not do aspire to representativeness 
(George and Bennett, 2004: 30), but they are useful for generating and 
developing theories about social dynamics which might be applicable across a 
number of sites, while incorporating the contextual distinctions between them 
(ibid.: 31).  George and Bennett (ibid.) note: “Case study researchers are more 
interested in finding the conditions under which specified outcomes occur, 
rather than uncovering the frequency with which those conditions and their 
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outcomes arise.”  In this sense, the use of cases in this dissertation is 
appropriate to theorizing the political dynamics of algorithmically-managed 
workplaces, particularly when anchored in oral evidence.  As Thompson (with 
Bornat, 2017: 5) argues, oral testimony is important to critical research because 
it is sensitive to sociopolitical complexities and allows the juxtaposition of data 
from different sources, such as official trade union statements and the voices 
of rank-and-file workers (ibid.).  Its ability to reveal workplace cultures and 
social dynamics means oral evidence has been of specific importance to labour 
scholarship historically (ibid.: 147-52), and its use in conjunction with 
documentary sources has often proved crucial to research on ‘grassroots’ 
political activity in particular, for example in developing Belinda Robnett’s 
(1997) theory of “micromobilization” in the African American civil rights 
movement. 
 
To generate the cases presented in this research, I conducted seven semi-
structured interviews (one of which was with a pair of participants), gathered 
press clippings and trade union press releases, attended two Amazon guided 
tours, trawled company websites, sourced technical specification sheets, and 
interviewees provided me with company induction materials, photographs and 
screenshots.  The eclectic compilation of empirical sources reflects the 
guardedness — and indeed the ‘messiness’ (Law, 2004) — of the sector and 
the access issues involved in researching it.  Many of the most prominent 
companies operating in the distribution sector have been noted for their vigilant 
approach to security when it comes to the labour process, and more 
specifically, labour conditions.  While the former may be a matter of commercial 
interests, the latter has become a matter of first media and subsequently 
government interest.70  This presents a challenge for observing the work sites 
first hand.  I wrote to a number of companies asking to observe their distribution 
                         
70 Among those called to the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee (2017a) 
were Sports Direct, Asos and Deliveroo. 
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centres, or to interview operational managers, but none replied to my 
correspondence.71  Although the correspondence explained the research in 
neutral terms, it is also the cases that adopting a critical or partisan research 
perspective can close of avenues of investigation (Fantasia, 1989: 251), so 
even if I had received a reply it could have been the case that managers would 
have declined to proceed with observations or interviews upon learning more 
about the research project. 
 
Moreover, the nature of the work presents challenges in finding employees who 
will take part in the research.  Many distribution centres have a high turnover, 
leading to weak social ties and therefore presenting a problem for attempts to 
snowball.  Non-managerial, temporary and agency employees are less likely to 
appear on networking websites such as LinkedIn, inhibiting the possibility of 
contacting employees remotely.  One option would have been to stand at the 
gate of a distribution warehouse and invite people to participate, but there are 
ethical implications in inadvertently singling employees out; one interviewee 
who had experience of such ‘gate job’ tactics reported that managers had 
threatened disciplinary action against anyone who took part in research on 
working conditions.  With these concerns in mind, I ruled out the potential of 
recruiting participants at their place of work. As Fantasia (ibid.: 247-8) notes, 
the conflictual context of working-class political action confronts the researcher 
with both the issue with the issue of partisanship and the potential that 
prospective participants may be highly mistrustful of the researcher.  In this 
sense, Fantasia argues, partisanship can in fact be necessary to gain access 
when researching topics such as workplace resistance (ibid.).  With this in 
mind, I leveraged my own political activity in labour and social movements to 
                         
71 An alternative option would have been to explore the possibility of covert observation, such 
as conducted by Woodcock (2017c). The option was considered, but practical circumstances 
meant it was not feasible.  However, covert observation (particularly an ethnography) would 
have carried the further methodological consequence of weighting the study to one particular 
site rather than a range. 
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secure interviews with the first two participants who I judged might be 
competent narrators (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995: 21-5) of working experience 
in the logistical sector, approaching one at a social movement discussion 
event, and contacting the other through a trade union.  I was able to establish 
common ground with these individuals to build rapport (Berg, 2004: 99) prior to 
their participation, which led first to their interviews and subsequently to the 
interviewees providing me with further access in the form of documentary 
sources, a further interview and vouching for my credibility when helping me 
recruit other participants.  Two further participants were interviewed together: 
one was known to me through prior mutual political networks; the other was 
recruited by the first participant, who vouched for me.  Given my ethical 
obligation to avoid harm to participants (Rubin and Rubin, 2012: 89), I agreed 
with participants that their identities and participation would be kept 
anonymous, as well as the exact locations of their workplaces or interviews, 
given the possibility that not only could such information be used to identify 
them, but there exists a precedent of workers facing punitive consequences for 
talking to investigators in this sector (Berg, 2004: 65; Gibbons, 1975). 
 
In ‘The American Worker’ (1947), Romano used a diary to build a composite 
picture of the workplace based on observations and anecdotes.  In addition to 
developing a ‘bricolage’ of empirical sources, I also chose to conduct interviews 
in a semi-structured way so they could provide as opportunities to elicit stories 
and situational detail (Rubin and Rubin, 2012: 97).  Upon introducing consent 
forms to the participants, I took the opportunity to introduce the overarching 
themes of the study and signpost the broad trajectory of the interview (Holstein 
and Gubrium, 1995: 41).  Drawing on a ‘vignette’ approach (Barter and Renold, 
1999) and sensitive to the principles underlying co-research inquiries, I began 
each interview by asking the participant to describe a typical day (drawing on 
Kolinko, 2002), including asking hypothetical questions (e.g. ‘What happens 
if…’) and clarifying details.  I treated this as my “essential question” (Berg, 
2004: 85) which anchored the interview by allowing the participant to verbally 
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‘show’ me around the workplace during a normal working day (Rubin and 
Rubin, 2012: 116).  Subsequently, I allowed the interviews to flow quite freely, 
adopting a friendly and responsive style which took the participants’ ideas 
seriously (ibid.: 36, 38).  Occasionally I offered some of my own knowledge and 
anecdotes relating to the sector to encourage elaboration on context to 
encourage participants to elaborate on context as well as their own attitudes 
and beliefs (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995: 45), but I was mindful to merely ‘echo’ 
participants when they were talking in-depth (Berg, 2004: 109).  Although the 
interviews were all semi-structured, I did draw on Berg’s advice by keeping an 
interview schedule to hand to ensure the interviews did not skip any relevant 
areas of discussion (ibid.: 84).  What follows is a set of descriptions of the 
various labour processes, generally reflecting the ‘typical day’ structure but with 
extra information pertaining to the technical organization of aspects such as 
performance tracking where necessary.  In line with my agreement with 




Supermarket distribution centre, Greater London (Lorenzo) 
 
Among the industrial parks of the Heathrow service area, a food distribution 
centre works on behalf of a national supermarket to sort and send food to stores 
across London.  I speak to Lorenzo, a ‘picker-packer’, whose job involves 
moving stock from large pallets to cages which will be delivered to 
supermarkets.  His day begins with a text message, prior to the start of the shift, 
which tells him whether the shift is confirmed or cancelled based on his 
productivity the previous day.  The shift begins in the briefing area, where a 
shopfloor manager tells a group of around eighty employees the day’s targets 
and delivers feedback (often somewhat forcefully) on the previous day’s 
performance figures.  Paid time begins when employees receive a ‘watch’ — a 
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Motorola WT4000 wearable device strapped to the forearm (Figure 1) — and 
scan a barcode to clock in in the briefing area. 
 
 
Figure 1. Motorola WT4000 series wearable terminal with ring scanner. 
Source: Lorenzo (with permission). 
 
Having clocked in, employees type a personal four-digital code into the watch 
and are allocated either the ‘chilled’ or ‘produce’ section.  The chilled section is 
kept between zero and two degrees Celsius, and the produce section around 
ten degrees Celsius.  Lorenzo explains that work in either section can be 
described as hostile due to the cold.  Work takes place on one of six ‘grids’ 
(Figure 2), each designated by a certain produce type.  Produce will often 
involve carrying large boxes of vegetables, whereas ‘small items’ work will 
involve packing produce like sandwiches and yoghurts.  Lorenzo tells me the 
division of produce often tends to inspire a gendered division among workers.72  
                         
72 In the first instance this tends to lead to men taking on the heavier work, but Lorenzo did 
also note that some workers try to assert a ‘men only’ rule in the meat grid regardless of the 
actual physicality involved in handling meat. 
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On entering the allocated work section, shopfloor managers73 tell the workers 
which pallets are ready.74 
 
 
Figure 2. A ‘grid’ lined with cages at Greater London supermarket distribution 
centre. 
Source: Lorenzo (with permission). 
 
The shift is made up of ‘assignments’.  Each assignment involves being 
allocated a pallet, scanning the pallet, moving the pallet using your assigned 
                         
73 There are four supervisors, or ‘shop floor managers’, on the floor. They are located 
between the grids and pallets. 
74 The pallets having been sorted by the employees working on ‘breakdown’ in the Goods In 
section. 
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trolley, and unloading items from the pallet into cages along the grid (Figure 3).  
Each cage corresponds to a particular destination, and the aisle along the grid 
is around 100m in distance.  Once cages are full, workers from the Goods Out 
section will move them to shipping bays, but picker-packers must bring new 
cages to the grid (for which they will be given a set amount of time).  Pallets 
can contain anything from one (large) to 500 (small) items, and often weigh 
around 600-700kg.  Sometimes it can be the case that although a pallet is 
physically ‘ready’ it cannot be electronically ‘received’ by the picker-packer 
because it has not been registered into the database yet, causing a detrimental 
effect on the productivity rate. 
 
 
Figure 3. Workers returning pallets at Greater London supermarket 
distribution centre. 
Source: Lorenzo (with permission). 
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The watch contains a screen interface, a number pad, and a barcode scanner 
which is clipped onto the end of the index finger.  Once workers have a pallet, 
the watch will tell them where to go (i.e. which cage) and which items to 
transfer.  This involves scanning both the cage and item each time, and 
‘confirming’ receipt of the item via the buttons, which adds to the physicality of 
the work. 
[The watch] is sort of heavy, it’s like maybe, I don’t know, 400 grams or 
something? Which doesn’t seem too much, but if you’ve got every day 
and you have to like.. I mean, how many times, you could calculate.. 200 
items per hour, but that’s like, let’s say, 1600 per shift, and for each item 
you have to look at it like at least.. So you make this kind of hand 
movement about 4000 times or something. So, and you’ve got the 
scanner combination, you’ve got the scanner on the finger, so you 
basically use your finger to kind of operate the scanner. 
 
A Motorola (2008) specification sheet states the wearable terminal with strap 
weighs either 391.2g or 440.7g depending on whether the terminal features an 
extended battery.  Through the scanning of items, managers compile records 
of the workers’ productivity rates both per assignment (pallet) and across the 
shift.  Two main figures are communicated to workers: a percentage figure 
based on the company’s hourly pick targets, and a cases per minute (CPM) 
rate.  In addition to the text message and briefing room session, there are 
several ways for workers to be informed of their productivity rate: 
 
One is a person [supervisor] of the temp agency — this doesn’t apply 
for the permanent workers — comes along and picks out people who 
are too slow and they show them a print out, they show them a print out 
which shows, let’s say, up to the last half an hour what your pick rate 
was, and if it’s, let’s say, below ninety percent or something they say you 
have to work a bit harder. (Figure 4) 
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The third way was, or temporarily is, a screen inside the warehouse. So 
they have screens where you can, at the end of the grid, when you 
return, you can see your own code and the percentage. The problem 
that they have with that is that workers (laughs) were standing there for 
about five minutes, you know, to wait for their number to come up and 
they had always like a commotion in front of these screens, so they 
abolished them again.75 … They were like in the airport where you like 
wait for your kind of you know number to come up…maybe they had like 
ten codes on there and there are like eighty people. 
 
Another method exists in the unauthorized use of the supervisors’ computer, 
which I will discuss further in Chapter 5.  There is one break per shift, which 
must be clocked on and off using the scanner.  Workers are released for breaks 
ten at a time, which can cause delays.  Lorenzo explains there can also be 
delays of up to an hour at the end of a shift because workers must stay until 
their pallets are finished.  At the end of the day, workers scan off the grid and 
clock out, ending paid time, and then return the wristwatch to a supervisor. 
                         
75 Lorenzo clarified the screens were used for six months before being switched off, with 
supervisors citing health and safety reasons. They were later switched back on, but no 
reason was given. 
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Figure 4. Productivity print out, Greater London supermarket distribution 
centre. 
Source: Lorenzo (with permission). 
 
Amazon fulfilment centre 
 
On two tours of Amazon’s LTN2 fulfilment centre, I was able to glimpse the 
basics of the labour process there.  The tours follow the journey of a stock item, 
which gives you the chance to see different groups of workers.  The centre is 
hot and noisy.  Stock comes into the warehouse via a Goods In bay.  
‘Associates’ shelve the items in the pick tower based on available space.  Aisles 
are divided into stacks, stacks into bays, bays into shelves, and shelves into 
sections.  The shelves are colour-coded, and each shelf section has its own 
barcode.  The shelver scans the barcode on the item and the barcode on the 
shelf section, and the item is stored.  Items are stored ‘at random’, in order to 
ensure shelvers and pickers need not walk further than necessary.  Pickers are 
tasked with picking items from shelves and loading them into totes (plastic 
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boxes).  Each picker uses a handheld scanning ‘gun’, which is attached to the 
wrist by a looped cord.  Scan guns, a Motorola MC3000 model, are stored in a 
docking bay, with a screen showing how many guns are docked, in use, in 
repair, or unaccounted for at a given moment.  The scan gun possesses a 
screen interface, which displays the next item to be picked and its location, as 
well as information about how many items have been picked, and “generally 
how you’re doing” (in one tour guide’s words).  We were not given the chance 
to look at a scan gun on the tour, but a BBC Panorama (2013) investigation 
shows the gun’s interface displaying the picker’s individual pick rate and a 
timer.  When a fellow ‘tourist’ asked what would happen if targets were not met, 
the tour leader said the company would try to find out if the employee needed 
to “receive more training” or be moved to another area, because targets are 
based on rates that have previously been achieved.  Items ordered online are 
conveyed via a live database to scan guns across the distribution centre.  The 
scan guns track where employees are within the picking spaces based on the 
last barcode they scanned.  A Motorola (2009) specification sheet says the 
device “provides real-time wireless data exchange for maximum productivity.”  
In principle, the database should allocate new orders to pickers who are within 
optimal distance of the item, ensuring both that the item is picked as soon as 
possible and that pickers do not have to travel great distances between picks.76  
Pickers walk to the location of the item as identified on the handheld screen, 
scan the item and shelf barcode, and place the item in a tote, which is on a 
trolley.  After picking the item, the handheld scanner gives the picker 
instructions for the next order to be picked.  A picker is unlikely to pick a whole 
order, but rather items from across multiple orders. A tote can fit around thirty 
items, depending on size.  Full totes are placed on a conveyor by the picker. 
 
                         
76 This is a form of waste reduction management inspired by Toyotist principles, as are many 
aspects of the Amazon management system. 
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Once conveyed, totes arrive at sorting stations.  The sorter takes the tote from 
the conveyor and scans each item, checking the quality.  A screen display tells 
the sorter where to put the item on a trolley.  Each sorter has a trolley, which is 
divided into shelves (such as A-F), which are divided into shelf-sections (such 
as 1-8). Each shelf-section is a separate order.  The sorted trolleys are wheeled 
a short distance to a parallel set of packing stations.  At the packing station the 
packer will start at A1, taking the items and scanning them.  A screen display 
will tell the packer which cardboard box to use, while a sticker printer will print 
a barcode label.  The screen also tells the packer their productivity rate 
measured in items per hour (Panorama, 2013).  The packer makes the box, 
packs the item, and if necessary puts brown paper into the box to protect the 
item.  Once the box is filled, the packer enters the box code onto a tape 
machine, which dispenses the correct amount of tape for that box.  Lastly, the 
barcode label is put onto the box.  The package is placed by the packer onto a 
conveyor.  The conveyor takes the parcel to the SLAM (‘scan label, apply 
manifest’) machine.  In seconds, the SLAM machine weighs the item to make 
sure it is likely to be the correct order, scans the packing barcode, prints a 
sticker label with the customer’s address and puts the label on the parcel.  
Incorrect items are conveyed to one side — likely causes are either incorrect 
orders or too much brown paper cushioning in the box.  Correct items are 
conveyed onto the last conveyor.  The final conveyor, like all the others in the 
centre, is made of rolling cylinders rather than a belt.  On this one, red blocks 
shuttle from side to side.  As parcels come down the conveyor, the shuttles 
move to push the parcel off the conveyor down the correct chute into the 
appropriate loading bay, based on the courier.  Associates then stack the 
parcels on pallets (big items around the edge, small in the middle) before 
wrapping them in cling film.  The pallets are loaded onto lorries to distribution 
centres, where they are posted to customers. 
 
As noted on the company’s operations website, each day the management 
team takes part in a gemba walk (inspired by the kaizen management 
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philosophy), which the general manager and heads of departments all attend.  
“They stop at each of the key processes (dock, receive, stow, pick, pack and 
ship) to review the top issues in the area. This helps the leadership team to 
understand what associates are working on and allows the teams to highlight 
any support they need” (Amazon Operations, n.d.).  Cleaning is happening all 
the time, but the entire centre stops processing orders for one hour each day 
to allow machine maintenance to take place.  The operation also appears to be 
paused while workers file into the canteen.  The announcement of the break 
was the first point at which workers were seen together; there are around 300 
associates on shift at normal (off-season) times, but they appear to work alone 
unless they are based in the Goods Out bay, which is the only place I observed 
associate-level staff talking to each other.  Meanwhile, the forces of 
management are present in a number of ways.  At their least prominent, there 
are notices around the centre with health and safety advice, instructions or 
allusions to the company’s continuous improvement ethos, and television 
screens on the ground level of the centre displaying a slideshow of three slides: 
a health and safety instruction, a short clip of an associate performing a task 
related to that area of the centre (e.g. packing a box), and a message relating 
to Amazon’s fundraising, charity or community achievements.  More 
conspicuously, in the middle of the ground level there is a security area with 
desks and overhead monitors, and a human resources ‘help centre’.  
Supervisors appear to wear differently coloured high-vis vests and seem to 
group together.  The managerial hand also appears in the canteen, where 
organized fun/theme days occasionally occur, and employees are encouraged 
to post their hobbies and interests on one board, and their workplace crushes 
on another. 
 
E-commerce distribution centre, Yorkshire (Elaine) 
 
A distribution centre in Yorkshire covers the area of approximately five football 
pitches and is three storeys high.  It serves the global distribution centre for an 
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e-commerce site specializing in clothing and employs a large number of people 
from the local area, which was deindustrialized through the 1980s and 1990s.  
The retail website is the umbrella company, which handles marketing and 
purchases on its website, but the fulfilment of orders at the distribution centre 
is overseen by a logistics firm that runs the warehouse and oversees staffing.  
Elaine, a local trade union organizer, estimates around half the staff are 
employed by an agency, with the other half employed by the logistics company.  
Employees of the logistics company are employed on ‘flex’ contracts, meaning 
employees’ working hours may be extended or reduced depending on 
company needs but they remain paid at a constant salary rate. 
 
When arriving on-site, workers go through security checks.  The basic check 
involves guards using security wands, but workers also press a ‘randomizer’ 
which allocates people for one of two levels of more detailed search.  Personal 
items are placed in lockers, and then workers clock in by swiping an employee 
card, beginning the paid portion of the shift.  Workers are allocated to either 
Goods In or Goods Out. In Goods In, stock from HGV loading bays is unpacked 
and sorted for storage at a rate of sixty-five items per hour.  In Goods Out, 
workers are given a ‘gun’ (also known as a ‘controller’), which houses a 
barcode scanner, a digital interface and a wrist strap.  The interface tells the 
employee what to pick and where to find the item.  The pick line is laid out in 
what is described as a ‘snake’ (Elaine gesticulates with an ‘S’ shape), which is 
designed to prevent congestion because in principle workers should start at 
one end and come out the other, repeating this route throughout the shift. 
 
The ‘gun’ also records the employee’s pick rate, showing the worker a number.  
Elaine tells me the target is 185 items per hour, but targets are not fixed or 
regulated.  Workers’ average pick rates are calculated for the whole time they 
are clocked in, including toilet breaks.  “Downtime” is monitored by team 
leaders via the handset, who are responsible for disciplining workers who fail 
to reach their targets.  Team leaders and section leaders comprise the 
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supervisory layer within the warehouse, with managers above them.  Other 
staff include security guards who operate a ‘stop-and-search’ policy and 
monitor “both visible and hidden” CCTV (XPO Logistics, 2016). 
 
The warehouse appears to run a lean model based on the demand of the retail 
website.  This means targets can fluctuate significantly, and historically 
employees have often had very little notice when their shift has been “flexed 
up” or “flexed down”, with instructions sent via SMS to workers’ mobile phones, 
but following a trade union initiative, workers are now given twenty-four hours’ 
notice of shift times. 
 
E-commerce distribution centre, Hertfordshire (José) 
 
José applied via an agency to work for a prominent e-commerce company as 
a Christmas temporary worker in one of its distribution centres.  He was 
successful and began working as a packer about eight weeks before 
Christmas.  Personal items were not allowed on the distribution centre floor, so 
he would begin a typical day by leaving his personal possessions in a locker, 
before walking to the briefing area and logging in with an electronic pass card. 
The briefing area contained large screens with a PowerPoint showing health 
and safety information, canteen offers, and other information such as rules.  At 
the briefing, which usually lasted four or five minutes, supervisors would tell 
workers the group targets, make them aware of any company messages, and 
occasionally announce novelties such as free pizza being provided at breaks 
or prizes for the most productive workers.  José describes a wall with workers’ 
names and photographs, assigning each of them to a workstation: 
 
There are eight lines, and you’ve got in this line twenty-six workstations, 
and you are to see yourself and your picture and then it says if you are 
singles or multis at the side, so they tell you, ‘Line two. Workstation ten. 
Multis’. 
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Workers would be assigned ‘singles’ or ‘multis’, referring to whether they will 
be packing one item per package or multiple items.  ‘Singles’ carried a 
productivity target of 102 items per hour, whereas for ‘multis’ workers would be 
expected to achieve 182 items per hour.  José would move to his assigned 
workstation and scan his pass card.  The workstation’s monitor would check 
his name and then ask him to check the workstation is clean and stocked with 
unmade boxes.  Either the workstation would be ready or he would need to do 
further preparation, in which case he would follow instructions on the screen 
advising him on making sure the workstation is ready.  Once ready, the shift 
could begin; José stood at the screen and it instructed him to scan the barcodes 
of a tote or a moveable ‘wall’ containing segmented shelves with a scanner 
which is attached to the workstation.  There were supposed to be two barcodes 
per wall but often they had been removed and not fixed.  José would scan items 
from the wall or tote, check the screen’s instructions, assemble the correct box 
and put the item(s) in, before placing the package on a conveyor belt that runs 
alongside the workstations at all times. 
 
Sometimes the conveyor would get jammed and switch off, in which case José 
was told to pile boxes on the floor beside him until it was moving again in order 
to maintain his productivity rate, which was being measured by the workstation 
scanner, but he tells me sometimes people would take the opportunity to log 
out and go to the toilet, or they would just take a short break despite the 
productivity calculation.  José would continue scanning and packing until 
everything from the wall had been packed.  At this point, there is supposed to 
be a new wall ready, but José said it was not always the case, which would 
mean waiting around.  Across his shift, José had two breaks of thirty minutes 
each.  Originally, he says, everyone went at the same time, but then the 
company began to stagger them.  Breaks meant José would sign out of the 
workstation computer and leave the warehouse floor through metal detector 
security gates in order to get to the canteen, doing the opposite on the way 
back. 
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The monitor José used showed him details of whichever item he was handling, 
as well as the necessary box.  It did not show his productivity, but both the 
company and the temp agency had supervisors on the warehouse floor at 
different supervisor ‘stations’.  There were also security stations with large 
monitors showing CCTV.  The team leaders, who work for the agency, would 
go to workers at the packing workstations and tell them their productivity based 
on a print-out.  José once asked how he could check his own productivity, but 
he was told he could only ask a supervisor for it.  Workers were told that the 
most productive temp workers could win a contract with the company, but José 
was not offered a permanent contract.77 
 
Online supermarket distribution centre, Sussex (Todd) 
 
Todd works as a ‘shopper’ as part of the online shopping department at a major 
supermarket.  Based in a normal store which is closed from 11pm to 7am, Todd 
begins work at 4am and finishes at 10am.  His job is to collect items from 
shelves; these will be compiled into full shopping orders to be delivered to 
customers’ homes.  When Todd arrives, he attends a team meeting in the 
empty loading area, where information will be relayed to workers, results of 
‘secret shoppers’,78 or managers will use the time to motivate workers (either 
positively or negatively).  It is a new feature; team meetings used to occur once 
a week in the training room in much smaller groups.  After the meeting Todd 
takes a handheld scanner from a shelf and logs into it.  It gives him a ‘shop’ 
and he goes to the starting point with a special trolley which holds eight boxes.  
Each box corresponds to an individual customer, but generally Todd will not 
collect one customer’s entire order — instead, on each shop he will pick a 
                         
77 But on his last day he was offered a Snickers and a Fanta. 
78 The ‘secret shopper’ is a research tool used by companies to see whether their employees 
are adhering to customer service rules or guidance. 
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portion of eight customers’ orders, and the full orders will be compiled after he 
has taken his full trolley to the rear-of-house warehouse. 
 
The scanner shows one item at a time on a screen with its precise location, 
and after each item is picked the next item on the interface will be the next 
closest item.  If an item is in its location, it is Todd’s responsibility to locate it.  
In the case of an item being sold out, Todd makes an appropriate substitution.  
After scanning the item, a different screen appears which tells Todd where to 
put the item on the trolley.  It used to be the case that a trolley may fill up before 
the shop had finished, but since the introduction of a “new system” products 
are weighed and measured, and shops are calculated to incorporate the spatial 
aspects of transporting the products on the trolley.  If there is not enough room 
in a box for the specified product, Todd presses an on-screen options button 
followed by an ‘item will not fit’ button, which will cancel from the shop any 
comparable or larger items which had been intended for that box. 
 
When Todd has filled his trolley, he takes it to the loading area where boxes 
are put in rows to be loaded into particular vans.  It is a busy area; while there 
are between twenty and forty shoppers on shift working front-of-house (as well 
as a full team of shelvers), there are generally only five or six team members 
sorting boxes for the vans, and even fewer actually loading them into the vans 
(of which there are generally around twelve).  Supervision is carried out by two 
shop-side team leaders, a manager for the tote sorters, a manager and team 
leader for the vans, two overall managers, and the head of the store.  Store 
security begins at 7am or 8am. 
 
Todd’s performance is measured based on items picked per hour (IPH).  His 
target used to be 115, but since the new system was brought in it has increased 
to 125.  The new system involves streamlining measures which have led to 
more densely packed (and therefore heavier) trolleys.  In the past, a particularly 
large shop would be around 120 items, and normal shops would often have 
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half-full boxes after the shop had been completed, but he says now it is “not 
uncommon to see a 200-item shop where literally the whole box will be full up”.  
There is nothing on Todd’s scanner to tell him whether he is reaching his target, 
but team leaders have access to live IPHs on a computer and will usually tell 
workers if they are not performing well enough. 
 
At the end of a shift it is common for team leaders to ask shoppers to stay on 
longer if they are part-way through a shop, but with the new system it is 
becoming more frequent that shops will be finished before the end of the shift, 
in which case Todd is asked to help the shelving team. 
 
Online supermarket delivery, Greater London (Lorenzo) 
 
Some time after our interview about the supermarket distribution centre, I 
received an email from Lorenzo telling me he had a new job and asking if I 
would like to talk to him about it.  He now works as a driver for a large 
supermarket chain, home-delivering grocery shopping bought online.  Lorenzo 
tells me there are two types of distribution centre where orders are fulfilled 
before being loaded for delivery — superstores with ‘shoppers’ who pick 
customers’ items from normal supermarket shelves, and specialized 
warehouses, which are not available to the public.  Lorenzo works at the latter 
type.  He says it employs around 1400 workers, including around 600 drivers, 
though not at the same time because shoppers in particular often work part-
time (Lorenzo guesses there are around 200 shoppers in the warehouse at a 
given time).  He estimates around fifty percent of the drivers are BAME, mostly 
southern Asian or Afro-Caribbean, and around ten percent are eastern 
European.  Drivers are generally employed as permanent staff but some work 
through an agency.  He observes that shoppers work with handheld devices 
up and down aisles, putting items into totes.  Conveyors ultimately take the 
items to the loading bay where loaders fill up the van sequentially.  As a driver, 
Lorenzo collects the van from the loading yard after it is loaded, and he says 
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there are generally no mistakes with how the vans have been filled.  He does 
not have an allocated delivery area, but he is generally confined to the same 
geographic ‘quarter’ of London, servicing the area about fifteen miles each way 
from the distribution centre. 
 
Lorenzo works in two four-hour blocks with a break in between.  His work 
revolves around using a handheld device similar to those used by postal 
workers and couriers.  The device incorporates sat-nav, customer orders, a 
scanner and a mobile phone.  Lorenzo tells me there used to be different 
devices, but workers asked for an integrated machine.  Most of the time he 
relies on the sat-nav, which was difficult at first.  He puts the customer details 
into the sat-nav and it gives him traffic updates and the route.  The sat-nav is 
“intelligent” — Lorenzo says drivers are encouraged to take a “better” route if 
they know one so the sat-nav will “learn”.  The sat-nav usually works, but 
occasionally creates problems if there are highway regulations such as where 
carriageways have been narrowed to prevent large vehicles.  In addition to the 
device, drivers have a paper manifest so they can still carry out the job if the 
machine fails (including taking signatures).  Each four-hour block will generally 
take Lorenzo to between four and ten customers, up to a maximum of twenty 
in a full two-block shift. 
 
Lorenzo (generally) follows the sat-nav to the customer’s door, but it can be 
hard to find addresses on built-up estates.  He does not have to scan totes out 
of the van, but the totes have labels and the sheet will say how many totes a 
customer has.  At the customer’s house the device is mostly used to collect a 
signature, but if the customer is unhappy about an item Lorenzo scans the item 
to take it off the bill, which will credit the customer’s online account.  The 
customer is allowed to keep the item; it is left to the driver’s discretion.  The 
device can also be used as a phone to speak to a call centre in case there is a 
delay, in the event a customer is not home, or in situations where there is a 
balance left to pay on an order, but Lorenzo says he only ever uses his private 
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phone because the device does not allow him to access customer details while 
he is on a call.  He says drivers actually tend to rely on their own phones “to an 
extent” because it can also be better to use Google Maps than the device’s sat-
nav.  He has to carry the totes into the customer’s kitchen and sometimes tries 
to make conversation. 
 
After four hours he is expected back at the yard (including for lunch), but he is 
not expected to return before the four hours are up, even if he did not need the 
full amount of time to complete the orders.  Sometimes productivity can be as 
low as three customers in four hours, in which case he can take long breaks 
sitting in the van as long as he does not leave the route, but sometimes there 
are days when he will struggle to finish inside four hours.  If drivers are left with 
spare time between deliveries, they are encouraged to call customers to see if 
they would like their delivery sooner, but each customer has a delivery time-
slot, drivers are not allowed to turn up early unannounced, and there has to be 
an allowance for travel disruption, so the schedule tends to be fairly generous.  
Lorenzo says there is generally little time pressure put on workers, such as 
targets, but the reception desk will use positive encouragement to try to get 
workers to take an extra lot of orders on their van if there are driver shortages 
and they have room. 
 
You can say like, ‘No I don’t want a double.’ They encourage you and 
the guys at the desk, they are really good at the, ‘Eh brother, you can 
do it!’ Y’know? 
 
Lorenzo says drivers can refuse to take extra loads, but they will be paid 
overtime if it is needed to finish orders, there are no penalties for being late, 
and the length of their breaks will not be affected.  It took Lorenzo about a 
month to realize this, and he said until that point he found the job quite stressful 
because he was always rushing to be on time while trying to get used to the 
sat-nav and unfamiliar parts of the city.  Sometimes the job can still be stressful 
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due to the physicality and if driving conditions are poor, but now he says on a 
good day the job can be enjoyable: 
 
On a good day it’s a bit of this, kind of, ‘masculine freedom’. You’re 
driving, you listen to some music, you drive through areas of London you 
haven’t seen, you’re going through some estates, there’s a kind of 
easiness about it. 
 
He also enjoys meeting the wide range of customers, and says it is interesting 
to see how different people live and eat. 
 
You go to some people and you feel like you assist someone to commit 
suicide because basically they don’t eat and just drink…and then you 
go to people with like three servants. 
 
But customers form the main source of sociality, and Lorenzo says: 
 
I never had a job where I talk less. 
 
He often talks hands-free to friends as he drives, and he sometimes chats to 
other drivers he sees at the beginning and end of shifts, in town or in the 
canteen, but he says even after six months he probably only knows about 
twenty of the 600 drivers.  In terms of supervision, Lorenzo says he did not see 
a manager for the first three months; he was only introduced to one following a 
complaint in which a customer complained Lorenzo had not been apologetic 
enough about a case of late-running: 
 




Lorenzo is aware his work record is kept on file.  He says he once scratched a 
bus and had to have a return-to-work meeting when he was ill for four days 
within six months (“that’s over the three percent mark”).  But minor 
misdemeanours like lateness do not seem to be a big problem, as long as 
drivers call in to the call centre on-route and, above all, they do not leave the 
route.  While some deviations are permitted (such as “better” routes), workers 
are informed their movements are monitored for location (via the vehicle’s GPS 
and front-facing CCTV), speeding and things like sharp braking (measured 
using a telematics box). 
 
E-commerce delivery platform, Greater London (José) 
 
After he stopped working as a warehouse packer, José began driving for a 
delivery platform that connects him to nearby e-commerce warehouses via a 
smartphone app.  After downloading the app, he filled out his data, driving 
licence information and bank details.  He waited ten days for a background 
check and then received an email saying his application had been activated.  
He has access to sixteen training videos through the app.  The app advertises 
time slots when he can take his car to the warehouse and pick up parcels for 
delivery, generally either the same day or the next day.  Once he has assigned 
himself to a slot the app tells him when he can check in at the warehouse.  
When he arrives on-site he checks in up to fifteen minutes before the shift is 
scheduled to begin by giving his name, and he is given a double-decker trolley 
filled with parcels.  He takes the trolley to his car and scans the parcels off the 
trolley with the app using the camera on his phone.  José says you are 
generally expected to take as many parcels as will fit, a normal amount being 
around forty, after which he tells an employee how many parcels he has taken. 
 
The shift begins with a swipe of the app.  José follows the GPS built into the 
app — he is not allowed to use an alternative GPS app — which can cause 
problems as it tends to be less reliable than some other apps.  This is an 
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important issue because for José to make the delivery (or make an attempted 
delivery) his app has to know he is in the right place.  If it thinks he is at the 
wrong location, he has to call a support line where an operative will recalibrate 
his location.  Attempted deliveries tend to get returned to the warehouse; the 
company generally asks drivers to try to leave parcels with neighbours, but 
José says it is not always practical in the time frame. 
 
José is paid for a four-hour slot, in which time he can usually deliver thirty-five 
to forty-five parcels.  If he has not completed all the deliveries in that time-
frame, he has little option but to continue regardless, because if he logs out 
without having delivered all the parcels the app may not pay him.  On the other 
hand, if José finishes all his deliveries early he still gets paid for the full four 
hours.  Apart from the training videos, José receives little in the way of 
supervision — he mentions just an occasional email with things drivers should 
not do (and which may cause them to be terminated).  He sees other drivers at 
the warehouse because they queue in two lines, but says there is not much 
time to talk and the starting hours differ day to day. 
 
Food delivery platform, south coast (Jamie and Noah) 
 
It’s an automated food delivery service without the automation. (Jamie) 
 
Workers of a food delivery platform at a southern coastal town are formally self-
employed, like others who make deliveries on behalf of the ‘gig economy’ 
platform company.  Workers join the platform with a very basic telephone 
interview, after which they have an induction with a ‘lead rider’. Following a 
basic online test,79 they go to the zone office to have the app (which is not 
publicly available) installed on their smartphone.  When signing up for the role, 
                         
79 Questions range from ‘Do you wash your hands after you go to the toilet?’ to ‘You come to 
a red traffic light. Do you a) stop or b) go?’ Respondents who fail can take unlimited resits. 
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workers are informed they will be expected to work both a Friday and Saturday 
of the same weekend twice a month. 
 
I speak to Jamie and Noah, a recent graduate and a university student who 
have been working for the platform as cyclists.  Before work, Jamie and Noah 
endeavour to leave their other jobs early, go home to make sure their mobile 
phones and riding accessories are fully charged, and turn the app on as soon 
as they leave the house again.  A shift begins whenever the worker logs into 
the app and marks themselves ‘available’.  When I speak to Jamie and Noah, 
the company is testing a feature called Pulse with some riders, which tells the 
rider if demand is low, normal or high, and offers the riders a graph of order 
demand.  Although the feature is in a beta phase, both informants point out it 
has aroused some cynicism and suspicion among riders about its accuracy. 
 
The app starts scanning for orders as soon as the rider has marked themselves 
available, refreshing every twelve seconds.  An embedded map is featured, 
displaying directions to the ‘zone centre’.  The zone centre is a designated spot 
in the town centre for workers to wait for orders.  Jamie and Noah tell me the 
company’s chosen zone centre led to riders being asked to leave by a nearby 
business, so they have informally created a new meeting point.  However, most 
workers do not use the zone centre (especially if they live in the town centre 
already), and there is a different assembly point for ‘peds’ (moped riders who 
work for the platform) because of local traffic rules.  Zones can cover either an 
entire metropolitan area (as in this case) or a section of a city. 
 
Workers in this zone earn £4 per drop, though there are different pay models 
across the country and continent.  Each ‘drop’ involves a new order being 
allocated to a rider via the app.  Once the worker accepts, they must make their 
way to the restaurant, collect the order, and take it to the customer.  The app 
offers a map and directions to the restaurant and customer, but I am told riders 
prefer to rely on their knowledge of the area.  If the worker does not accept, 
144 
they are issued an ‘unassigned’ penalty.  They can have up to ten percent 
unassigned before they attract the attention of managers. 
 
If there is a problem with a drop, such as a puncture or having a crash, the rider 
has to call the managers in the zone office, who will communicate with the 
restaurant and/or customer and give the rider an unassigned penalty.  The app 
also contains a link to an 0800 number, which will connect to the customer in 
the event they cannot find an address.80 
 
In the zone I investigated, there are two zone managers and, Jamie and Noah 
estimate, between 300 and 600 riders.  Workers do not have access to the staff 
numbers, but they tell me there has been a surge in new riders due to a recent 
recruitment drive, which has led to more workers quitting due to there being 
less work to go around.  The two types of riders (cyclists and ‘peds’ — moped 
riders) expect different performance rates.  For a cyclist, averaging four drops 
per hour is an achievement, but peds can hit higher numbers of drops.  Jamie 
and Noah say that at the time of the interview, ten drops per shift is good for 
cyclists, but for peds the figure is more like fifty or sixty.81  Some cyclists put 
this down to the way orders are allocated to riders, the process of which is the 
source of speculation to workers.  In particular, peds tend to reach higher drop 
rates by picking up a greater number of ‘doubles’ and ‘triples’, where multiple 
customers’ orders will be picked up from the same restaurant at the same time, 
meaning they can earn £8 or £12 for a single collection. 
 
The app monitors where the rider is via GPS, and their location is made 
available to both the restaurant and the customer.  When the drop is complete, 
the app will usually allocate a new drop within a reasonable distance, which 
                         
80 In the UK an 0800 number is free to call from a landline, and typically either low-cost or 
free from a mobile. 
81 It should be noted that although moped riders do have higher hourly averages, they also 
tend to work longer shifts than cyclists. 
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can lead to riders staying in one area of the zone for most of the shift.  Cyclists’ 
shifts tend to last two or three hours, with riders logging out of the app when 
they choose (at busy times by using a feature on the app, ‘make this my last 
order’), because if their drop rate dips it will bring down their hourly average 
(which is recorded in the app).  During peak hours riders often take risks in 
order to earn a higher hourly wage. 
 
The peak period is concentrated… So on Friday night, I’d be sitting at 
the zone centre, and your phone bings, and like, right this is the start 
and I have to cycle as many miles as I can before 9.30, and then the 
money stops…that was the situation on Friday, it just all dried up for 
cyclists at 9.30, but you know, like I’ve got, say, two hours to absolutely 
bust my balls and cycle the most amount of miles for the most amount 
of money. (Noah) 
 
On finishing work, some workers will congregate in zone central to compare 
stats using the ‘My Deliveries’ (i.e. order history) feature of the app.  Most riders 
will just go home, but the process of assessing stats post-shift is a common 
experience. 
 
There’s this constant problem where you’ll come in from a shift and 
probably about seventy to eighty percent of the time you’ll do the 
calculations and you’ll be really disappointed, and that’s kind of a 
horrible moment, because they make it easier, they give you the My 
Deliveries thing which shows you your deliveries per hour and if you see 
an hour with no deliveries in it, you’re like, ‘I literally didn’t work for an 
entire hour.. I didn’t make anything, I got zero per hour’ and like that’s 
just.. the app literally shows you your earning capacity, and I think it has 
a great demotivating capacity in a sense. (Jamie) 
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Once a week or less, workers are sent an email with a breakdown by the 
company.  The emails vary — each of my informants received a different type 
of (semi-)regular email — but they tend to include some metrics, such as 
average hourly earnings, time to accept orders, time to restaurant and time to 
customer.  It is not clear what the intended purpose of the email is, as the 
workers I spoke to say the metrics had never been brought up in their verbal 
communications with managers, which were already limited. 
 
Technical composition in distribution 
 
The purpose of describing work processes in this way is to gain a better sense 
of how work is organized and how workers interact with the labour process (and 
its technologies) in their daily activities.  But as I stated in Chapter 1, the 
technical class composition of work also bears a relationship to political class 
composition, in that it is the terrain on which struggle occurs.  As Kolinko (2002) 
states, the organization of work is “neither an accident nor the product of a 
master plan” — something that becomes more apparent in the following 
chapters.  First, I summarize key aspects of the technical composition of 
algorithmic management, particularly at the interface between workers and 
management, which provide a route into thinking about its political character in 




Each of the cases is characterized by the presence of some form of 
performance tracking, typically involving a mobile personal computer (with the 
exception of José’s Hertfordshire e-commerce distribution centre, where he 
used a scanner attached to a static personal workstation).  In all the warehouse 
cases, tracking was carried out using a scanner device — either a ‘gun’ or a 
‘wristwatch’.  Tracking was described primarily in terms of productivity rate 
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(such as items per hour), but with the exception of José (whose work required 
him to remain static), the workers’ ability to carry out their work also had a 
spatial dimension, most commonly in terms the worker being told the location 
of their next task.  This aspect was most significant in the work process 
described by Elaine, Todd and on the Amazon tours, because the worker’s next 
task would be assigned on the basis of their last scanned location (Lorenzo, by 
contrast, was acting based on the products he scanned from his pallet).  In the 
delivery jobs, the primary form of tracking was based on geographical location, 
measured by the GPS of their mobile phones, or in Lorenzo’s case, the multi-
purpose handset.  As Lorenzo was driving a company van, he had further 
means of being tracked in the form of the van’s telematics, CCTV and its own 
GPS.  While Lorenzo’s progress was tracked via a scanner (with a paper back-
up copy), José, Jamie and Noah all recorded their progress via an app, through 
which José scanned items with his mobile phone’s camera, and Jamie and 
Noah interact with buttons on the app.  In terms of tracking, Jamie and Noah 
had an added temporal dimension to their performance measurement, in that 
restaurants and customers would be anticipating their arrival. 
 
Evidence of tracking would be available to workers in different ways.  BBC 
Panorama (2013) showed an Amazon picker’s handset with a visible pick rate 
and countdown timer, but of the warehouse workers I spoke to only Lorenzo 
had any access to his own performance data — primarily in the form of a 
morning text message telling him whether the prior day’s performance would 
award him another shift, but also in the form of the screens which were used 
intermittently at the edge of the grid.  In all other cases, workers either had to 
ask for their productivity information or would only receive it verbally from a 
supervisor at their decision, generally if workers were underperforming.  No 
one I spoke to knew how warehouse productivity targets were set, except that 
Elaine described them as “unregulated”, whereas the Amazon tour guide said 
they were based on what the company knew to be achievable.  At Todd’s 
workplace the targets were increased with the introduction of a new ‘system’, 
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which he explained through the incorporation of new product-specific 
measurements.  For the delivery workers, the clearest evidence came from 
their GPS map as they worked.  For Lorenzo and José this was important 
because there were penalties for being in the wrong location, but otherwise 
their performance was not based on the ability to achieve a high productivity 
rate.  Jamie and Noah, by contrast, were not penalized for taking alternative 
routes (although they would do so knowing their movements were visible to 
multiple parties), but did receive a weekly email with performance figures, as 
well as earnings calculations via the app.  With the exception of Lorenzo and 
José’s delivery jobs, target-based performance (whether productivity or 
delivery speed) is the basis of supervisory discipline, and in one case shift 
allocation.  For Jamie and Noah, the combination of time-based performance 




Information transmission takes different forms for delivery workers and 
warehouse workers.  Delivery workers interact with an app (or job-specific 
device) which connects to the company via GPS and mobile data signal 
(3G/4G).  With the exception of José, warehouse workers interact with a 
handheld mobile device through scanning barcodes and selecting menu 
options, which transmits data via an in-built radio data terminal.82  In both cases 
workers communicate with what repeatedly gets referred to as ‘the system’ (or 
more succinctly, ‘it’) — a computer database (or databases) that manages 
stock or order progress, tracks the work of employees, time-stamps activity, 
calculates performance, and assigns new tasks where necessary.  In all cases 
except the static workstation and Lorenzo’s pallet work, new tasks are assigned 
to the worker based on their most recent tracked location, whether the next 
                         
82 In Rushton et al (2014), ‘radio data terminal’ is used synonymously with ‘scanner’. 
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item to pick, the next food order to collect, the next parcel to deliver or the next 
route to follow. 
 
As is apparent from Chapter 2’s discussion of Taylor, the principle of individual 
productivity being calculated as tasks-per-time is by no means novel.  
However, three things are striking about the logistical media at the centre of 
the labour process in these cases.  First, the continual streaming of work data 
in real-time: as long as the device is logged in, everything it does (including 
‘downtime’) is transmitted from the worker to a database.  Second, the spatial 
dimension.  As Jesse LeCavalier (2016: 4) points out, “information can be 
moved incredibly fast but objects must still be moved”; it would be one thing to 
interpret the algorithm merely in its quantitative dimensions, but we can see 
that it does matter how a task is carried out, for example pickers not walking 
too far at Amazon or delivery riders being encouraged to cycle fast.  To 
maintain control of these processes, logistical media are crucially locational 
(Rossiter, 2016: 4).  Third, the persistence of opacity with regard to how ‘the 
system’ works: what it does or does not track, how it allocates work, how 
decisions are made, and what happens with the data.  These are the primary 




Real-time spatial tracking is to the performance era what time and motion was 
to the command era, in that it shapes workers’ relation to work and to being 
managed.  Real-time spatial tracking enables the intensification of work but 
exceeds the need for ‘representation’; as I will demonstrate over the next two 
chapters, this can be both to management’s advantage and disadvantage.  But 
as Rossiter (2016: 6) notes, logistics is not simply about speeding processes 
up, but also about ‘calibrating time’ according to different factors and interests.  
Work process data is bound up within these calculations, which entails a 
necessary alignment of social relations — not just once or at regular intervals, 
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but in real-time.  As Rushton et al (2014: 355) state: “The continuous 
measurement of performance is obviously essential to monitor process 
improvement”. 
 
Central to the technical composition of algorithmic management in distribution 
work is the ongoing process of calibration, which implicates the location of 
goods, transmission of orders, means of transportation, management of space, 
and the actualization and management of labour power.  One sense of a 
‘management interface’ is the moment at which the control of labour is brought 
into calibration with other (quantifiable) logistical processes.  Similar to 
Hookway’s (2014) notion of an interface as a set of relations which together 
produce an effect, the management interface occurs when the ‘unplannable’ 
element of labour is brought under sufficient “technical control” (Edwards, 
1979: 112) to allow productive processes and capital accumulation to run with 
little turbulence, whether through the simple actualization of labour power 
within the agreements of the employment contract, or more drastic actions such 
as withdrawing shifts or ‘flexing’ working hours at short notice according to 
business needs.83 
 
What is notable about these cases is that the management interface (as 
calibration) can occur with relatively little involvement from human managers.  
Instead, part of the supervisory burden is taken up by a personal (handheld) 
device, which relays instructions to workers and performance data back to ‘the 
system’ (either to be stored on databases or fed back into algorithms).  But 
interactions with the device also represent a management interface, closer to 
Cramer and Fuller’s (2006: 150) description of an interface as 
 
                         
83 Edwards (1979: 112) defines technical control as involving “designing machinery and 
planning the flow of work to minimize the problem of transforming labor power into labor as 
well as to maximize the purely physically based possibilities for achieving efficiencies.” 
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the point of juncture between different bodies, hardware, software, 
users, and what they connect to or are part of. Interfaces describe, hide, 
and condition the asymmetry between the elements conjoined. The 
asymmetry of the powers of these bodies is what draws the elements 
together. 
 
In this sense, the interface is both a meeting point and a threshold defined by 
asymmetry between parties. 
 
These two perspectives of the ‘interface’ suggest different things about how 
labour is technically composed within the distribution process.  As a ‘moment’, 
the management interface refers to how labour is calibrated in relation to other 
logistical processes (and by extension other labour processes), i.e. how it is 
managed as a necessary component of a logistical chain.  ‘Calibrated’ here 
can entail timing, pace and movement across the workforce, as well as shift 
allocation.84  As a ‘place’, management interface refers to how labour is 
managed as living labour, through instruction, tracking, targets and 
identification, i.e. pertaining to the balance of social forces.  In this sense, the 
interface refers to issues of workers’ cooperation, which is to say the 
actualization of labour power.  The device itself contains a graphic user 
interface — this is not my interest here — but the device is interesting in the 
sense of its dual role ‘in the interface’ (a factor in an ongoing temporal 
alignment) and ‘at the interface’ (as a threshold between workers and ‘the 
system’).  As I discuss in the following chapters, this element of the technical 




                         




Following Chapter 2’s discussion of management theories in relation to 
algorithmic management, this chapter has begun to analyse the management 
of distribution work by introducing a series of cases at various points in the 
outbound distribution process.  Following further discussion of the 
methodological approach, I have described the technical composition of a set 
of workplaces that share various aspects of ‘algorithmic management’.  From 
these cases I have drawn out three aspects for further discussion: tracking; the 
temporal, spatial and opaque features of ‘the system’; and the idea of the 
‘management interfaces’.  I have argued real-time spatial tracking helps us 
think about labour in two senses: as a logistical component, and as a social 
force.  This has led me to consider two senses of ‘interface’ within the 
algorithmically-mediated labour process: interface as a moment of logistical 
calibration, and interface as a threshold or meeting point of asymmetric 
elements.  Overall, this chapter has described the technical composition of 
distribution work in such a way that we may consider how the use of cybernetic 
and non-machinic components create a distinctive managerial effect.  This will 
be the topic of Chapter 4, which discusses the political effects of algorithmic 
management, before arguing for the significance of the workplace resistance 
that exists in these workplaces in Chapter 5. 
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couldn’t find my boss 
so I stopped and did nothing 
then my boss found me 
 






Having situated algorithmic management within a history of management ideas 
and technologies in Chapter 2, and responding to the relevance of class 
composition analysis and the workers inquiry methodology established in 
Chapter 1, in Chapter 3 I began a class composition analysis of algorithmically-
managed distribution work by describing the technical composition of a series 
of empirical cases.  These cases showed the centrality of tracking and 
information transmission to the organization of work by algorithmic 
management, and I began to reflect on how these techniques affect the 
temporal and spatial aspects of work, while their internal workings, or logic, 
remain opaque to workers. 
 
The starting point of this chapter is a basic recognition that algorithmic 
management is about more than just the rational organization of processes.  In 
this sense, although the term ‘algorithmic management’ could invite a focus on 
the specificities of particular algorithms, an explanation of specific algorithms 
as technical artifacts would not necessarily assist a critical analysis of 
algorithmically-mediated work as a sociopolitical imaginary.  Even if barriers of 
access could be overcome and sections of code could be obtained, it is not 
clear that we would find in them the hidden principles of algorithmic 
management, and certainly not ones with the explanatory power to account for 
the modes of organization and politics that lie beyond the point of algorithmic 
execution.  As Nick Seaver (2018: 378) argues, “press on any algorithmic 
decision and you will find many human ones”.  This chapter therefore builds on 
antecedent chapters by enquiring into algorithmic management in terms of the 
effect an enhanced computational capability has upon the managerial 
operation as a social, political force.  Specifically, I investigate what algorithmic 
management means for four elements of work: 1) labour demand, which I 
examine through a comparison of different approaches to bringing workers to 
the work process; 2) workflow, especially workers’ experience of work and its 
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organization; 3) communication, in terms of codified device interactions, 
ongoing data tracking, and sociality between workers; 4) space, in terms of the 
organization of the workplace and work.  I then build on these concerns by 
examining the effect of algorithmic management on authority in the workplace 
— or the effect of algorithmic management on management — not only in terms 
of the managerial use of an algorithmic management system, but also the types 
of managerial subjectivity it produces. 
 
The chapter serves as an analysis of the politics of managerial power indicated 
by algorithmic management.  It politicizes the technical composition found in 
distribution work by asking what the effect of algorithmic management 
techniques are on workers, as well as human supervisors, and through 
advancing an account of the forms of management instantiated by algorithmic 
management technologies such as handheld scanners.  In doing so, this 
chapter sets out the political terrain of the algorithmically-managed distribution 
workplace in preparation for a discussion of workers’ political agency in 
Chapter 5. 
 
What algorithmic management means for work 
 
In Chapter 3 I introduced a series of workplaces and roles which are subject to 
algorithmic management.  In this section I examine four key effects of 
algorithmic management which rearrange aspects of work, particularly as felt 




In their study of Uber, Rosenblat and Stark (2016: 3759) argue managerial 
strategies of “worker engagement” — i.e. the point at which workers are 
engaged in work — are predicated on “information and power asymmetries” 
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which empower the employer to “effect conditions of soft control” (sic).  In 
Chapter 3’s cases this dynamic can be felt most firmly in the text messages 
reported by Lorenzo and Elaine at their respective distribution centres.  At 
Lorenzo’s Greater London supermarket distribution centre, a text message is 
sent to tell workers whether their shift is confirmed or cancelled based on their 
productivity score on the previous day.  While the supermarket distribution 
centre’s shift allocation system is based on agency workers being employed 
on zero-hour contracts, at Elaine’s Yorkshire e-commerce distribution centre, 
text messages tell workers whether their upcoming shift has been lengthened 
or shortened based on a contract stipulation which allows the company to make 
adjustments to shift times based on its need for labour.  In both these cases, 
information and power asymmetries rooted in the workers’ employment 
contracts are leveraged at the expense of their economic security.  However, 
cases situated in the ‘gig economy’ offer differing ‘worker engagement’ 
approaches to meeting their demand for labour, each of which has to account 
for the formal choice to work that exists in gig economy work. 
 
The first — referred to here as Flex — is the tool used to match freelance 
drivers such as José to package collection slots.  Flex drivers use an app to 
accept requests to collect parcels from an e-commerce warehouse depot at an 
advertised time, after which the app is used in conjunction with the smartphone 
to track the delivery route using GPS and record the delivery of parcels using 
the camera as a scanner.  The second is Pulse, a new tool built into Jamie and 
Noah’s food delivery platform app which tells riders whether demand is high, 
medium or low.85  Both tools are used to ensure there is a labour supply in 
place to meet the demand of distribution; neither company technically employs 
its delivery drivers/riders, so while the app’s users form the labour pool in a 
sense, the Flex and Pulse tools are mechanisms for ‘activating’ workers in such 
a way that each company only pays for the labour time it wants.  To do this 
                         
85 At the time of interview, Pulse was in a beta phase. 
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both apps rely on contacting workers ‘out-of-hours’, in that Flex and Pulse are 
both constantly available to workers without them having to ‘log in’ or accept 
an assignment, and they are both predicated on off-duty workers using the 
tools to decide whether to take on future work assignments (whether 
immediate-future in the case of Pulse or near-future in the case of Flex).  Aside 
these similarities, the two tools have notable distinctions in how they work and 
the effects they generate. 
 
Flex might be considered akin to an app-based version of similar SMS-based 
shift allocation systems, as used by distribution centre workers such as 
Lorenzo in Greater London, in that they both communicate remotely whether 
and at what times labour is needed.  However, unlike that system, the Flex tool 
is not based on productivity and therefore is not a disciplinary tool; the notable 
difference is that rather than commanding or denying attendance, Flex 
advertises a choice of shifts as demand is created, reflecting the formally self-
employed status of its workers. 
 
I have to check the [job] offers every day. I can check even the offers 
the same day…so sometimes you have blocks in a short time that you 
can give a short notice, but you take the risk, it’s not every day like this. 
Sometimes you can go in the morning and, ‘Oh I want to go today at 11 
o’clock’ and at 8 o’clock you check and maybe there’s not any block until 
5…You can know if you have accept the block the day before, but that 
depends if you say, ‘Tomorrow I want to go 10 or 11 o’clock,’ but you 
check, ‘Oh it’s only blocks from 12 or 1 or 2.’ Okay I accept it or I take 
the risk tomorrow…but maybe next day there’s still no blocks until 4 
o’clock. (José) 
 
But the effect is still a binary approach to ensuring only the exact supply of 
labour needed to fulfil the tasks required: workers are either wanted or not 
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wanted, explicitly, and accepting a collection slot via the app means accepting 
the work. 
 
Pulse approaches labour allocation in a different way.  As far as Jamie and 
Noah are concerned, what Pulse says about demand appears to have a weak 
correlation to the actual demand for riders to fulfil orders.  This could be 
attributable to the beta testing of the tool, although Jamie strongly suspected it 
is a design feature intended to dupe workers into logging onto the app, 
potentially at the expense of their earnings if demand turns out to be low: 
 
To be honest I don’t know if it’s intended to be accurate. (Jamie) 
 
I wouldn’t trust it as far as I could throw it. (Jamie) 
 
Such an accusation could be disregarded as conspiracy-minded, but a similar 
conclusion was reached by Rosenblat and Stark (2016: 3777) in their study of 
Uber.  The approach to ensuring labour supply is continuous rather than binary 
— there is only ever high, medium or low demand (never no demand) and these 
appear to correlate to busy, normal or less busy order times respectively, rather 
than bearing relation to the number of riders logged-in and available.86  
Whereas Flex workers are kept at a distance from the work process — their 
ability to access it at all is tightly regulated through bounded ‘offers’ (i.e. time 
slots) — Pulse aims to ensure the oversupply of labour rather than a matching 
of supply with demand, so there are always riders available whenever a 
delivery comes through. 
 
You have to remember that it doesn’t bother them whether you turn up 
to work and earn much money, so I take quite a cynical view of those, 
like, demand management tools because in their ideal world all their 
                         
86 Despite being advertised in terms of demand for drivers (Waters and Woodcock, 2017). 
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workers are working all the time and they’re paying them nothing 
because it costs them nothing to have a rider sitting there doing shit all. 
(Noah) 
 
This is made possible because riders are paid per delivery rather than for the 
time they are logged in.  As such Pulse ‘entices’ rather than advertises; the 
actual work allocation will be done by the algorithm after riders have logged in, 
and even in periods of ‘high demand’ there is no guarantee of work. 
 
Scrutiny of ‘precarious’ forms of work such as those found in the gig economy 
tends to focus on the terms of employment, variously described as casual, 
precarious or ‘bogus’ (Woodcock, 2017b; Cant, 2017; Segalov, 2015; 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, 2017a), but Flex and 
Pulse show us how casual contracts are made workable for the companies by 
facilitating the activation of ‘dormant’ workers, giving substance to Rosenblat 
and Stark’s (2016: 3777) impression that in Uber “the rhetorical invocations of 
digital technology and algorithms are used to structure asymmetric corporate 
relationships to labor”.  In the case of Flex, we can observe the way technology 
allows the labour process to be based on casual work: labour is no less crucial 
to the work process, but it can now be organized in such a way that workers 
are kept away from sections of it until they are necessary.  Because e-
commerce delivery drivers in particular are entering the work process at a later 
stage of distribution, the company can assess how many deliveries need to be 
made and therefore precisely how many drivers are required, although the 
Yorkshire and Greater London distribution centres are able to use contractual 
stipulations to achieve a similar effect. 
 
Food delivery platform riders are also entering the labour process at a late 
stage, filling the section of the work process which requires cooked food to be 
delivered to customers.  But the company approaches the scenario differently: 
although formally similar to running deliveries for José’s e-commerce platform, 
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the delivery of hot food demands a more immediate allocation of labour — 
clearly a Flex-style system of advertised delivery slots would not be fit for 
purpose.  The food delivery platform therefore necessitates an available pool 
of ready workers, which allows the company to advertise estimated delivery 
times to customers.  In contrast with Flex, where slots are advertised to all 
drivers who have the app, the food delivery platform measures its pool of 
available workers by requiring riders to log in to the app, a threshold that once 
crossed means riders can be allocated jobs and penalized for refusing to 
accept orders — in other words the threshold past which workers are on 
‘company time’ and must be available.  Riders are not remunerated for the time 
they spend waiting while logged-in, despite the principle that they make 
themselves available for penalization, so the role of Pulse is to encourage 
riders to cross the threshold of logging in by setting an expectation (unreliably, 
according to Jamie and Noah) of how much time they can expect to spend idle 
— therefore unpaid — once they log in.  As with Flex, this is a ‘lean’ approach 
to work allocation which benefits the company by reducing the unproductive 
labour time it pays for (see Chapter 2), but Pulse represents a novel way to 
encourage workers to cross the ‘factory gate’ unpaid with the uncertain promise 




                         
87 An added benefit to the employer is the reduced need for consistency (i.e. retention) of 
personnel. Workplaces can have a fairly high turnover, attracting workers from student (Todd) 
and migrant (Lorenzo) labour pools from the local area with seasonal contracts (José) or 
through agencies (Lorenzo). Where workplaces are located on industrial parks, such as in 
Greater London, it is not uncommon for workers to move between various distribution jobs all 
within close proximity to each other, which is possible in large part due to comparable 
ergonomic expectations (as discussed later in this chapter). José, for example, had at various 




Having entered the workplace, work can begin once the worker has logged in 
to a computational device, most commonly a handheld scanner.88  At this point, 
the work flow begins — understood here not as the flow of goods and 
processes across the whole productive process, but as the main component of 
the process of working.  Put simply, it is the point at which the worker has 
settled in to their shift and begins to ‘get on with’ the job.  For every worker I 
spoke to, there would come a point after initially beginning work where they 
would describe how ‘then you just go on like that…’.  These periods, which 
comprise the bulk of the working day, are when the worker and their handheld 
device work together most intimately.  For managers, this is the key period of 
data gathering and productive labour time.  For workers, it is the time in which 
their experience of the work process is most consistently shaped.  Vehicular 
distribution work and warehouse-type distribution work have different but 
comparable work flows.89  As shown in Figures 5 and 6, there are entry and 
exit points which can either mark the end of a shift or the end of a ‘shop’, but 




                         
88 The exception being the food delivery platform, where logging in to the app is entering the 
workplace. 
89 NB The food delivery platform workflow, although vehicular, more closely resembles a 
warehouse-type work flow. As I noted in Chapter 3, although the practicalities of platform 
work and warehouses are different, their form is similar; the app turning the town into a virtual 
warehouse for food delivery riders. 
90 There are occasions on which the consistency of work rhythms are interrupted by what 
appear to be technical irregularities - in such cases, workers are generally encouraged to 








Figure 6. Typical work flow in distribution centre work. 
 
A common reflection across everyone I spoke to was that the fundamental 
basis of the work was, in one way or another, following the instructions set by 
their personal computational device (i.e. data terminal).  As Berardi (2009: 75-
6) notes, there is ambiguity about the extent to which the use of softwarized 
devices have brought about a standardization of labour, although we can 
recognize the certain interchangeability they facilitate.  He states: 
 
We can say that the digitalization of the labor process has made any 
labor the same from an ergonomic and physical point of view since we 
all do the same thing: we sit in front of a screen and we type on a 
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keyboard. Our activity is later transformed by a concatenation of 
machines into…the moving of forty metal boxes or a restaurant’s 
provisioning. 
 
Yet, he continues, we also know that at the same time the content of what we 
do can be completely different, so we could also say the work has become 
more specialized — although we can acknowledge it wouldn’t take very long to 
gain the operational knowledge of a different job because the simplification of 
the labour has made it more interchangeable (ibid.).  As we now know, the 
devices involved in the distribution workplaces discussed here require more 
effort on the part of the worker than to “sit in front of a screen”, yet the presence 
of the screen and indeed being present to the screen are both fundamental 
elements of the work flow in each case, regardless of whether the worker is 
also required to push a trolley, pull a pallet, ride a bicycle or drive a van in 
addition.  We can say, therefore, that much of the skill involved in successfully 
carrying out the work boils down to successfully acting on the basis of a digital 
interface — much like the skill of driving safely having as much to do with acting 
on the basis of a dashboard as the ability to coordinate oneself and take 
account of one’s surroundings (Bartlett and Tkacz, 2017: 9n12). 
 
The organization of work flow facilitated by the personal data terminal affects 
the way work is structured and experienced.  An algorithmic management 
system — or simply ‘the system’ — is able to direct workers and control their 
manifests (i.e. task duties) in real time, reducing the technical need for group-
oriented plans of action directed by human managers, or even the need for 
workers to come on-shift at the same time.  In this context, events such as team 
briefings serve more humanistic or ideological purposes, reminding workers of 
their targets or the values of the company rather than being a technical 
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requirement to orient workers to the day’s tasks.91  Put simply, they are a social 
and political choice, which explains their use in some cases but not in others.  
Changes in the management system at the Sainsbury’s online shopping 
department have meant a reduction in shared start locations, with a knock-on 
effect for the sociality of the work: 
 
With the new system there is no dedicated starting point for each shop. 
Now shops can start half way through Ambient 1 and go on Ambient 2, 
and vice versa. The biggest concern here is that it will be harder to tell 
who is on each shop with you. Before I’d be able to ask a mate if they 
were on Ambient 2 next, and if we both were then we’d be able to go 
around chatting. Now we can’t rely on that. (Plan C, 2017b) 
 
While attempts to stop workers talking with each other are not novel to 
algorithmic management, as I will discuss later in this section, we can see the 
breakdown of sociality as a by-product of the organization of work flow which 
contributes to the phenomenological experience of being an algorithmically-
managed worker.  In her study of Las Vegas gambling machines, Schüll (2012: 
56-7) draws a comparison between the “profit logic of temporal discipline” in 
gambling machine design to techniques of behavioural management in 
industrial and disciplinary environments.  Most strikingly, she focuses on how 
the ambition of “continuous gaming productivity” (ibid.: 52) is delivered by the 
promotion of an “embodied relation” between gambler and machine (ibid.: 174).  
Machine gamblers enter a state of ‘flow’ in which they lose their sense of time, 
and, according to casino design guru Bill Friedman, “their sense of reality, 
existing only for the moment, for the next bet” as their “embodied experience 
                         
91 We could speculate that a purely algorithmic system would see workers come on-shift or 
be paid only when strictly necessary; an idea floating in the background of the cases that use 
flexible contracts or operate on a piece-rate model. 
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in the material world is exchanged for a timeless flow of repeating moments” 
(ibid.: 49).   
 
Schüll’s account is illustrative for thinking about the way a form of control is 
iterated in the relationship between user and device.  In particular, she 
highlights how psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s original use of “the term 
‘flow’ to describe states of absorption in which attention is so narrowly focused 
on an activity that a sense of time fades, along with the troubles and concerns 
of day-to-day life” (ibid.: 166) becomes subjugated to the economic logic, 
reinforced by “the configuration of the machine, whose programmatic 
interactive parameters allow gamblers little in the way of tactical or performative 
improvisation” (ibid.: 179).  This is politically salient when thinking about the 
embodied, rhythmic relation between workers and personal devices.  As 
Rossiter (2006: 159) notes: “The possession of time by any kind of worker is 
the condition of possibility for the organization of labour.”  We can think of this 
not only in terms of individual access to time, but collective access to ‘shared 
time’ across the workforce.  Panorama (2013) documents the sense of urgency 
felt by Amazon workers as they race against timers on their devices in order to 
achieve productivity targets, and yet the device produces a strange sense of 
time where the worker’s ability to control their time is repeatedly reduced to the 
next twelve seconds.  Like the goods in the warehouse, as embodied by the 
tote or pallet, workers are also just-in-time, a lean flowing force whose actions 
play out for twelve second at a time before being reset.92  Rossiter (2016: 40) 
argues: “Logistics robs living labor of time. At the level of labor management, 
logistics registers the calculation of time against the performance of tasks and 
movement of things.”  If algorithmic management devices contribute to the 
production of a continuous present (Fisher, 2009: 58-9), then as well as 
                         
92 The premise of the sci-fi thriller Source Code (2011, dir. Jones) comes to mind, wherein the 
protagonist has a set amount of time to work out a puzzle before his timeline is reset to the 
beginning. 
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thinking about the worker being denied foresight into the future, we can also 
think about the relegation of the need for narrative memory (ibid.).  Instead of 
learning from past experience or being able to recall working patterns or routes, 
instead of needing to be able to recall details of the day in order to colour in 
productivity print-outs, memory is outsourced to the algorithmic management 




The types of work flow produced under algorithmic management demonstrate 
particular norms of workplace communication.  As discussed at the end of 
Chapter 3, algorithmically-managed communication particularly involves 
tracking and transmission, especially as facilitated by handheld devices, which 
are workers’ primary tools in most algorithmically-mediated distribution 
workplaces.  At the most fundamental level, these devices enable rapid 
communication between workers and their labour, at the point of work, and the 
managerial ‘system’ across a number of databases.  This forms the basis of 
what we can think of as data communication.  Aside from data communication, 
algorithmic management also has a powerful effect on human communication.  
Largely a by-product of working practices, the deleterious effect of algorithmic 
management on human communication, both among workers and between 
workers and managers, was deeply felt by the workers I spoke to and is 
important for understanding the affective regime produced in distribution 
workplaces. 
 
Data communication is facilitated by personal software devices, most typically 
a handheld scanner, which acts as a site of instruction, command, inventory, 
recording, tracking, seeing, transmission — and therefore communication and 
control — within the work environment.  The device operates as a logistical 
interface, connecting live orders to workers in real-time, but it also acts as a 
“point of juncture” (Cramer and Fuller, 2006: 150) between workers and 
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management: workers interact with the device via its display, scanner and 
positioning system throughout the course of their work flow, which updates 
databases on the progress of a given job or set of tasks in real-time; meanwhile 
the management system provides workers with tasks or instructions, and 
sometimes targets, and provides shopfloor managers and supervisors with 
information about workers’ productivity. 
 
As such, the device represents a threshold between the realm of work’s 
execution, to be carried out by the worker, and work’s conception, the realm of 
the employer’s ‘business’ beyond the worker’s reach (see Goodrich, 1975: 56).  
Through calculating the relationship between time and actions (and space, as 
we will see), the algorithmic management system provides managers with 
choices about how to scrutinize workers’ performance against targets — for 
example in the group setting of the briefing or one-on-one on the shopfloor with 
the use of print-outs, via text message when used for shift allocation, or in order 
to have workers compete against each other, as demonstrated by the use of 
public television monitors in Lorenzo’s supermarket distribution centre. 
 
For the worker, disciplinary measures are generally the culmination of a 
process of data mediation beginning with their use of the handheld device.  This 
leads to anxiety about the degree to which devices track and transmit an 
accurate reflection of the work carried out, and in particular whether the metrics 
against which workers’ performance is scrutinized by managers are able to 
account for mitigating circumstances such as items being in the wrong place or 
the inventory being inaccurate.  In general, such contextual and contingent 
factors are not accounted for within the productivity system, which usually 
appears to be calculated simply as completed actions divided by logged time 
(e.g. items per hour).  One exception was in Lorenzo’s distribution centre where 
upon making a mistake, workers had to find a supervisor who could use a 
special code to log the handset out of the productivity system to give the 
supervisor time to rectify the issue.  The time spent locating a supervisor, 
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however, negatively affects the workers’ productivity score, which in Lorenzo’s 
case was directly linked to shift allocation. 
 
It is important to note workers’ productivity scores are a predominantly political 
device intended to ensure the maximum actualization of labour power.  Across 
all the workers I spoke to, achieving 100 percent of the target was a fairly rare 
occurrence.  In Lorenzo’s supermarket distribution centre, successful shift 
allocation depended on achieving ninety to ninety-five percent of target.  In 
José’s e-commerce centre, it appeared the targets were more or less 
unachievable: 
 
I talked to all the people, and I talked to permanent staff that had been 
there for a year, nine months, seven months. And I said to them, ‘Right, 
I just talked to our colleagues and they got the same warnings as I do 
about the target. Could you tell me anyone who meets the target?’ And 
you know how I said we are maybe 400 people per shift? Only three or 
four people meet the target…I said, ‘Why do they put the target so high?’ 
and they said to me, ‘Because if they put it lower, the people then will 
achieve it and they won’t have motivation to get more productivity’ is 
what I was told. (José) 
 
Despite the perpetual state of underachievement experienced by workers, the 
companies they are working for represent some of the most successful national 
and international customer-oriented supply chains.  In this context, it is difficult 
to see how workers’ stated performance is accurately correlated to the actual 
logistical performance of a warehouse’s operations.  In this sense, the tracking 
of workers is contributing to two parallel processes — the actual logistical 
alignment which is necessary for the just-in-time distribution of goods into, 
through, and out of a warehouse, and a managerial regime which revolves 
around ensuring the productivity (and therefore cost-efficiency) of workers.  
Nonetheless it is conceivable that workers could fall foul of what Pasquinelli 
169 
(2015b) calls ‘algorithmic vision’.  Highlighting the problem of apophenia within 
algorithmic governance (“the experience of seeing patterns or connections in 
random or meaningless data”), Pasquinelli notes “There is an excessive belief, 
indeed, in the almighty power of algorithms, in their efficiency and in the total 
transparency of the metadata society” (ibid.: 9).  I will return to the idea of the 
“almighty power of algorithms” later in this chapter, but the initial implication for 
workers is that they may have no recourse if managers draw patterns which 
are not substantiated by reality. 
 
Alongside data communication processes there exist norms around human 
communication in the algorithmically-mediated workplace.  Contrary to the 
sorts of expectations of intellectual and communicative sociality usually found 
in discourse about the post-Fordist workplace, both broadly (Tomaney, 1994: 
162-3; Piore and Sabel, 1984: 278) and in autonomist thought (Lazzarato, 
1996: 135; Terranova 2004: 88; Negri, 2017b; Virno, 2004: 61-2), the 
overarching norm within algorithmically-managed distribution work appears to 
be one of minimizing communication between workers, specifically talking, 
either indirectly or directly. 
 
I never had a job where I talk less. I worked there now half a year and I 
know probably twenty people out of the 600 drivers, you know, that I 
would talk a bit more to. You talk a bit like in the morning or like beginning 
and end of shift, but very minimal, but yeah never had a job where I talk 
so little. Yeah it can be a bit lonely. (Lorenzo) 
 
The workforce on any one night is composed of a hugely complicated 
number of different people, right, so you can’t know everyone, and you 
don’t know who’s gonna be working on any one night, and you haven’t 
got a mode of communication that can reach anyone, and there’s no 
common workspace. Loads of people don’t use [zone centre], like loads 
of riders never go to [zone centre], like there’s a select few of us who 
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choose that community, a lot just don’t…For the first month I worked I 
didn’t even know it was there, I just worked. (Jamie) 
 
These forms of communicative reduction are generally felt as ‘part and parcel’ 
of the job by virtue of its organization through personal handheld devices, which 
is further emphasized in delivery roles where workers each have their own 
mode of transport.  However, direct attempts at minimizing verbal 
communication, particularly supervisory intervention, are also reported. 
 
You used to be able to talk to people as you went along. Now, and I 
don’t know why, but the team leaders have got a lot more hands on. 
They will just stand at the end of the aisle and watch you, and if you’re 
talking they’ll tell you off for talking, it doesn’t matter if you’re meeting 
your.. So for example, I had a shop I did the other day: the IPH is 125, I 
had a big 180 item shop, I got IPH of 250…Even if you’re getting 
something like a 200 IPH, they’ll still say, ‘Stop talking, you’ve got work, 
don’t talk’ and stuff like that, so it’s fucking like being in the mafia d’you 
know what I mean? It’s like a code of silence. It’s really added to the 
mood of the place. (Todd) 
 
Often some managers basically shout at you, y’know, ‘Stop talking!’ 
Y’know, they don’t like you to talk because they say you make mistakes 
when you get distracted and you don’t work enough. (Lorenzo) 
 
While being told not to talk at work is hardly novel or unique to either distribution 
work or algorithmically-managed work, this form of antisociality was widely 
reported across the cases.  In the context of algorithmic management, rules 
against talking serve the purpose of directing workers’ attention to their 
personal device by creating an environment where communication is 
channelled through hardware rather than across the social space of the 
workplace.  Although a by-product of the organization of work and management 
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rather than its aim, such efforts to reduce unproductive labour time contribute 
to the intensification of work and imply an affective dimension to the work 
whereby workers feel isolated from one another.  This experience contradicts 
accounts of computationally-dependent work which focus on the increase in 
cooperative forms of working (see Mills, 2013), and problematizes the idea that 
the increased coordination of workers necessitates increased cooperation and 
communication between workers.  In Lazzarato’s thesis on immaterial labour, 
he states: 
 
if it is no longer possible to lay down and specify jobs and responsibilities 
rigidly (in the way that was once done with ‘scientific’ studies of work), 
but if, on the contrary, jobs now require cooperation and collective 
coordination, then the subjects of that production must be capable of 
communication — they must be active participants within a work team. 
The communicational relationship (both vertically and horizontally) is 
thus completely predetermined in both form and content; it is 
subordinated to the ‘circulation of information’ and is not expected to be 
anything other. The subject becomes a simple relayer of codification and 
decodification, whose transmitted messages must be ‘clear and free of 
ambiguity’, within a communications context that has been completely 
normalized by management. (Lazzarato, 1996: 135)  
 
In algorithmically-managed distribution work, jobs and responsibilities are still 
being laid down rigidly, in a broad sense.  There is flexibility in the specific tasks 
being placed onto workers, but “cooperation and collective coordination” does 
not come from the workers being composed as a team and communicating with 
each other directly; rather it is cooperation and coordination solicited ‘from 
above’, mediated through ‘the system’.  As approached in a different way by 
Lee (2016), there is ambiguity in the extent to which workers know they are 
being coordinated at all, but to clarify Lazzarato’s own ambiguity it should be 
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made clear that the ‘coordination’ of jobs pertains to workers being coordinated 
(by the management system) rather than coordinating themselves. 
 
However, Lazzarato does provide an insight into the nature of the 
communicational relationship, in that it is “predetermined in both form and 
content” (Lazzarato, 1996: 135).  This is to say communication between 
workers (horizontally) is mediated through the forms of data communication 
conducted (vertically) through the device and management system.  As the 
worker uses their scanner or app, information is relayed both by and to the 
worker through predetermined functions within the user interface.  We can think 
of this in terms of the display and the on-screen options the worker interacts 
with, but also in terms of the constant communication generated by and for the 
real-time calculations made by the management software to fulfil the dual role 
of logistical coordination and performance tracking.  As such, whatever the 
worker does (or does not do) with regard to the specific tasks assigned will 
generate data in ways they have no control over.  This is the primary mode of 
communication in algorithmically-managed distribution work, which in turn 
provides the basis for intermittent worker-supervisor communication, as I will 




Many of the uses of data tracking, both product oriented and worker oriented, 
could be facilitated by an electronic check-out till.  A version of that form of 
management can be seen at José’s warehouse packing station, where his role 
entails being stationary at a computer, taking items from a movable ‘wall’, 
scanning and packing them into appropriate boxes, and placing them onto a 
conveyor belt to be taken to the ‘goods out’ section.  But for mobile distribution 
workers — especially pickers — algorithmic management entails a particular 
relation to movement through space. 
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Warehouse pickers receive instructions on a graphic interface attached to a 
handheld scanner.  After each item is picked, the screen gives them a location 
for the next item.  Throughout a shift, the worker’s movements are organized 
through the algorithmic assignment of items.  In the case of an Amazon 
warehouse, the route walked by a picker is ‘planned’ by real-time calculations 
which account for the status of orders, as well as the location of stock and other 
workers.  The workload is configured as “a continuous process rather than as 
a goal-oriented sequence” (LeCavalier, 2016: 40), with the handheld device 
acting as the worker’s eyes and, to some extent, brain.  One result is an altered 
sense of spatial awareness, the worker not knowing where they are going until 
they are told to go there, or — in the case of warehouses with tall stacks — 
having much awareness of where their co-workers or supervisors are at a given 
time.  Spatial disorientation is heightened in a warehouse like one of Amazon’s, 
where stock is generally stowed on a random basis.  As LeCavalier (ibid.: 42-
3) notes, “seemingly counterintuitive spatial manifestations appear and are 
increasingly normalized” because logistical organization entails a mediation 
between an abstract (quantitative) environment and a concrete (qualitative) 
environment which “enables an imagination that focuses on action rather than 
form and that measures distance in time” (ibid.).  An artifact of this imagination, 
Amazon’s random stow system entails that goods brought into the warehouse 
are stored randomly rather than categorically, the rationale being that it will 
reduce wasted labour time both in terms of pickers’ task of searching and the 
ability to direct workers’ movements according to algorithmic calculation.  Such 
a concern for the productive use of movement and the rational use of space 
may call back to the Gilbreths’ motion studies, but the key difference is 
algorithmic management entails a governance of actions which is not based on 
a ‘one best way’ which workers can learn or perfect, but a temporally and 
spatially specific ‘one best way’ calculated in real-time and incalculable and 
unknowable to the worker. 
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Such a system relies on workers effectively becoming tracked or ‘sensed’ 
entities alongside stock via tracking devices (see Agre, 1994: 104).  Pickers 
cannot see the next item(s) they will have to collect, so they are limited to acting 
solely on the basis of the information being displayed on their device at a given 
moment.  The item queue and therefore their projected work route — the 
worker’s spatial movements throughout a shift — can conceivably be 
reprogrammed continuously as the worker works, without ever knowing any of 
the alternative future work patterns they could have been assigned.  And yet 
workers are assessed according to the metrics of a system which is not only 
unknowable to them but seemingly unknowable to their human supervisors too, 
as I will discuss further below.  Moreover, this arrangement has practical effects 
on workers’ own abilities to manage their workload: Todd explained that in the 
previous system at his online supermarket distribution centre, workers had 
access to the full ‘shop’ (manifest) for their trolley.  As such they could employ 
unsanctioned ‘tricks’ for making the work physically easier and more mentally 
stimulating, such as leaving the trolley at the end of an aisle and picking items 
from shelves using a carrier bag.  In the new system, workers cannot see 
beyond their next item, forcing them to move through the store in more 
regimented and enforceable ways, unable to function according to their own 
sense of the best course of action. 
 
Through considering the effect of algorithmic management on workers’ 
interactions with space, we can see the way workers rely on the result of a 
feedback loop which is presented to them on their personal interfaces.  Instead 
of receiving appraisal or evaluation about how they could organize their work 
flow better, the device they work with plays an organizing role in that it relays 
information accrued from the worker’s actions and uses them to calculate 
directives which take into account other logistical factors, which the worker can 
put into effect without having to make decisions for themselves.  In this sense, 
while the handheld scanner carries a literal digital user interface, it also 
occupies an interface position in the sense theorized by Hookway (2014); that 
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is, the interface as a moment of alignment or calibration, in this case between 
physical actions, transmitted signals, databases, algorithms and other 
processes.  The handheld device therefore provides a way into thinking about 
the live system of symbolic and moving parts of the logistical operation, the 
‘system’ possessing a god’s eye view which facilitates the interlocking of 
discrete processes at a distance. 
 
What algorithmic management means for 
authority 
 
The algorithmic frontier 
 
What emerges from the previous section is the sense of the frontier of control 
described by Goodrich (1975), or the point beyond which “there shall be no 
discussion” (ibid.: 56).  At this point, information generated by the worker — 
whether active, such as through scanning barcodes, or passive, such as 
allowing a certain amount of time to elapse between codified device 
interactions — crosses a threshold as it passes into the ‘system’, out of reach 
of the worker’s control or (over)sight.  Practically speaking, workers may be 
aware of certain points at which their data surfaces, such as on their 
supervisors’ computer monitors.  As I will discuss in Chapter 5, technically this 
does not necessarily put the data out of a worker’s view, but once the data has 
reached the computers, workers can do little to intervene in its use by a 
manager or supervisor.  With work information recorded, transmitted and 
stored digitally on managerial databases, managers have choices about what 
to do with the data: from updating targets to marking workers for discipline (or 
‘further training’), from adjusting the work allocation via SMS to reorganizing 
the work process altogether.  This characteristic of information technology is 
what Zuboff refers to as informating.  Along with automating certain 
procedures, she argues information technology is specific in that it produces 
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textual information about (‘informates’) an organization or work process which 
was previously beyond the purview of machines (Zuboff, 1985: 8).  In the 
1980s, Zuboff argued the informating capacity of information technology would 
shatter the Taylorist division of labour by creating (or providing access to) 
information at the point of production: “technology returns to the worker what it 
once took away, with a great deal more as well” (ibid.: 15).93  Following this 
section, I am instead able to describe an extreme Taylorization, but one within 
which the status of management (and managers) is problematized. 
 
As well as the continued development of the material dimension of power, 
which Zuboff calls ‘technique’, there is also a rearrangement of authority — as 
the ‘spiritual’ dimension of power — at the heart of algorithmic management 
(see Zuboff, 1988; 2015: 81).  In this section I discuss this rearrangement in 
terms of the elevation of the authority of ‘the algorithm’ and the subduction of 
the supervisory function.  As such, I show that algorithmic management is not 
just about equipping management with a set of tools collectively referred to as 
‘algorithms’; rather, it entails a new managerial mode, and with it the production 
of a new managerial subjectivity.  As Woodcock (2017a) notes, there is a 
question mark over the degree to which algorithmic management actually 
enhances managerial control, or whether it just provides an illusion of control.  
In this section of the chapter, I investigate the managerial politics of algorithmic 
management and reveal the character of management in algorithmically-
managed distribution work. 
                         
93 She continues: “The worker’s knowledge had been implicit in his or her actions. Informating 
makes that knowledge explicit; it is a mirror reflecting what was tacitly known but now is in a 
form that is public and precise” (Zuboff, 1985: 15). Zuboff’s reading of Taylorism seems to 
take very literally scientific management’s attitude to the conversion of worker’s knowledge 
into managerial functions. However, Taylor only listed the harvesting of knowledge as an 
example of managers’ new responsibilities as part of a systematic approach to obtaining 
workers’ “initiative…with absolute uniformity” (Taylor, 1911: 15). Arguably, an informating 




Algorithmic management relies on the elevation of the authority and status of 
algorithms within work.  For workers this takes two primary forms: first as social 
regulation, second as generative power.  Building on Lash’s account of the 
types of rules which govern a society of ubiquitous media (2007: 70-1), the 
regulative power of algorithms emerges most obviously in the way performance 
calculations are leveraged against workers.  Whether at team briefings or on 
the irregular occasions when supervisors approach workers with print-outs of 
productivity scores, the calculations the ‘system’ makes based on workers’ 
actions are the central focus of disciplinary relations between workers and 
managers, and they are intended to become the primary motivator for workers 
to perform to a desired standard.  But in a further, more technical sense, Lash 
encourages us to consider the way power is found “in the algorithm” in the way 
algorithms produce generative rules as they function (ibid.: 71).  For example, 
as algorithms ‘informate’ work, data is fed back into the information workers 
receive and must act on via their handsets.  Circumventing the need for 
appraisal or traditional learning, control is maintained throughout the system 
on a more ‘protocological’ basis (see Galloway, 2006), whereby software is 
able to organize information based on the effects it monitors across the digital 
network and the various moving parts of the labour process without the need 
for workers’ abilities as human agents.94  This process can be observed in 
simple terms in the way item replacements enacted by workers in Todd’s online 
supermarket distribution centre affect the future shops of all other workers, 
without them necessarily knowing a change has happened at all.95 
                         
94 I am also reminded of Agre’s ‘grammars of action’ (1994). 
95 To demonstrate: if the system tells Todd to pick Marmite and Todd sees there is no 
Marmite, he uses his handset to tell the system Marmite is out of stock. Either the handset 
will suggest he choose Vegemite or another yeast extract, or he may tell the system he has 
selected Vegemite as an appropriate replacement. To ensure no other workers have to go 
through this process, and possessing the new information that there is no Marmite (whatever 
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However, both these forms of algorithmic authority suggest a destabilization of 
the position of human managers on the shopfloor.  As I have discussed, as 
pickers work they cannot see the next item(s) they will have to collect and are 
effectively limited to acting on the basis of the information being displayed on 
their handheld scanner at a given moment.  But supervisors do not have access 
to the logic of the algorithmic management system either, and it is clear from 
the pace and scale of the logistical process that algorithms are making 
decisions independently of managers constantly.  The effect is that algorithmic 
management appears less as a tool for managers to wield as they choose, and 
more like a system which incorporates everyone on the shopfloor — including 
human managers — and develops its own authority.  Although the system 
produces calculations which may be used by managers against workers, it is 
not clear to what extent (if any) human managers are themselves involved in 
many of the decisions which go on to affect workers.  Rather, the ‘algorithms’ 
of algorithmic management appear as a paternalistic force which command the 
obedience not only of workers but also of supervisors themselves, the main 
difference between the two groups being the degree to which they are denied 
knowledge of the managerial process and the political power to discipline.  
Under algorithmic management, management itself is further divided not only 
into the ‘disciplinarian’ and ‘executive’ (i.e. shopfloor and corporate), but into 




Algorithmic management has been framed as the automation of management 
(Woodcock, 2017b; Cant, 2018), especially middle management.  The extent 
to which business intelligence systems can threaten the role of the middle 
                         
the stock database may have said before), the system will change the shopping manifests of 
other pickers, i.e. telling them to pick Vegemite rather than have them look for Marmite at all. 
After Todd has performed an ‘item replacement’, his colleagues will be unaware they were 
ever initially supposed to be looking for Marmite in the first place. 
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manager has been stated by Eckerson (2011: 48), and recent studies of 
Deliveroo (Woodcock and Waters, 2017) which dwell on the idea of information 
technology supplanting a middle stratum of supervisors and managers are in 
many ways rehearsing classic debates in the organizational literature (Simon, 
1977: 28, 30-3; Zuboff, 1988).  Certainly, the straight replacement of managers 
by machines appears to be one dimension of algorithmic management in 
distribution work, especially where the work is primarily vehicular: 
 
I didn’t see my personal manager I think for three months. (Lorenzo) 
 
I’ve not seen [a manager] in the flesh since I joined. (Noah) 
 
In these cases — online shopping delivery and food delivery, respectively — 
the workers I spoke to feel their managers are largely absent from the work 
process as they experience it.  However, as I discussed above, the nature of 
real-time mobile performance tracking devices means managers are still 
intimately involved in the work process even if they are not physically present.  
The characterization of algorithmic management as the ‘automation of 
management’ therefore fails to tell the whole story.  As I have already stated, 
the use of devices in conjunction with the managerial system means data is 
continually collected through what Zuboff calls informating.  A departure from 
Zuboff’s earlier work, however, is that in the algorithmically-managed 
workplace, workers’ access to information about the work process is limited.  
This is a Taylorist move, which aims to put management (rather than labour) in 
a prime control position but without requiring the presence of human managers 
at the site of work. 
 
Having the screen end of a computer program as the first supervisory layer 
present to the worker has two key consequences.  First, the fact workers carry 
out the bulk of their work without human supervision means managers can 
modulate their proximity to the ‘shopfloor’ — it becomes possible to be 
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simultaneously physically absent from the work site, yet computationally 
present at discrete and even minute moments within the work process.96  
Second, the distantiation created by managing workers across a physically 
distributed network through the use of dispassionate handheld devices allows 
managers to step behind something of a ‘digital veil’, providing managers with 
plausible deniability in relation to the commands and calculations of the 
algorithmic system.  The result is that while managers are able to distance 
themselves from the shopfloor, the processes of tracking, transmission and 
performance calculation, and correlate decisions about task (and shift) 
allocation and discipline are masked by the algorithmic infrastructure, ‘black 
boxed’ and made unaccountable.  Whereas physical managers can take 
responsibility and be held accountable for their decisions, even in apparently 
minor ways, in algorithmically-managed workplaces workers are instead 
encouraged to “just trust the system” (Todd), putting questionability beyond the 
reach of human actors. 
 
In the system we trust 
 
By outsourcing a variety of processes to ‘the system’, chains of command can 
be rewired and managerial control can be mediated through a technical 
ecology which is presented as its own source of authority, upholding the 
rational and objective directives of the work process.97  As Todd testified: 
 
There’s a phrase at work they keep repeating which is ‘just trust the 
system’. It’s like quite quasi-religious, to the point where I like —  ‘Amen!’ 
— I cross myself when they say it. (Todd) 
 
                         
96 For an early discussion of this dynamic see Zuboff (1988: 337-41, 342-55). 
97 Possible in part due to the presentation of work process information through numbers 
presented as ‘raw’ data. As David Beer (2016: 9) notes, even “the notion of the algorithm” 
contributes to the “social power of algorithms”. 
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One implication is that any notion of managerial accountability is reduced; 
decisions or diktats emanating from ‘the system’ are not immediately traceable 
to any particular manager or managerial decision, and instead appear ready-
formed to be actioned with limited possibilities for workers to challenge them.  
Should workers raise concerns with supervisors, as Todd states, they are 
encouraged to “just trust the system”, further asserting the idea that managers 
themselves are secondary to the strategic vision of ‘the system’ and therefore 
ought not to be judged or held liable for its judgements. 
 
In this sense, just trusting the system and managerial distantiation work hand-
in-hand — the instruction to “trust the system” acts as a means of deflecting 
scrutiny of human managers towards the non-human management 
infrastructure, as though human managers were entirely separate from it, 
observers to its mysterious and apparently autonomous workings just like 
workers.  Yet we can also observe situations where the wide reach of 
algorithmic control actually does surpass the supervisory abilities of human 
managers — with increased productivity on the part of workers, there is literally 
too much information for supervisors to meaningfully oversee.  Todd described 
how the pace and scale of the work as mediated by ‘the system’ can increase 
worker productivity to the point that managers’ attention is divided, forcing them 
to focus on potential bottlenecks arising in the movement of stock into lorries 
rather than the actions of those workers assigned to picking tasks, and 
therefore creating opportunities for reprieve between ‘shops’: 
 
You gotta remember…because everybody’s doing similar sized shops, 
it’s never that one trolley will come in at a time, it’ll always be twenty at 
a time, twenty at a time, so you know they’re rushed off their feet loading 
these up, getting them organized, getting them ready for the first 
deliveries at 7 o’clock. (Todd) 
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They don’t have time to check through 160 boxes with the sheet of paper 
with all of this, so you take advantage of the lack of manpower. (Todd) 
 
They’re too busy, so you take advantage of them running around. (Todd) 
 
In this way we can see that as well as deflecting scrutiny from workers to ‘the 
system’, managers are themselves forced to “just trust the system” to some 
extent, given they are practically unable to check over or supervise the 
algorithm themselves for sections of the work process. 
 
In Todd’s workplace, as with the other distribution centres I have referred to, 
supervisors are still present — their role has not been automated away.  
However, they too are subjected to the use of devices and subordinated to ‘the 
system’.  Although basic disciplinary functions remain — commands to stop 
talking, occasional instructions to work harder — the computational system and 
its devices instead wield a technological authority which appears to supersede 
the authority of the supervisor.  Supervisors, like workers, are subject to this 
authority; supervisors, like workers, have to “trust the system”.  As we have 
seen, this is even the case when supervisors appear to be ‘out-managed’ by 
the system, unable to check for themselves that workers’ picked items match 
the manifests they were given. 
 
Under algorithmic management, then, there is a modification of the supervisory 
role which puts human supervisors in a peculiar position.  Concurrent with the 
elevation of the authority of the algorithm is an epistemological emptying of the 
supervisory position.  While supervisors still have access to a greater range of 
devices (such as PCs) and system privileges (such as workers’ performance 
data), their job is as much about being in service to algorithms as overseeing 
workers.  Their role shifts towards humanistic intervention: although purely 
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intimidatory measures are not precluded,98 the supervisor may offer ‘tips’ on 
how to work more efficiently or introduce novelty features into team briefings 
such as sweepstakes or giveaways interwoven with company communications: 
 
They try to give you tips how you can go faster… If it works, maybe I 
could follow the tip, if it doesn’t work for me I just find another way. At 
some points I just get to the conclusion that probably you’re not gonna 
get the target anyway. So I say, ‘Okay, I follow my ways,’ some tips they 
help me out, others don’t. (José) 
 
When there is something going on at work, [the briefing] will be to do 
with work, it’ll be to do with changes, so when the [new] system was 
being introduced it was always about, ‘Here’s what we know, changes, 
what to expect’ and that. When there isn’t it’s all something to make you 
feel like the department is your community, a close-knit group. (Todd) 
 
It’s a briefing at the start of the shift, and they’re saying things like, ‘Oh 
today we’ve got this target,’ sometimes they tell to you, ‘Okay today we 
have a free piece of pizza in the canteen.’ It’s not long, sometimes they 
tell you, ‘Okay park properly…don’t take two spaces at once,’ it’s things 
like this. (José) 
 
The role supervisors play under algorithmic management is more pastoral than 
pedagogic.  Were it not for their discretionary disciplinary powers, we might 
more accurately consider them subvisors — their role being less about being 
above (‘super-’) workers, and more about being in service (‘sub-’) of algorithms, 
shepherding cooperation with electronic instructions.  The “quasi-religious” 
quality of the “just trust the system” imperative referred to by Todd reflects not 
                         
98 The humanistic management tradition has not necessarily denoted a humane management 
tradition. See a fuller discussion in Hanlon, 2016. 
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only the theological dimension taken on by the ‘system’ or ‘algorithm’, but also 
the ecclesiastical role adopted by the supervisor, who — in reaction to the 
ontology of unknowability discussed in Chapter 2 — becomes to varying 
degrees a preacher of the algorithm’s sanctity and a shepherd of the working 
flock,99 themselves subject on all sides to the unknowable calculations of an 
apparently omniscient power.100  
 
Black-box management: reflections on a new 
terrain 
 
David Beer (2009: 996) understands Lash’s (2007) notion of power through the 
algorithm as “forms of power that are reactive, concealed, and which are 
shaped on the ground at the multifarious points of communication.”  This 
description resonates with this chapter’s exploration of algorithmic 
management in distribution work, in particular the adaptive and ‘black boxed’ 
nature of the managerial instruments faced by workers.  But algorithmic 
management also entails a reorganization of management: while we can see 
the production of a political phenomenology that affects how workers interact 
with work and each other both prior to the labour process, while working, in the 
regulation of communication and in how they experience space, it is also the 
case that relations of workplace authority are rearranged to privilege the 
standing of the algorithmic management ‘system’.  Although the supervisory 
function is reduced in vehicular distribution work (which is arguably a facet of 
the nature of the work), human managers (particularly supervisors) still play a 
disciplinary role within distribution centres.  But while the algorithmic 
management system automates aspects of what would historically have been 
                         
99 See Agamben (2011) for a thorough discussion of the theological dimensions of political 
economy. 
100 It is reasonable to assume supervisors are themselves subject to monitoring by a higher 
managerial stratum. 
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the responsibility of human managers, its ‘informating’ function means the 
system emerges as a managerial figure in its own right.  As with human middle 
managers’ relationship to human upper managers, supervisors in the 
algorithmically-managed workplace are on the same ‘side’ as the system, yet 
subordinate to it and working in its service. 
 
Having analysed a number of the key effects of algorithmic management, I now 
reflect on algorithmic management as a new development in the scientific 
management paradigm.  I then turn from a discussion of algorithmic 
management as a political technology towards reflecting on it as a political 
topography which acts as the context for the forms of worker resistance I 
discuss in Chapter 5. 
 
Taylorism for the twenty-first century 
 
This chapter has shown how algorithmic management affects both workers’ 
experience of work — in terms of work allocation, communication and the 
political phenomenology of work — and the relations of authority within the 
workplace, such as the elevation of algorithmic authority and the creation of 
both physical and political distance between managers and instructions or 
decisions.  These are the effects of an extreme Taylorization facilitated by a 
real-time algorithmic system, in which we can see a separation of conception 
and execution right down to the way workers move through a distribution 
centre.101  Heightened computational capacity means there is a greater wealth 
of data which can be produced and calculated, which disrupts the role of 
supervisors: whereas in the past information about the work process would 
have to be gathered over time or by undertaking routine research exercises, 
                         
101 ‘Way’ here mainly refers to the physical routes taken by workers, as in ‘direction’, but other 
research (Moore, 2018; Neff and Nafus, 2016: 129) has shown that the integration of 
wearable tracking technologies into computationally-mediated workplaces is affecting how 
workers move in a more bodily sense, as in ‘manner’. 
186 
the algorithmic management system is based on the real-time production of 
work data as it ‘informates’ the work process.  Concurrently, the conversion of 
data into directives is largely automated, and can factor in a far wider range of 
tracked processes (and at greater speed) than human managers may be 
capable of.  While algorithmic management operates within a Taylorist 
paradigm, it signals a key development in terms of its ability to decentralize the 
managerial endeavour, not by distributing power across the workforce in a 
more democratic way, but by way of a digital media infrastructure within which 
real-time cybernetic feedback loops produce a more generative form of control. 
 
Although there is an epistemological hollowing-out of both workers and 
supervisory shopfloor management, algorithmic management appears to entail 
only an ever-greater maximization of computational knowledge of the work 
process.  Algorithmic management appears to substantiate Piperno’s (1996: 
127) claim that: 
 
The central aim of information knowledge is not the completeness and 
coherence of facts and judgments on the world, but rather the 
optimization of procedures, be they for decisions, diagnosis, 
management, or planning. Information knowledge incessantly 
transforms procedures so that the action may be more effective and, 
above all, faster. 
 
It is not important for workers or even supervisors to retain or expand their 
knowledge of the productive or logistical process, because ‘the system’ 
produces a continuous present which is based on calculations that are cast as 
authoritative and trustworthy.  This logic enables the optimization of 
commercial operations, but it also acts as a technique of managerial power.102  
                         
102 It is useful to recall Bendix’s (1963: 278) reading of Taylor here, which argues one of 
Taylor’s objectives was actually to eliminate personal managerial authority through a greater 
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Waters and Woodcock (2017) observe that at Deliveroo, workers are not 
provided with an actual performance target, only an email to say whether they 
achieved it or not; a scenario which demonstrates the fundamental 




The food delivery platform riders I interviewed felt the black-boxing of 
managerial processes (in their case within an app) removed the possibility of 
certain types of information ever being gained by workers, to the benefit of 
management and to the detriment of workers, who may wish to contest their 
conditions. 
 
So, like if I work as a waiter, I can tell if I’m needed or not, and if I’m sent 
home early and there’s no orders I can be like, ‘Well there weren’t any 
orders, there was no one in the restaurant to be fair.’ Like obviously it’s 
shit because I should be guaranteed a wage whatever, but you can 
kinda see the demand. Whereas on our end we have no idea how orders 
are distributed between riders, whether that changes over time… 
(Jamie) 
 
If you can understand the work process fully, it’s quite easy to 
understand how to organize in the work process, whereas what we’ve 
worked on is [delivery platform] riders understand the work process 
about as well as we can do, but we can’t penetrate the algorithms and 
shit going on in our phones. (Jamie) 
                         
adherence to an authoritative ‘science’: “Once his methods had been introduced, the 
managers would be as much subject to rules and discipline as the workers themselves. … 
Thus cooperation resulted from the fact that workers and managers complied with the results 
of scientific investigations, though it also depended upon a prior mental revolution which 
made the wholehearted acceptance of these results possible.” 
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It’s all done server-side obviously. The app is a dumb client — when the 
system goes down…your app just goes blank. So there’s nothing going 
on in the phone, it’s all server-side, so there’s no way we can even find 
out. (Noah) 
 
Jamie referred to this scenario as “informational asymmetry”.  Rosenblat and 
Stark (2016: 3777) settle on a similar formulation in their study of Uber, 
concluding that “power and information asymmetries emerge via Uber’s 
software-based platform through algorithmic labor logistics shaping driver 
behaviour, electronic surveillance, and policies for performance targets.”  The 
combination of these technical and political considerations within the 
algorithmic management infrastructure is perhaps unsurprising when we 
consider that asymmetry is both an aim of Taylorism (see Chapter 2) and 
arguably the condition of human-machine interfaces in general (Cramer and 
Fuller, 2016: 150-1). 
 
But it nonetheless poses issues for thinking about workers’ capacity to exercise 
their agency within the work process.  In this respect, Lorenzo identified a key 
difference between his work at the supermarket distribution centre and the 
manufacturing job he moved on to regarding the way performance was tracked.  
The distribution centre collects productivity data using bulky digital 
‘wristwatches’ connected to finger-mounted scanners (Figure 1), which is then 
collated using SAP software.103  Apart from the times when near-real-time 
monitors are displaying target percentages at the edge of the working area, 
generally the day’s performance is only known to the worker the next morning 
by way of the shift allocation SMS, with supervisors picking specific workers to 
approach on the shopfloor with SAP print-outs (Figure 4).  By contrast, 
performance at the manufacturing job is tracked on a whiteboard which 
displays twenty to thirty measures of progress relating to various sub-assembly 
                         
103 For an in-depth discussion of SAP, see Rossiter (2016: 51-6). 
189 
and assembly processes.  Figures on the whiteboard are updated every hour 
or so, and the final figures are assessed at the end of the day in a debrief.  
Because the employees are filling in the performance results themselves using 
dry-wipe pens, they are in possession of the productivity information before the 
manager.  Lorenzo explained that this provided the opportunity for workers to 
come up with reasons or excuses as to why the performance appeared a 
certain way before the manager came onto the shopfloor for the debrief — a 
far different scenario to the distribution centre, where — as I mentioned in 
Chapter 3 — the introduction of communal screens left workers trying to work 
out among themselves how their performance was being processed. 
 
One impulse to what Rosenblat and Stark (2016: 3762-3) refer to as the 
“blindness” workers face in a situation of informational and power asymmetry 
is to identify the need for trust over the algorithms at the heart of algorithmic 
management.  This is explored in the literature by Lee (2018), who conducted 
an online experiment to find out participants’ perceptions of algorithmic 
decisions, but it is also reported as an obstacle to organizing by workers such 
as Jamie and Noah, who felt the untrustworthiness of the information displayed 
on their screens (such as the Pulse labour allocation tool) actually led to 
workers concluding the app favoured certain types of workers (moped riders) 
over others (cyclists) when it came to the allocation of deliveries, harming the 
potential for building common cause between the two groups against the 
employer.  However, Edwards and Veale (2017) ask whether the ‘right to an 
explanation’ is misplaced, and whether it would offer the remedy transparency 
advocates desire even if they could ‘have’ it.  In Chapter 5, I show that 
information asymmetry between management and workers may not be the 
barrier to political action it first appears, and may in fact offer under-considered 




Framing algorithmic management 
 
Negri (2017b) imagines that “Today, in the post-industrial era, the body and 
brain of the worker are no longer docile for dressage and horse-training by the 
bosses;104 on the contrary, they are more autonomous in building cooperation 
and more independent from organisational command.”  But the picture drawn 
in this chapter bears a closer resemblance to Fisher’s (2009: 34) idea that 
 
As production and distribution are restructured, so are nervous systems. 
To function effectively as a component of just-in-time production you 
must develop a capacity to respond to unforeseen events, you must 
learn to live in conditions of total instability. 
 
Recent scholarship has underlined the significance of the relationship between 
management technologies and the development of precarious terms of 
employment (Waters and Woodcock, 2017; Moore, 2018), but even within the 
confines of distribution workplaces, we can see the emergence of a relationship 
between a technologically reorganized managerial regime and a political 
phenomenology of work based on computationally-mediated directives and 
algorithmically-enforced performance metrics. 
 
Complementing Zuboff’s (2015) notion of ‘surveillance capitalism’,105 Waters 
and Woodcock (2017) suggest algorithmic management can be understood as 
a “synthesis of panopticism and Taylorism”.  As discussed in Chapter 2, 
Woodcock (2017a) suggests the idea of an algorithmic panopticon due to the 
“illusion of managerial control” underpinning Deliveroo’s algorithmic 
management system.  However, although the idea of panopticism may be 
                         
104 This metaphor is likely a reference to the dual meaning of manège, originally from French. 
105 And indeed an established literature on ‘dataveillance’. See Clarke, 1988; Degli Eposti, 
2014. 
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suggestive of a political will that appears to reflect the motives of algorithmic 
management, it is far from instructive in terms of explaining the actual balance 
of forces within the work process.  To do that, we need to also see algorithmic 
management as a “[strategy] that capital must struggle to impose” (Cleaver, 
1979: 43) by means of enquiring into the political composition of living labour, 




This chapter has assessed the implications of algorithmic management for the 
organization of work as experienced by workers and has discussed the 
managerial politics implied by the algorithmic management system.  The 
algorithmically-managed distribution workplace is one in which workers can 
see aspects of the work process subject to computational logic, right down to 
their own phenomenological experience of working and the way they navigate 
the space of the workplace.  The intimate integration of personal computing 
devices such as handheld scanners means communication becomes codified 
and sanctioned in particular ways, and within platform-based distribution work, 
algorithms are used to manage workers’ access to the labour process.  In this 
chapter, as across the dissertation, I have opted not to focus on algorithms in 
terms of discrete lines of code, but to understand them as “part of a complex 
of power relations” (Goffey, 2006: 19), reflecting the way workers themselves 
encounter ‘the system’, with algorithms acting “as part of an ill-defined network 
of actions upon actions” (ibid.).  The conceptual imprecision of ‘the system’ is 
partly beside the point, partly the point itself.  As I have discussed, the idea of 
‘the algorithm’ or ‘the system’ nonetheless takes on its own authoritarian 
(arguably theological) quality and emerges as a managerial force on the 
shopfloor in its own right, to both workers and supervisors alike.  But it is able 
to adopt this role precisely because of its perceived unknowability, and its place 
beyond the informational threshold.  This is the terrain of struggle entailed by 
algorithmic management. 
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If you got a job, 
you can be an agent. 
You can work for revolution 
in your place of employment. 
 






This dissertation has examined the conditions faced by workers within 
algorithmically-managed workplaces in the distribution sector.  Chapter 3 
outlined the labour processes of a number of workplaces and discussed the 
technical composition of workers within them, whilst Chapter 4 took a closer 
look at the politics of algorithmic management, drawing out the political 
implications of informational asymmetry between managers and workers, and 
discussing the effects of managerial tactics implicated in work involving 
handheld interface devices.  Both these built on Chapters 1 and 2, which 
examined the class politics of workplace technologies and managerial 
innovation, respectively.  Having politicized managerial practices, in this 
chapter I bring together strands from all the preceding chapters to focus on 
questions pertaining to workers’ political practices. 
 
This chapter focuses on two main questions: 1) What actions are workers 
taking against the managerial forms that govern them at work?  2) How do 
these actions contribute to our understanding of contemporary class struggle 
in algorithmically-organized workplaces?  As such, this chapter is an inquiry 
into the political composition of workers in these workplaces which, following 
Chapter 4, continues to focus on the relation between the technical class 
composition of distribution work and the political forms taken by class interests 
within them.  Whereas Chapter 4 discussed the role of technological 
organization in the managerial endeavour, both in terms of governing the 
productive process and foreclosing certain forms of worker association or 
organization, in this chapter I explore the capacity for workers to contest these 
forms of control, with a particular focus on political forms arising from the 
technological organization of the work process.  In doing so, I turn from more 
traditional forms of organizing — such as unionization — towards less formal 
types of action and the idea of what I call a ‘metic commons’ as a frame for 
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understanding the potential for alternative forms of association within the 
algorithmically-mediated workplace. 
 
Braverman (1974: 17) reminds us of the importance of analysing labour 
processes as part of an historic evolution of social forms — in particular the 
importance of not simply accepting “what the designers, owners, and managers 
of the machines tell us about them” but rather undertaking an “independent 
evaluation of machinery and modern industry”.  As discussed in Chapter 1, this 
extends to the way trade unions often take an ‘objectivist’ view of technologies 
of organization (Panzieri, 1980), but in this chapter I extend the principle to the 
political actions of workers by highlighting the gap that exists between ‘official’ 
efforts to improve conditions in the sector — which largely occur outside the 
workplace and seldom focus on the conditions of working life — and the actions 
being taken by many workers on a daily basis to maximize their interests in 
spite of efforts by management to mitigate against the ‘problem’ of labour.  
Furthermore, I will challenge the idea that forms of resistance taken on the 
shopfloor are necessarily individualistic or impervious to collectivization. 
 
Collinson and Ackroyd (2005: 321) note “the empirical coverage of resistance 
and misbehaviour is seriously incomplete, and there are new terrains in which 
conflict can be expressed.”  It is the task of this chapter to continue the 
exploration of this terrain of conflict and signal observable forms of resistance 
and organizational misbehaviour within them, challenging the perception that 
“resistance and misbehaviour may have no future (because, among other 
things, managers and authorities have acquired effective techniques of 
behavioural control)” (ibid.).  As Ackroyd and Thompson (1999: 5) argue, the 
notion that there is now no alternative for workers but total compliance does 
not square with what we know of organizational history, nor with the empirical 
observations of the current study.  But it does raise the question of how we 
classify ‘resistance’ at work.  Having discussed the central importance of 
worker cooperation to management in Chapter 2, in this chapter I take a broad 
195 
conception of workplace resistance, spanning established forms of worker 
organization, the autonomist notion of ‘refusal’, as well as informal instances of 
misbehaviour, on the grounds that misbehaviour includes a raft of actions 
which undermine managerial attempts to cultivate a certain organizational 
culture, following Ackroyd and Thompson (1999: 4): 
 
the processes which are formative of organizational behaviour are, to a 
considerable extent, outside the control of managers. This means that 
behaviour can only be affected to a certain extent. …only degrees of 
conformity with managerial expectation can be produced. A good part of 
our consideration of misbehaviour…shows how incorrigible and 
innovative organizational behaviour actually is. 
 
While I acknowledge the limits of the term ‘resistance’ — particularly in terms 
of its reactive connotations which belie the priority of working-class struggle 
established in Chapter 1  —  in this chapter I use it as a working term along 
similar lines to Hodson (1995: 80) to refer to acts “intended to mitigate claims 
by management on workers or to advance workers’ claims against 
management”.  The latter part of the definition in particular allows me to shift 
focus from a primarily ‘negative’ stance of refusal or non-compliance towards 
a more ‘positive’ conception of struggle which invokes the commons of the 
infrapolitical realm (Scott, 1990: 183) and the concept of ‘metis’, which refers 
to forms of knowledge or intelligence which arise in situationally-specific 
contexts and invoke an element of cunning (Detienne and Vernant, 1991).  In 
order to do this, I elevate a selected range of political forms from my empirical 
findings that demonstrate both political and technological guile, which I 
conclude is a starting point for thinking about the potential for responsive forms 
of collective action in the algorithmically-mediated workplace.  Here it should 
be stated that judging workplace resistance in terms of its capacity to transform 
society would be an impossible burden (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999: 23).  
However, it is my intention to argue the significance of actually existing 
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workplace resistance for those who care about the transformation of class 
society. 
 
Trade unions and the future world of work 
 
Historically, analyses of political class composition have focused primarily on 
formalized political expressions, in particular the formal vehicles of the labour 
movement: trade unions, and — in the past — the relationship of workers to 
mass workers parties.  Taken as an expression as the ‘class for itself’, trade 
unionism (including independent or base unionism) has historically been 
concerned with ‘organizing’ the labour force to improve the social position of 
labour against capital.  The approaches and characters of different trade unions 
throughout history (and still) have varied dramatically, and as such it is difficult 
to sketch a general character regarding unions’ political activity, but aspects 
tend to include negotiating with employers, mounting legal challenges, 
representing workers in grievances, organizing branches within workplaces, 




In the course of my interviews, I spoke with trade unionists from both a small 
‘independent’ union, the Independent Workers Union of Great Britain (IWGB), 
and a large mainstream union, the GMB.  Involved in a campaign to unionize 
workers at an e-commerce distribution centre, the GMB organizer told me: 
 
The end game is a recognition deal. (Elaine) 
 
Tactics towards achieving this end ranged from lobbying shareholders and 
generating press attention to gate jobs, which was the primary point of contact 
197 
with workers at the site.106  The primary aim of the GMB campaign concerned 
the use of insecure contracts, with other demands concerning pay, dignity at 
work and transparency.  The centrality of the recognition deal reflects the stake 
held by trade unions for some time within the modern industrial landscape, 
namely to act as an intermediary between workers and employers in order to 
negotiate around the terms and conditions of work.  With a political endgame 
looking something like the co-management of work, Marxist scholars have 
often lamented the curtailment of trade unions’ historically socialist character.  
Braverman (1974: 10) puts this down to a lack of appetite for workers’ control: 
 
The unionized working class, intimidated by the scale and complexity of 
capitalist production, and weakened in its original revolutionary impetus 
by the gains afforded by the rapid increase of productivity, increasingly 
lost the will and ambition to wrest control of production from capitalist 
hands and turned ever more to bargaining over labor’s share in the 
product. 
 
The contractual focus of unions does not typically lend itself to questions 
concerning technology except where it threatens jobs (i.e. technological 
unemployment brought about by automation), and although unions such as the 
GMB are and have been concerned with negotiating managerial expectations 
regarding pick rates (Elaine), their approach is one of collaboration with 
managers and often invoking the language of fair conditions, which is not 
necessarily felt to be universally positive.  While Elaine, a regional organizer, 
spoke highly of the GMB’s role in arranging for ergonomic studies to be carried 
                         
106 ‘Gate jobs’ refers to the practice of leafleting and talking to workers at the entrance to a 
workplace in order to persuade them to join the union. It is a tactic used when a trade union 
lacks a presence inside the workplace it wants to organize. 
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out at an Asda distribution centre, Todd felt Usdaw’s negotiation regarding 
similar metrics had potentially made life harder:107 
 
Elaine: …we’re 83% density organized in Asda distribution and we 
have…a national body that meet made up of lay-members that are 
elected by the membership… So they have a regulated pick rate and 
what that means is they’ve had time and motion that have come out into 
the site, and they will then look at all the different variations of how.. day 
working to night working, lone working, lifting, heights, speeds, erm, 
whether you’re a man or woman, whether you’re pregnant, whether the 
lifting equipment technology that you have fits into it. There’s a whole 
array of assessments that’s done. 
CG: So they’ll come out on behalf of the union? 
Elaine: So no, so time and motion generally come out from the 
employer, so the employer will come out and they’ve got different ways 
of doing it like they can click on a button thing or they can do a timer on 
a watch and then we negotiate and regulate around that, so we know 
what our members are able to do…they’ve took into the factors of how 
far these people have got to walk. You can get massive big bags of dog 
food so you’re having to pick.. Can somebody pick that up? How do they 
pick it up? …most people order online by the way, the heaviest stuff, so 
all the tins and all the bottles, so all that has to be taken into account, 
how easy is it to get ‘Z’ item from there and that from there and where 
do you put it, how do you put it into your trays? So it’s all, it’s all 
massively regulated and being talked about and if there’s something 
that’s not right we change it, we work with the employer to change it, 
and because we want it to go smoothly, and we want the business to 
                         
107 Usdaw, the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers, is a large trade union which 
primarily represents retail workers. It has recognition agreements with a number of major 
supermarket chains. 
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succeed, but not at the health and safety of our members and the 
workforce…the unions are there as sort of a sort of comparator to try 
and stop people from exploiting the workers and doing too much, and 
it’s just giving the voice of the workforce. 
 
CG: Is there a union? 
Todd: Yeah, Usdaw. 
CG: Are they active? 
Todd: No, they’re shit. Yeah, they’re really bad. I’ve never had the union 
rep come up to me and ask if I wanna join, I had to find out for myself 
what the union was, and they’re basically just a yellow union. The only 
interaction I know that they’ve had with my department is that they 
agreed the maximum weight for these boxes, which is fifteen kilos. 
What’s fifteen kilos times by eight? That’s a lot. 
CG: 120 plus the trolley. 
Todd: Yeah that’s what you’re expected to be able to push around the 
whole fuckin’ store by the end of the shop. And so yeah the union hasn’t 
done me any favours, just said I need to have a fuck-off heavy trolley to 
push around. I’d rather not. 
 
Todd’s response illustrates the distance that he felt from what was likely 
considered a win on the part of his union.  For Todd the pressing managerial 
claims to be mitigated involved expectations around performance and conduct, 
but for Elaine the key priority was winning a recognition deal, after which 
concessions could be sought in a pragmatic way that seeks an amenable 
balance between employers’ and employees’ interests. As I will discuss later, 
Todd still found expectations demeaning and acted against them on a daily 
basis with a range of tactics, even after his union’s intervention. 
 
A more generous reading of the historical narrowing of trade unions’ claims 
over the productive process could point to the successive restrictions placed 
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on trade union activity in the UK, particularly regarding the ability to take strike 
action.  In 2016, 322,000 days were lost to strike action — the eighth lowest 
annual total since records began in 1891 — around forty percent of which were 
lost to a single dispute (Office for National Statistics, 2017).108  In the same 
year membership of trade unions, in decline since the early 1970s, reached its 
lowest point in the post-war period (Labour Market Analysis, 2017).  These 
figures support Woodcock’s (2017c: 98) argument that trade union 
membership and activities account for only a section of workers’ political 
activity and cannot be taken as indicative of the whole, and they also suggest 
trade unions are failing to adapt to the new conditions of work.  In the 
distribution sector, the problem is further exacerbated by unions’ priority to 
recruit in-house staff over agency workers (Lorenzo) — a pragmatic calculation 




Beginning in 2016, a great deal of effort from British trade unions operating and 
campaigning in the distribution sector was focused on the Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee’s ‘future world of work and 
the rights of workers’ inquiry, which I referred to in the introductory chapter.  
Although the announcement of the inquiry was framed against a backdrop of 
the new technological context of work, it was essentially concerned with issues 
of a contractual nature (Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, 
2016).  It makes sense that unions should be so invested in the contractual 
direction of travel indicated by the future world of work.  Not only does it open 
the possibility of the degradation of workers’ lot, but it threatens unions 
themselves with a crisis of identity and purpose at a time when trade unions 
are already largely limited to their claimed ability to offer in-work protection. 
                         
108 129,000 days were lost to the BMA’s junior doctors’ strike (Office for National Statistics, 
2017). 
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The conversation around the future of employment contracts in the distribution 
sector and related ‘gig economy’ has been dominated by the wider concern 
around the rise of (or return to) precariousness or ‘precarity’.  The result has 
been something of a ‘precarity preoccupation’, with the issue of (in)secure 
contracts being seen as the key to all future successes.  This has implications 
for the way trade unions organize their efforts, in particular putting resources 
into engaging in (or initiating) juridical-legislative proceedings rather than 
worker-oriented industrial action.  It is notable that the activity of the future world 
of work inquiry has been complemented by recent court proceedings involving 
Uber and CitySprint, brought by the GMB and IWGB unions.  Lena,109 an 
organizer with the base IWGB union, told a gathering of the Transnational 
Social Strike platform (Plan C, 2017a): 
 
When a court rules that the contract is a sham — I’m talking about an 
employment tribunal — that’s the law, and they have to listen to the law. 
They can kind of long it out listening to the workers complaining about 
stuff, but ultimately they have to listen to a judge saying, ‘You’re 
operating a sham and you have to change things.’ So I’m just saying 
they have different uses, strikes and legal action, and I think in the long 
run you have to challenge the legality of what they’re doing because 
that’s the cornerstone of their business model and it’s the ultimate tool 
of oppression essentially, like these bogus contracts are designed to 
deprive people of rights, so you have to assert your rights through the 
court and we live in a liberal open democracy with an independent 
judiciary, like we should use that to get workers’ rights in my opinion 
because we need them. (Lena) 
 
Like if you don’t get sick pay or holidays or pensions on contracts like 
we’re on, it’s really hard, and when pay is at such a disparity across the 
                         
109 Name has been changed. 
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fleet, it’s really hard to convince everyone to strike so although it’s really 
good for highlighting issues, I think it’s almost like a PR stunt and I guess 
that’s pretty much it. (Lena) 
 
This juridical-legislative focus, often combined with publicity campaigns, is 
typical of the activity of unions big and small across the sector in recent years 
(Elaine, Lena).  It is not my intention here to denigrate attempts to get 
parliamentary or case laws changed in workers’ favour, especially given the 
costs associated with pursuing employers through the courts, and given the 
UK’s strong anti-union laws it is perhaps unsurprising that unions should 
choose to focus their firepower on the ears of the state when they have an 
opportunity, but the scope of their interventions demonstrates a selective focus 
given the spectrum of problems facing workers in these industries.  In 
particular, there is a strong focus on ‘fixing’ the employment relationship at the 
expense of investigating the ongoing technological restructuring of the 
workplace evidenced throughout this dissertation — an order of priorities well-
established within the trade union movement.110   
 
While the link between dubious employment arrangements and the 
technologies governing work is increasingly well-documented (Moore, 2018; 
Waters and Woodcock, 2017), it is striking that there exists a tendency, even 
in accounts which turn to questions of how workers may resist contemporary 
encroachments, to frame possibilities for resistance in terms of workers’ ability 
to find leverage in and against the contractual dimension of their 
circumstances.  This has been the case in the recent reports of workers ‘fighting 
back’ within Deliveroo and Uber (Zhou, 2017).  Although we often see 
reference to the technologies of management, the response tends to ignore 
                         
110 As highlighted by Nick Dyer-Witheford, the decision by United Auto Workers to opt for 
contractual security over a stake in technological changes in the Treaty of Detroit, although 
no doubt well-intentioned, proved myopic and arguably jeopardised the future of thousands of 
auto workers (Dyer-Witheford, 2015: 39-41). 
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technologies, instead opting for a preoccupation with the wider legal techniques 
of precarity. 
 
Even where there remains a nod towards technological managerial practices, 
a focus on the contractual relation upholds a conception of workplace 
resistance — and ‘organizing’ workplaces — which occurs at a predominantly 
‘macro’ level.  The perspective becomes one in which resistance is conceived 
of as largely extrinsic to the workplaces in question.  Instead of beginning at 
the point of subjection (i.e. in the work process) and looking at struggle from 
the point of production, a strategy exists of trying to gain or force recognition in 
order for a union to negotiate with the employer or lobby for parliamentary 
scrutiny.  Given we have seen how crucial workplace technologies are to how 
management enacts (or attempts to enact) its control of workers, it is notable 
that so far approaches to the issue have neglected to consider how struggles 
within the workplace might be affected.  While contracts are certainly a part of 
the picture, they do not tell the whole story, not least because contracts 
describe an ideal type of relation and do not necessarily reflect the realities of 
work.  But in a period of significant organizational change across the sector, it 
feels significant that workers’ organizations are primarily concerned with 
solutions which do not directly involve workers, but instead ask workers to join 
in order to bestow trust to organizers who will do bidding on their behalf, while 
day-to-day they remain in a challenging work environment waiting for a change 
to occur in a meeting room or courtroom elsewhere.  This has been a typical 
and prominent thread within trade unions alongside (and often running counter 
to) shopfloor organizing within the ‘rank and file’, despite workers asking for 
assistance in this respect, and the fact that everyday resistance is already 
taking place at the point of subjection ‘unorganized’, regardless of what unions 
do: 
 
A challenge to workers agitating in the industry is to assess the everyday 
tactics workers use to make their jobs easier and articulate them into a 
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campaign. It’s hard to imagine a future set of demands for workers that 
doesn’t include the technologies discussed above as fundamental 
platform on which to fight. (Barr, 2018) 
 
Resistance: what are we talking about? 
 
From misbehaviour to subversion 
 
As Collinson and Ackroyd (2005: 320) note, the academic literature on 
employee resistance is less than coherent, and the lack of agreement on basic 
terminology — ranging from labels such as resistance, misbehaviour and 
dissent — suggests differences of opinion on how the field should be defined.  
In this chapter I adopt a fairly expansive conception of resistance, approaching 
Sprouse’s (1992: 3 in Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999: 2) definition of “anything 
you do at work you are not supposed to do”.  While I do exclude ‘positive’ 
incarnations of such activity (though the normative appeal of any such instance 
is contestable),111 such a definition is necessary to incorporate forms which are 
usually excluded from terms such as ‘organizing’.  I note Ackroyd and 
Thompson (1999) argue for a wider or separate category of ‘misbehaviour’ but 
also note it has come to be used in conjunction with ‘resistance’ (Woodcock, 
2017c: 101).  For my purposes here, I see the value of incorporating most of 
what Ackroyd and Thompson (1999: 31) term ‘misbehaviour’ — especially with 
regard to the figure they call “the recalcitrant worker”  — within the umbrella of 
‘resistance’, not least because it has a dual meaning with implications for the 
systems thinking explored in Chapter 2.  But as I am concerned with politicizing 
such acts, I find it useful to refer to Hodson’s (1995: 80) definition of actions 
“intended to mitigate claims by management on workers or to advance workers’ 
claims against management”.  Appropriate for the discussion of workers’ 
                         
111 For Ackroyd and Thompson this form of misbehaviour would fall under the sub-category of 
‘committed engagement’ (1999: 25). 
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interaction with technical systems, Hodson’s definition also allows us to think 
about resistance through the lens of subversion.  Subversion means we can 
think about misbehaviour beyond behaviour, resistance beyond negation, and 
disruption beyond interruption.  Subversion allows us to consider action which 
may take any of these forms, but which may also be understood as an 
intervention or creative redirection which is concerned with effecting new 
conditions and maximizing workers’ space within the organization and 
advancing their interests, even momentarily. 
 
Workplaces are messy, and as such I am keen to retain some of the messiness 
of resistance when considering workers’ practices of non-compliance.  It is 
important to note — as Collinson and Ackroyd (2005: 321) do, paraphrasing 
Kondo (1990: 224) — that 
 
there is no such thing as a ‘true resister’ or an entirely ‘authentic’ or 
‘pristine space of resistance’. Notions of ‘resistance’ may thus appear 
inadequate because oppositional practices are frequently characterized 
by ironies, contradictions, and unintended outcomes, while employees 
often ‘consent, cope, and resist at different levels of consciousness at a 
single point in time’. 
 
As such there is a fine line to tread when politicizing resistance, particularly 
those practices which were not necessarily undertaken for explicitly political or 
ideological ends.  Woodcock (2017c: 109) notes there have been attempts to 
reframe as ‘sabotage’ anything short of complete compliance, but whereas 
sabotage is intended to disrupt crucial mechanisms or machinery, a lot of the 
actions we can observe “do not significantly undermine the process of capital 
accumulation”.  Nonetheless, they may still be political, such as if they are 
aimed at reappropriating personal dignity taken by managerial practices (Scott, 
1990: 112-3).  The resistance I discuss in this chapter encompasses a broad 
set of defensive actions undertaken by workers.  Whereas others may equate 
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resistance with some notion of ‘fighting back’ (see Scholz, 2017), here I want 
to make a delineation between more formalized political expressions of 
working-class self-activity and less formalized actions which indicate a general 
direction of antipathy from workers to employers.  Such a delineation is useful 
in separating out what I refer to here as the ‘organizing repertoire’ from other 
forms of action, because elevating the significance of less formal forms of 
action may allow us to tap into the “underlying reservoir of class attitudes” 
discussed by Braverman (1974: 30), and to consider such actions not only in 
negative terms of mitigation but also in positive terms of advancement or 
advocation.112 
 
Less formalized political activity is characteristically harder to ‘see’, as theorists 
of resistance have noted (Scott, 1990; Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999; 
Woodcock, 2017c).  Although often concealed, such acts need not be overtly 
ideological; general acts involving the “withdrawal of cooperation” (Edwards 
and Scullion, 1982: 154) can be thought to be ‘always already implicated’ in the 
ongoing struggle for cooperation within the workplace (Hanlon, 2016: 155).  It 
should be noted that the point is debated. In attempting to define the 
parameters of ‘misbehaviour’ proper, Ackroyd and Thompson (1999: 21-8) 
argue for a classification schema of workplace practices which may be 
considered misbehaviour, resistance, class struggle, etc. This is appropriate 
for their ends in identifying and elevating forms of activity neglected by the 
literature on organizational behaviour, and they are right to note there are forms 
of authority and non-compliance that exist outside of class relations (ibid.: 24).  
But while I am sympathetic to their claim that it is not accurate to “define all the 
observed employee motives and practices by using the concept of resistance 
to control, or to judge its effectiveness primarily through the degree of formal, 
collective action achieved by workers” (ibid.: 23) — actions may have a range 
                         
112 My use of the term ‘organizing repertoire’ is influenced by Peters’ (2015) idea of ‘protest 
repertoire’. 
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of motives — this does not mean we cannot think about practices in terms of 
their amenability for collective action, or whether the dispositions or principles 
involved in those practices might have a bearing on the prospect of workers 
advancing claims against management.  
 
A framework of ‘refusal’ 
 
The breadth, possibility and radical contingency of working-class struggle is 
theorized by Tronti as refusal.  For autonomists “the beginning of liberatory 
politics” (Hardt and Negri, 2001: 204), refusal speaks to the agency of workers 
implied by the class relation, particularly as the wage labour relation (Tronti, 
1965), discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 as the indeterminacy of labour power 
and a fundamental problem for management.  Tronti argues the notions of 
refusal and revolution cannot be separated (ibid.), but far prior to the ultimate 
collective and organized political refusal of capitalist social relations (i.e. a 
revolutionary movement), for Tronti (1972) the “point of departure not only for 
the antagonism, but for the organization of the antagonism” is the point at which 
“the working class confronts its own labor as capital, as a hostile force, as an 
enemy”.  Tronti recognizes in workers’ passivity — namely disillusionment with 
work — the spontaneous and elementary step in refusal, the point at which the 
worker first refuses to be an “active participant” by “opting out of the game”.  
This is fertile ground for Tronti (ibid.): 
 
Hence, what appears as integration of the working class in the system, 
by no means represents a renunciation of the struggle against capital: It 
indicates a refusal to develop and stabilize capital beyond certain given 
political limits, beyond a fixed defensive cordon, from which aggressive 
sallies can then be launched. 
 
Tronti’s use of language is unfortunate here, but the idea is that the transition 
from workers’ diligent activity to alienated passivity at work is at the same time 
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the beginning of active refusal.  The task then is to overcome passivity by 
developing “tactics of organization to actualize the strategy of refusal” — i.e. to 
collectivize and weaponize refusal beyond its initial spontaneity — in order to 
act upon “the threat of denying [the capitalist] the mediation of the working class 
in the capitalist relations of production” (ibid.).  This requires an organizational 
turn which Tronti does less to flesh out — and as I will discuss later, the issue 
of moving from ‘spontaneous’ action to collective action persists still — but, 
Tronti notes, “passive non-collaboration in the development of capitalism and 
active political opposition to the power of capital are precisely the starting point 
and direction of this organizational leap” (ibid.). 
 
The concept of refusal contains within it both negative forms of action 
(disengagement; doing a job badly, slowly or disinterestedly) and positive forms 
(redirecting activity, subversion, denying mediation, ‘aggressive sallies’).  As 
such, when thinking about workplace resistance it complements Hodson’s 
suggestion of acts that may mitigate managerial claims or advance workers’ 
claims.  Woodcock draws on the concept to reframe the politics of the wider 
phenomenon of ‘everyday’ resistance, in particular its overshadowing by 
established ‘official’ forms of industrial action.  Continuing his claim that trade 
union membership is a narrow gauge for understanding the extent of workplace 
resistance, Woodcock argues that while events like strikes are certainly 
significant forms of action, they are a tactic chosen for their visibility and 
spectacle.  By contrast, most resistant acts are not those workers would want 
to advertise, especially in insecure workplaces, but rather those which feel 
more immediately feasible or sustainable in otherwise powerless jobs 
(Woodcock, 2017c: 98-100).  As such they can be considered along the lines 
of Tronti’s ‘defensive cordon’, indicating what Scott (1990: 183) calls 
‘infrapolitics’ — “an unobtrusive realm of political struggle. … That it should be 
invisible…is in large part by design — a tactical choice born of a prudent 
awareness of the balance of power” — but nonetheless grounded in the pursuit 
of autonomy (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999). 
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I now turn to a discussion of the observations in the cases.  Following an 
overview of all forms of resistance observed for completeness, I draw out four 
examples which demonstrate different degrees of refusal, but which exhibit in 
various ways a relation to the technical composition and technological 
organization of the work.  In particular, I argue they overcome passivity in their 
use of cunning intelligence (metis), but also depend on an infrapolitical 
commons which may offer the basis for the ‘organizational leap’ envisioned by 
Tronti. 
 
What is observed? 
 
Resistance took place in every workplace I enquired into.  In this section I will 
present all the forms of resistance relayed to me by participants, before 
examining a selection in closer detail in the next section.  In order to avoid 
overidentification with categories offered in some of the organization studies 
and sociology of work literature, I will separate them into simple descriptive 
categories here which will suffice for our purposes: accidental, formal, informal.  
For completeness, I will give an overview of every type of resistance relayed to 
me across my interviews with workers and organizers.  I do not claim any of 
the types of resistance are necessarily new — although some methods, as we 
will see, are certainly novel in their approach — and while I do not claim every 
instance of informal resistance is driven by explicit political (ideological) 
motives, it is my position that they all possess political implications.  Having 
discussed them above, in this section I am bracketing out externally-conducted 
‘macro’ forms of resistance, namely legal challenges and press publicity, which 
(across the cases I have studied) were actions taken on behalf of workers 






Accidental forms of resistance are those arising as largely unintended 
consequences of either the technological, practical or social organization of 
work.  Three forms were reported.  First, technical malfunctions were reported 
by every participant, and effectively presented a blockage to the functioning of 
the productive process, particularly as the majority of workplaces relied on a 
functioning digital infrastructure and had no recourse to a non-digital 
alternative.  As well as creating down-time for production and lag in productivity, 
technical malfunctions also tended to generate consequences such as talking 
and wasting time.  Second, the disruption caused by the installation of public 
productivity screens discussed in Chapter 3, which led to workers huddling at 
the edge of the grid in order to wait for their ‘score’ to appear.  Third, conflict 
between workers held up the work process, affected productivity and harmed 
the ‘team’ ethos many workplaces were purporting to aspire to.  Sometimes 
arising from the physical organization of work (getting in each other’s way) or 
from perceived slights ranging from favouritism to outright racism (particularly 
in cases of inter-nationality conflict), inter-worker conflict could be viewed as a 
failure of human relations management in fostering adequately collaborative or 
happy working relationships, although it should be noted that in two cases 





Formal resistance refers to acts which may or may not be ‘official’ (i.e. trade 
union sanctioned) but are always intentionally political and generally drawn 
from the historically established repertoire of organizing tactics.113  While I do 
                         
113 The IWW encourages organizers to structure their workplace interventions around the 
‘vowels’ of organizing: Agitate, Educate, Inoculate, Organize, Unionize. While to my 
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not claim to have adopted a representative sample, I feel it is important to note 
these were reported by a minority of participants.  The reported practices were: 
holding meetings (usually in a pub after work, where shift times permitted), 
liaising via a WhatsApp group or through social media (where groups were set 
up for the purposes of discussing political activity), producing a workplace 
bulletin to be handed out to co-workers, encouraging co-workers to join a union, 
holding a wildcat strike, holding a slow-down. 
 
Worker meetings were started by self-selected groups keen to organize in their 
workplaces and were populated by invitation.  One social media account was 
set up as a one-to-one/one-to-many medium for workers to liaise with an 
external union organizer, and WhatsApp groups were variously either set up 
for the purposes of organizing collectively (and later as a union) or were 
commandeered for political purposes having originally been social group chats.  
Workplace bulletins were authored by workers intent on organizing their 
workplaces or raising workplace issues with large numbers of co-workers; they 
were generally handed out at breaktimes, before/after work or between jobs, 
and typically contained details of perceived exploitative practices within the 
workplace as well as information about related workplaces and details about 
workers who were organizing politically in other parts of the company (whether 
at a different site or in a different country).  Encouraging co-workers to unionize 
occurred either in casual but intentional conversations with co-workers, or in 
one case as part of a union’s efforts to recruit with ‘gate jobs’ (the practice 
whereby union organizers stand at the gates as workers are leaving the 
premises of work).  It should be noted all these practices can be considered 
‘bread and butter’ organizing tactics deployed by large, small, and 
unincorporated worker organizations the world over.  While none of them are 
unlawful, according to participants all of them were viewed with suspicion by 
                         
knowledge I didn’t speak to any IWW members, all five are covered in the actions listed here, 
and all five were in evidence when I spoke to Jamie and Noah (who share a workplace). 
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managers once, or if, they became aware.  In one case, managers were 
reported to have infiltrated a WhatsApp group and used it to discipline an 
employee marked out as an agitator, before contriving to scupper a planned 
union meeting by holding a rival meeting at the same time with a voucher 
incentive for attendees. 
 
Beyond day-to-day ‘bread and butter’ tactics, there was one reported instance 
of a wildcat strike, and one reported organized slow-down.  The wildcat (i.e. 
‘spontaneous’ rather than balloted) strike was organized very quickly through 
WhatsApp groups separately from workers’ attempts to unionize (although 
there would later be wildcat strikes incorporated into union strategy).  Wildcat 
strikes (i.e. the collective downing of tools irrespective of mechanisms such as 
an official ballot) are typically illegal in the UK, but in this case — a ‘gig 
economy’ delivery company — workers used the loophole afforded by their 
status as ‘independent workers’ instead of ‘employees’ to avoid any legal 
consequences being brought upon them.  Arguably the action was not a ‘true’ 
wildcat strike (Lena, Plan C, 2017a) because it only required workers to refrain 
from logging into the app rather than staging a collective ‘walk-out’, but the 
effect was the comparable.  The slow-down was a one-shift protest conducted 
by agency workers at a distribution centre.  Planned through a series of after-
work meetings, the workers had formulated a set of demands, the foremost of 
which was pay parity with in-house workers.  As the agency workers were paid 
seventy percent of the in-house rate for the same job, the slow-down aimed to 




By ‘informal’ resistance I do not wish to infer from observed actions a trivial or 
casual tenor.  Rather, I use the term to denote forms of resistance which tend 
to lie outside the union organizer’s toolbox.  While it is true some acts of 
informal resistance may be dismissed as selfishness, laziness or carelessness 
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— indeed Lorenzo, whilst relaying details of some of these tactics with pride 
still lamented their apparent individualism — I wish to defend their inclusion 
within the framework of resistance, not least because they form by far the 
largest category of resistant acts from across my participants’ observations, but 
also because they force us to think about resistance outside of what is familiar 
despite (in most cases) their familiarity. 
 
The implementation of informal resistance tended to be either individually or 
knowingly implemented, tacitly ‘organized’ or cooperatively produced, 
consciously political or not, but certainly not accidental, always falling within 
Sprouse’s definition of resistance, and almost always the result of what 
Braverman (1974: 35) referred to as “active dissatisfaction”.114  Across my case 
studies these included: lying, fudging figures, intentional mistakes, doing a bad 
job, obstruction (making someone else’s job harder), damage, stealing, wasting 
time (including unsanctioned breaks), taking advantage of devices, snooping 
(especially logging into supervisors’ computers), playing games, making fun of 
managers, talking, eating, refusing tasks, absenteeism, and attempting suicide.  
These instances range from the mundane to the extreme, and many of them 
are common regardless of workplace, but for our broader purposes it is 
appropriate to outline those which bear a relation to the technological 
organization of work, especially through the algorithmic management system. 
 
Jamie and Noah described the common practice of workers lying for personal 
gain.  Their food delivery platform means managers are distanced from the site 
of work, so workers have to liaise with the company via a helpline when 
accidents occur.  A common ruse is for workers to call the helpline near the 
end of their shift and say they have had an accident on the way to a customer’s 
                         
114 Commonly (mis)attributed to personal or generational failings, Braverman (1974: 35) 
raised the connection between “active dissatisfaction” (which we might alternatively call 
‘attitudinal resistance’) and the nature of the work (such as boredom). 
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house.  The telephone operator will cancel the order, meaning the rider can 
take the meal home for themselves.  Jamie and Noah also described how 
workers may also go through this process for the novelty of ending the shift 
with a ‘good deed’ by opting to give the meal to a homeless person.  By 
contrast, José described lying as a defensive action: delivering packages to 
airports incurs hefty parking charges, so a common practice is for workers to 
‘forget’ to pick up items bound for the airport. 
 
Lorenzo contrasted the ability to fudge figures in his new job (where productivity 
is calculated manually on a whiteboard by workers) with his distribution 
warehouse job where productivity data is collected and calculated digitally.  He 
described how the non-digital aspect of reporting statistics allows workers to 
make sure they are ‘achieving’ satisfactory targets. Committing intentional 
mistakes was described in detail by Todd, a worker at an online shopping 
department.  The practice primarily involves abusing the ‘substitution’ function 
on the handheld device in order to sabotage the stock database, which is 
updated according to workers’ inputs, as well as providing the amusement 
associated with giving customers incorrect items of the worker’s choosing.  
Moreover, the bottleneck created by the organization of ‘shops’ means 
supervisors are unable to check whether the substitutions are appropriate. 
 
José described testing the limits of the automated reporting of lateness from 
lunch breaks at a fulfilment centre, and how workers have begun to waste time 
more liberally having concluded the targets they are expected to hit are 
unachievable.  Todd discussed how workers could effectively take breaks when 
they desired by exploiting a handset option under the previous digital system 
— a practice curtailed until Todd found a new workaround.  Meanwhile Lorenzo 
described how some workers discovered a code they could put into their 
handheld devices which would take them out of the productivity system, 
meaning they could take breaks from the ‘grid’ floor without raising the attention 
of supervisors.  Lorenzo also described how workers would secretly log into 
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supervisors’ computers to check their productivity scores.  Usually supervisors 
would only bring productivity print-outs to workers if they were 
underperforming, but by gaining access to supervisors’ computers they could 
find out whether they were overperforming unknowingly. 
 
‘I found this out…’ 
 
Of all the observed forms of resistance, I want to focus on those which display 
creative refusal and subversion — not only to avoid the replication of 
discussions hosted in other studies, but because some of the examples in 
particular make inventive use of the technological organization of work which 
has been discussed in this dissertation.  Furthermore, they are notable for how, 
in spite of the technological strategies used by management, they demonstrate 
not only the mitigation of managerial claims upon workers but the advancement 
of workers’ claims.  These examples, I argue, demonstrate an intimate ‘metic’ 
(cunningly intelligent) understanding of the workplace which offers a potential 
way of thinking about the political organization of workers on the shopfloor. 
 
Four examples in particular demonstrate principles which may be carried into 
how we can think about shopfloor resistance in algorithmically-mediated 
workplaces: productivity slow-down, taking advantage of handheld devices in 
order to reclaim time, intentional mistakes, and snooping.  As I will argue, these 
examples are notable for possessing either the quality of or potential for what I 
call ‘metic commonality’ — shared situational understanding leading to 
collective guile. 
 
Example 1: Slow-down 
 
The only one of the four examples which fell outside the category of informal 
resistance was the slow-down at a food distribution centre in Greater London.  
Conceived and planned by non-union salts in cooperation with a small group 
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of employees, the slow-down is a less common tactic of formal resistance.115  
Distinct from ‘soldiering’ or ‘heel dragging’, the slow-down was planned as a 
one-day protest in support of a set of demands formulated by a group of around 
ten temp workers at the warehouse.  Central to the demands was the 
relationship between the productivity rate and the system of shift allocation via 
SMS, as discussed in Chapter 3.  The scale of the action’s adoption was 
somewhat spontaneous, but this had been part of the gamble of those who had 
initiated the action and formulated its rationale and demands.  The conception, 
execution and aftermath of the action is relayed by Lorenzo: 
 
Lorenzo: We had political aspirations — we thought, okay, we have to 
first of all break the system of shift allocation and productivity rate, so as 
long as they allocate the shifts as they want and tie it to the productivity 
rate they will be like rat race, I mean people will like fuss in order not to 
be in the lowest ranks and then get a shift. So we said like, okay, we 
want four shifts guaranteed at least per week, never mind the 
productivity rate. 
CG: Who’s we? 
Lorenzo: It’s a small group of people who initially worked there with a 
purpose to organize something, so that was three of us, and then that 
group kind of grew to let’s say ten people who would come sit here in 
the same [beer garden] table, so we had the idea of having that type of 
like ‘demand’ if you want, like four [shifts] guaranteed and same wage 
as the permanents, because the permanents, their productivity rate in 
general, especially if they’ve been like longer established there then 
their pick rate is lower than of the temps and then they don’t hassle them 
so we say like y’know, we do the same work for same money. …the 
                         
115 ‘Salting’ usually refers to the process whereby union organizers join a workforce in order 
to unionize it. It is a common tactic of independent or radical unions such as the IWW. In this 
case the three salts who worked at the warehouse as agency hires were not trade unionists. 
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main discussions were like amongst us in the grids, and we said, okay, 
what is our possibility? Let’s just read out the demands in the briefing in 
the morning before shift… And then we said we were gonna do a day of 
slow-down, so we work seventy percent because we only get seventy 
percent, so basic kind of equation, and that was in a sense, people 
would know at some point we would do it, but not the permanents, the 
permanent workers were not like included, maybe that was a mistake, 
maybe it was good because maybe they would have talked, some of 
them. So one day we said, okay, seventy percent. About three quarters 
of the temps took part in that you could see, y’know, productivity going 
down, people were having fun like for one, two hours it was real fun 
because you could really see everyone is working slow and like making 
fun of it, going slow motion and you could see the supervisor coming in 
there to have a meeting with [the logistics company] and, ‘What are you 
doing? What the fuck?’ and y’know big kind of.. So for two hours it was 
really great and then they asked the permanent workers to work 
overtime, and they did, maybe also because some of them were not 
even aware that there was something like an ‘action’ going.. We talked 
to them a bit but like also we didn’t want to be too vocal, but in the end 
we were too vocal… So yeah we got disciplinary and we got kicked out, 
and yeah, that was it. 
 
The slow-down at the Greater London supermarket distribution centre was 
conceived as an intervention into one of the primary political forms taken by 
management, namely the mechanism which tied agency workers’ productivity 
to their daily shift allocation.  The organizing group took advantage of the daily 
briefing to publicize their demands and relied on the proximity of workers on 
the grid for other temp workers to join in with the action.  Notably, the action 
made use of and subverted workers’ experience of the digital infrastructure of 
the productivity system.  Being used to finding out their productivity percentage 
on a day to day basis in the morning shift allocation SMS, workers were able 
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to subvert their experience of work flow to achieve the desired rate of effort 
(seventy percent of target productivity), which was confirmed in the following 
day’s text messages.  The slow-down was also fun, creating an intervention 
into the usual psychosocial dynamic of the work at the distribution centre by 
flouting and subverting the authority of the algorithmic system, in doing so 
making visible the ‘illusion’ of managerial control and its reliance on workers’ 
cooperation. 
 
Although the slow-down was unsuccessful in achieving its demands, it 
attempted to overtly mitigate and militate against poor pay, worker competition, 
unforgiving productivity management and the shift allocation system.  The 
threat of the shift allocation system was also resisted through the act of joining 
the slow-down, with workers appearing to set aside concerns about the direct 
effect their participation would have upon their own shift allocation.  Meanwhile 
the action was able to advance claims both overt and implicit: overt in terms of 
the pay and shift allocation demands; implicit in terms of inter-worker 
cooperation and collaboration, and in subverting the authority of the 
productivity system by second-guessing its calculation. 
 
Example 2: Taking advantage of handheld devices 
 
At both the Greater London supermarket distribution centre and the south coast 
online supermarket distribution centre, a more consistently ‘everyday’ form of 
resistance involved taking advantage of handheld devices in order to reclaim 
time from ‘the system’.  At Lorenzo’s warehouse this involved workers putting 
a special code into their wrist-mounted interfaces, which would take them out 
of the productivity system and create time for an unsanctioned break: 
 
Lorenzo: There are different codes, for example, what can happen is 
that you made a mistake and you want to — because if the checkers 
find the mistake then you get a [disciplinary] point and you’re not 
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supposed to have too many points for having done wrong stacking — 
so you can tell the supervisor that you think you made a mistake, then 
what happens is the supervisor has a little barcode that you can scan, 
then you’re out of the productivity counting element. You’ve got free 
time, so to speak, to look and see if you made the mistake, if you find 
the item or whatever that you might have put in a different cage/in the 
wrong cage. So that normally, like, you wouldn’t know the code because 
you scan and that kind of quickly gives the information from the scan to 
the watch saying like, okay, from now on you can go through the cages, 
it shows you on the wristwatch how many items should be in there and 
you can double-check. So, some workers know the code — I mean 
either they’ve heard it from a supervisor or they have some way to find 
it out, and the company might change that code because workers use 
it, yknow you find them in the locker room for five minutes just having a 
rest, and you know, okay, they’ve got the code. Where there’s a bit like 
yknow.. some of the workers are private with that because they know 
only if a few workers have that code it won’t.. 
CG: So they actually leave the grid? 
Lorenzo: Yeah they go like y’know in the locker room or it’s a bit risky 
but hang out in the toilet, but they are a bit private about this knowledge 
because y’know they think if it spreads then too many people use it and 
then I can’t use it anymore because management will come down on it. 
 
Meanwhile in Todd’s online supermarket distribution centre, historically 
workers could make use of a button on the handset menu which would remove 
items above a certain size from their shop, making the shop go quicker and 
allowing workers to get rid of heavy trolleys or effectively choose when they 
took their breaks: 
 
Todd: If it [an item] doesn’t fit, you have a button.. the options button 
comes up with another menu and you can say ‘item will not fit’, and what 
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that will do is get rid of any other items in that same box that are around 
the same size that are left on the shop, so another small sabotage thing 
that happens…when you wanna go on your break or you just can’t be 
bothered to push the trolley around anymore because it’s really heavy, 
you’ll press that for items to get rid of the shops to make it go quicker. 
So you can get away with it, and you can leave or sit down or do 
something else. 
CG: Do they not realize when they come to pick up the boxes? 
Todd: No, they’re too busy, so you can take advantage of them running 
around, the managers like. And because the shops are all sort of.. you’re 
anonymous in doing it because somebody else will have another part of 
the same shop. 
 
However, with the introduction of a new digital infrastructure, new menu options 
meant workers were no longer able to determine when their shop would end 
by taking advantage of the ‘item will not fit’ button.  But within a week of the 
new system being introduced, Todd had found an alternative way of ending 
shops prematurely: 
 
Todd: I found this out.. So, on the old system you could end a shop 
whenever you wanted [unauthorized] and go on your break whenever 
you wanted. With the new system you can’t prematurely end a shop. 
You can press the ‘item will not fit’ but that doesn’t get rid of everything 
like you used to be able to. Now you have to finish the shop before you 
go on your break or whenever you leave or whatever. But I worked out 
you could pick up another handset that you’re not logged onto and you 
log onto it and then a menu comes up that says ‘carry on’ or ‘exit shop’ 
and if you press the ‘carry on’ button the shop will switch from this gun 
to the other gun, which is useful for when you’ve run out of battery or 
something like that, or, if you press the exit, it gets rid of the shop and 
so you can go on your break again. It puts it back into the system. 
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CG: How easy is it to pick up another gun? 
Todd: Well say I take my breaks at 8 o’clock — it’s 8 o’clock and my 
mate’s finished and we’re gonna go out for a fag and she’s already 
logged off her gun, she’ll pass me her gun, I’ll log onto that, it’ll come 
into the in-between menu where on the other one it’s carry on or exit, 
then exit. So I worked that out the first week the new system was 
introduced and the managers didn’t know that that could be done, but 
then they did know about it and I got a bollocking. 
CG: How did they find out? 
Todd: I guess somebody told ’em, ’cause a few people were doing it as 
well because I was showing people and word gets round. Um, I was 
actually showing one of the team leaders once winding her up… Yeah I 
think that was it, I accidentally went into a really long shop and I said I’m 
not gonna do it because I want to go on my break, and I would have 
been there till half 9 and that’s half hour before I finish and I was like, 
‘there’s no point taking a break then.’ She said, ‘No, you have to do it 
because you can’t come out of a shop.’ I said, ‘Yeah I can,’ and just did 
it (laughs), and yeah maybe that’s how they found out. Grassed myself 
up. It happens dunnit? 
 
In these cases, workers exploited cracks in the digital architecture, taking 
advantage of the organization of work to advance claims to time and rest in 
secret by outsmarting the system, seizing the opportunity to act out of the gaze 
of supervisors and engage in limited collaboration with other workers.  In 
Lorenzo’s case, workers were able to resist the claims of the productivity 
system, in particular the intensity demanded by the maintenance of the CPM 
rate over time, as well the length of time between breaks, and of course the 
exclusivity of the code itself, which was formally reserved for supervisors and 
managers.  Until the change of system, using the ‘item will not fit’ button allowed 
workers in Todd’s case to direct the length of time between their own breaks, 
and until Todd made his team leader aware of the workaround he had 
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discovered with his colleague, they had been able to re-establish control over 
their break times by using the handset-switching technique. 
 
Taking advantage of the affordances of handheld devices involves taking 
advantage of the physical distantiation of managers and their trust in the 
algorithmic management system, both in terms of its ability to keep workers 
working and its capacity to reflect periods of downtime in its performance 
calculations.  As a form of resistance, it allows workers to suspend the work 
flow by disrupting the data transmission from between their device and the 
system, allowing them to move about the workplace as they wish in order to 
take breaks on their own terms.  
 
Example 3: Intentional mistakes 
 
Another type of resistance regularly undertaken by Todd was in making 
intentional mistakes.  This took two main forms: doing product relocations 
incorrectly, which would confuse the database and lead to stock errors, and 
giving customers amusing item substitutions. 
 
Todd: When the item isn’t where it’s meant to be you’re normally 
supposed to do product relocation where you go find where it is and then 
you have to scan the whole shelf to update the computer system, 
because it’s all live, it updates as it goes. You’re meant to do that. 
CG: But will your productivity tracking be paused for that time? 
Todd: No, no, it won’t be paused, it bites into it, and these things can 
take four, five minutes. Again as a low-level sabotage in dragging heels 
you either don’t do it — you substitute it instead and pick something else 
— or you find it and instead of scanning all of the items you just scan 
the shelf number and the one item, and then that fucks up everything 
else that’s on that shelf, and then someone has to do every single item 
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on that shelf because the computer thinks, ‘This is the only thing on the 
shelf’. (Todd) 
 
Although there is a clear incentive to cut corners on a product relocation while 
it negatively affects one’s productivity calculation, it occurred to me Todd 
seemed rather intent on exploring methods of refusal with little discrimination, 
so I probed further, asking why he was so keen on committing sabotage: 
 
Todd: You’re bored out your nut... And because the way I’ve always 
understood this, particularly this job, is.. So, it’s very low-paid work, just 
for the sake of my self-esteem here Craig, I want to make it feel like I’m 
being valued, so I want to make my work as expensive as possible by 
being as least productive as possible. The less work I do in the hour, the 
more that little bit of work that I’ve actually done is worth. So for the fact 
of self-esteem I want to make that £7.80 stretch out a bit. So yeah, away 
from the sarcasm it’s bitterness. You’ll kick out at the boss, at the job, 
for being shit. It can make the job fun — so one of my favourite things 
to do at the moment is because they can’t see who’s substituted things, 
there’s no drawback, no backlash you’re gonna get, so every single film 
or DVD that gets requested, I substitute for Star Wars: Rogue One, 
because it’s a sick film and everyone should see it. Yeah just stuff like 
that, it’s funny, it’s fun to do... 
CG: Can they not work out who’s done the substitution? I’m trying to 
think about the paper chain if you like, in terms of the barcodes and 
scanners, so if they see the item’s wrong, do they not think, ‘Okay it’s 
wrong and it’s in that box, and that box was in that trolley, and that trolley 
was assigned to you’? 
Todd: I’m not sure if they can or they can’t, but given I’ve been 
repeatedly substituting things like Peppa Pig for Rogue One, TV boxsets 
— someone ordered a TV boxset of something, got given Rogue One 
instead — so it’s really obvious, like this is not even a connected item. 
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So there’s been instances like that where it should have been them 
having a word with me, but they didn’t. 
CG: Will they check the substitutions? 
Todd: So they can see the substitutions are happening because they 
can see what buttons you pressed, but they don’t seem to be able to 
see what’s been substituted for what, just that a substitution’s taken 
place… So I haven’t been spoken to personally. It seems to suggest that 
the shopper is made anonymous, I mean I don’t know how far it can be 
pushed, it’s something I’m still trying to figure out. 
 
Todd readily admitted the work had something of an infantilizing effect which 
made workers, especially young workers, want to ‘play up’, but regardless of 
tone it is without doubt Todd was expressing his ‘active dissatisfaction’ and 
establishing for himself what he felt was a ‘defensive cordon’ against the more 
onerous claims placed upon workers by management.  In particular, Todd 
attempted to mitigate the perceived punitiveness of the work, the authority and 
paternalism of digital instructions, and what Todd considered to be the 
demeaning character of work, especially its boredom.  In doing so, Todd was 
able to sabotage the ‘informating’ aspect of the algorithmic management 
system by sending false information across the algorithmic threshold, taking 
advantage of managerial distantiation and the communication options afforded 
by the handsets in order to make fun, get pleasure from insubordination, and 
possibly inflict reputational damage on the company. 
 
Example 4: Snooping 
 
Todd referred to his understanding of what supervisors could and could not 
know about workers from their end of the digital infrastructure.  This 
understanding was partially formed on the basis of whether disciplinary 
consequences arose; it was also partially informed by multiple efforts to see 
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what supervisors were seeing on their computers, initially in terms of 
productivity, but also in terms of workers’ actions in general: 
 
[Workers’ productivity] is on the computer screen in the area where they 
[supervisors] load up the trolleys. They have a computer that one person 
normally mans…they can’t see what you’re doing…but they can see 
every single function, every single button you’re pressing, but they don’t 
know what shop you’re doing it on. (Todd) 
 
Todd: I saw the opportunity to have a look at the screen, so I said to the 
manager, ‘I don’t understand, what do you mean?’ And she said, ‘No it’s 
all up here up on the screen.’ She showed me it. 
CG: This is their computer? 
Todd: Yeah, and it had a list of every single button that had been 
pressed, but it will just have like, pressed a function button, went on this 
menu, pressed on this menu, came out of a shop, went onto a shop, 
came out of a shop, went on to a shop, it doesn’t have anything to do 
with the items, or I don’t think it did anyway, so it’s something I need to 
have a look at again. 
 
While Todd’s approach relied on engineering excuses to look at the 
supervisors’ monitors, in Lorenzo’s warehouse workers adopted a slightly more 
skirmish-like approach by waiting for supervisors to be in a different part of the 
warehouse before covertly logging into their PC: 
 
…workers know how to operate a computer. Normally you’re not 
supposed to touch it but there is for the supervisors a computer at the 
end of the grid and some workers who have been there a bit longer, they 
know how to get to the.. So if they want to know like about their 
productivity rate they can look it up on the supervisor’s computer. 
(Lorenzo) 
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These actions intervene in managerial political forms by trying to gain insight 
into the computational vision of supervisors from the other side the algorithmic 
frontier, particularly through taking advantage of the layout of the workplace in 
Lorenzo’s case, or indeed by taking advantage of the supervisors themselves 
in Todd’s case.  In adopting these ‘snooping’ tactics, both Lorenzo and Todd 
attempted to gain access ‘behind the curtain’ to access managerial knowledge 
regarding workers, thereby surreptitiously advancing a claim to knowledge of 
their own performance and the asymmetric functioning of the system more 
broadly.  For Lorenzo this was largely a question of assessing whether or not 
workers had been overworking (in their own way trying to ensure the 
expensiveness of their labour), whereas for Todd it arose from a wider concern 
of figuring out which actions workers could get away with.  Furthermore, in both 
cases these participants resisted the assumption of the managerial retention of 
data generated by workers, both in terms of the range of data points (Todd) 
and the content of the data (Lorenzo). 
 
Collective action problems 
 
An obvious objection to the politicization of these actions would be to say they 
are largely the actions of individuals — especially disgruntled individuals or 
individuals apparently intent on finding ways to be disruptive.  But as I have 
argued above, such actions are nonetheless political even if their scope seems 
marginal.  However, there remains a concern as to whether these ‘individual’ 
actions have the capacity to be ‘scaled up’ or generalized across a workforce 
as part of a collective endeavour.  This was a point of reflection for both Lorenzo 
and Todd: 
 
So in that sense, yeah, there’re these little individual ways to deal with 
the system. Normally it doesn’t create any collective kind of sentiment. 
Another way that people try to get a higher productivity rate is by taking 
single items, that means you don’t pull a whole pallet with 200 to 500 
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items, you take a little single item that is on a smaller trolley, and if you 
— normally these are located in certain supermarkets — if you’ve 
worked there long enough you know this item will go there, so I quickly 
take it and I only scan in once I’m already there at the end of the grid, 
and you get I don’t know 200 percent for that. So, and some people want 
to monopolize that, they make themselves have a bit of an easy life, 
which creates a bit of like, not like a collective feeling. So, in that sense 
most of these strategies to deal with these kind of imposed system relies 
on individualist behaviour, so not very heroic. (Lorenzo) 
 
Todd: …it was the team leader making the colleague cry that’s made 
this quite a realistic thing ’cause a lot of people were quite annoyed 
about this, so one of the tactics is instead of waiting until your shop’s 
finished and then taking your trolley out to the back for them to sort out, 
when you want to go on your break just leave it in the shopfloor, leave it 
with the gun as well, go on your break and come back to it after that. 
CG: Why would that be problematic? 
Todd: So, that would completely ruin the pick speeds, ’cause you’re 
mid-shop and all of a sudden there’s fifty minutes of inactivity, and so 
that would make their targeting system, their way to measure 
productivity useless, because if it becomes common practice that every 
shift there’s a huge group of people with fifty minutes of inactivity not 
because they’re slow at shopping but because they’re going on their 
breaks and not leaving their guns out the back, yeah it’d be a way to 
damage the way that they penalize it and y’know the direct relationship 
with it is that the colleague was made upset over her pick speed. 
 
There are certain principles and concerns here which are reflective of all the 
interviews to various degrees: the highlighting of “individual ways to deal with 
the system” and concern about the (usual) lack or (occasional) presence of 
“collective feeling”; tactics that get learned “if you’ve worked there long enough” 
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but a recognition that rendering managerial political forms “useless” relies on 
them becoming “common practice”.  With these issues in mind I now want to 
abstract from observable moments of resistance to consider the principles they 
evoke, arguing alongside Thompson and Ackroyd (1995: 629) that 
 
The essential conditions for resistance and misbehaviour are still 
present… It is not a case of ‘waiting for the fightback’, romanticizing the 
informal, or disregarding the capacity of unions to renew their own 
organisation and strategy. Rather…we have to put labour back in, by 
doing theory and research in such a way that is it possible to ‘see’ 
resistance and misbehaviour, and recognize that innovatory employee 
practices and informal organisations will continue to subvert managerial 
regimes. 
 
In doing so I will use two key frames: the Ancient Greek concept of metis, 
adopted and revived by a disparate range of scholars in the last two decades, 
which I will use to discuss the guile demonstrated by workers despite the 
technological and organizational circumstances they face, and the more 
familiar political concept of a commons — in this case in terms of the 
infrapolitical realm which exists among workers involved in even informal 
practices of resistance.  I will then discuss how a notion of metic commonality 
allows us to ‘see’ the political composition of workers in the case studies.  
 




A common aspect of the selected examples (as well as other observed 
instances) of resistance is the presence of metis.  With no direct English 
translation but usually understood as ‘cunning intelligence’, metis (μῆτις) is an 
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Ancient Greek term denoting the application of a form of knowledge which is 
variously practical, situated, cunning, experiential, wily, vernacular and 
deceptive (Singleton, 2014: 102-7).116  Necessarily difficult to formalize in 
action, the term is similarly slippery.  Often reduced to a quality approaching 
‘local knowledge’, ‘responsive intelligence’ ‘know-how’ or a ‘knack’ (Scott, 
2005; Letiche and Statler, 2005; Campbell, 2015), Singleton (2014: 105) draws 
on Detienne and Vernant (1991), arguing alongside Chia and Holt (2009: 196) 
that a fuller and more accurate understanding of the term necessarily requires 
the inclusion of duplicity and in particular guile — political aspects of metis 
which roused Plato’s ire in his meditations on the concept.  Detienne and 
Vernant (1991: 3-4) describe the term as a way of knowing which 
 
implies a complex but very coherent body of mental attitudes and 
intellectual behaviour which combine flair, wisdom, forethought, subtlety 
of mind, deception, resourcefulness, vigilance, opportunism, various 
skills, and experience over the years. 
 
Resistance involving metis is necessarily active.  Metic resistance is not merely 
a source of drag on flow, but an intervention into the system.117  The implication 
for strategies against resistance (i.e. managerial innovations) is that they are 
political rather than technical.  Moreover, metis emphasizes the aspect of 
refusal which is not merely withdrawal, but the inventive action of conducting 
one’s time and energy to reorient labour time towards one’s own will against 
the efforts of the managerial endeavour.  In his discussion of la perruque (‘the 
wig’), for example, de Certeau (1984: 25) posits the way a worker may 
                         
116 Due to the lack of direct translation, μῆτις is variously transliterated as metis, mêtis and 
mētis within anglophone literature. 
117 Regarding the slow-down, for example, the aim of the action was to reduce the 
performance rate down to seventy percent to make a specific point about pay disparity. 
Rather than merely working slower than usual, participants had to gauge their work rate 
based on experiential intelligence and judgement. 
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creatively divert work time towards their own “free” endeavours, ensuring it is 
nonetheless “disguised as work for his employer” (sic).  To understand 
resistance as metic is to evaluate the notion of ‘doing what you’re not supposed 
to’ in such a way that draws out the practical and situational acumen that 
informs such actions, as well as affirming the agency of the people who 
undertake them.  Resistance in this sense is a subversion (and reappropriation) 
of one’s own labour, a reorientation of activity towards satisfying one’s own 
preferences and getting away with it.  Woodcock (2017c: 104) notes how it can 
take some time before workers feel comfortable enough at work to begin 
engaging with other workers (especially for the purposes of deviating from 
managerial instructions) because of the initial fear of being sacked for 
incompetence.  What is it that makes the worker feel comfortable after time — 
comfortable enough to talk on the job and exploit opportunities for non-work 
activity?  It is what Lorenzo and Todd referred to in describing their ‘tactics’ for 
pushing back against managerial systems — the learned knowledge of where 
those opportunities exist and how to get away with taking advantage of them.  
This is metis in action. 
 
Tactics, in this sense, are opportunistic; as de Certeau (1984: 26) argues, they 
are form of art ‘tricking’ order against itself.  Lacking the power afforded by a 
proper ‘locus’ (see Chapter 2), the art of “pulling tricks” in this way “involves a 
sense of the opportunities afforded by a particular occasion” (ibid.: 37) which 
invokes a “clever utilization of time” (ibid.: 38-9) — and indeed a sense of kairos 
(καιρός), or the ‘right’ time (de Certeau, 1980: 37).  A tactic successfully pulled 
off is therefore a “guileful ruse” (de Certeau, 1984: 37).  But although he 
connects his theory of tactics to a discussion of metis (de Certeau, 1980: 36-
38), de Certeau (1984: 39) states his disinterest in developing a “semiotics of 
tactics” — his accounts of la perruque and battlegrounds serving as illustrations 
for a theory of consumer culture and practice rather than political resistance.  
However, the idea that tactical intelligence involves a ‘sense of the 
opportunities’ is instructive in considering the idea of metic resistance. 
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Metic resistance is necessarily political rather than technical.  This is what 
Taylor (1911: 6-8) recognized in workers’ ability to regulate the productivity of 
their work and ratio of effort to wages.  Taylor’s response was similarly political, 
as I argued in Chapter 2, but despite the spread of scientific management 
methods right through to algorithmic management systems, we still see the 
persistence of metic subversion. We observed this in Chapter 2, in the failure 
of Uber drivers to ‘cooperate’ with the app by ‘gaming’ it (Lee et al, 2015).  But 
whereas Uber relies on a decentralized standing reserve of unpaid would-be 
workers, along similar lines as Noah and Jamie’s food delivery platform, 
workers in distribution centres are tracked within a productivity system for the 
large majority of their working hours.  In these workplaces, the cunning involved 
in resistance involves learning (or experimenting with) what the management 
system (and human managers) can and cannot know; i.e. to gain a ‘sense of 
the opportunities’.  As Todd put it when questioned about managers’ ability to 
find out about his purposefully inappropriate swapping of items: 
 
You gotta remember…because everybody’s doing similar sized shops, 
it’s never that one trolley will come in at a time, it’ll always be twenty at 
a time, twenty at a time, so you know they’re rushed off their feet loading 
these up, getting them organized, getting them ready for the first 
deliveries at 7 o’clock. (Todd) 
 
They don’t have time to check through 160 boxes with the sheet of paper 
with all of this, so you take advantage of the lack of manpower. (Todd) 
 
They’re too busy, so you take advantage of them running around. (Todd) 
 
Taking advantage of the supervisory reliance on visual checking was similarly 
reported in Woodcock’s (2017c: 107) ethnographic observations of call centre 
workers resetting a timer to claim extra minutes for their break, but as I 
discussed in Chapter 4, the managerial reliance on the algorithmic system in 
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particular sits alongside managerial distantiation and alters the ways managers 
maintain their ‘presence’ and control over workers as they work.  As I further 
discussed, such a system appears to require a measure of cooperation from 
workers, at the very least in terms of proper communication as demanded by 
devices such as handsets.  In Todd’s case we see something like informational 
refusal or subversion, whereby data is given to the system in the correct form 
but is false or misleading.  What we see is that with managers largely absent 
from the shopfloor, workers instead ‘negotiate’ with the system, which — 
programmed to anticipate compliant workers — is unable to respond in 
comparably cunning ways. This is what Lunghi (2017: 49) calls a “counter-
logistical moment”. 
 
Contemporary activist responses to the organization of the distribution sector 
and phenomenon of logistics are often concerned with the question of leverage 
(Milburn, 2015) — “fault lines and weak points” (TSS Platform, 2017: 9) where 
workers could concentrate power to tip the balance of control in their favour.  
The ambition recognizes the fulcrum aspect of logistics within the wider 
economy, but as a strategy it struggles once the scale of the managerial control 
operation becomes clear, leading organizers to settle on contractual aspects of 
working conditions as a predicate for effective future action (Lena, Plan C, 
2017a).  The issue of leverage is apposite to a discussion of metis — examining 
applications of the term, Singleton (2014: 108-9) discusses how levers embody 
metis by intervening in physical circumstances to move greater weights with 
smaller forces with against apparent probability, drawing upon the ancient 
Peripatetic text Mechanica (Pseudo-Aristotle, 1936).  Applied to the workplace, 
what emerges looks less like workers’ power as traditionally conceived, but 
more like workers’ guile: the use of situated wisdom and experiential cunning 
to seize or subvert, even momentarily, the current of managerial control; “to 





To what extent is it really the case that existing examples of resistance are 
confined to the practices of individuals?  The actions I have covered have 
seldom arisen from lone ingenuity, and even in cases where that is closer to 
the truth, workers have relied on confidants and blind eyes to continue 
practices undetected.  While resistance may in one sense take the form of 
individual acts of refusal, in another sense there is a social situation which 
provides the conditions of possibility for those actions.   This social situation 
may involve a direct induction into ‘tricks’ workers can deploy, or ignoring (or 
learning from) the misbehaviour of a co-worker.  In Woodcock’s (2017c: 108) 
ethnography, resistance often involved “glances and mouthing words across 
the call-centre floor” and being complicit in a covert social code: “reporting the 
problem [of leads running out] straight away was generally frowned upon as it 
would take that choice away from others”.  This is what de Certeau (1984: 26) 
envisages when he describes how “With the complicity of other workers (who 
thus defeat the competition the factory tries to instill among them), [the worker 
deploying la perruque] succeeds in ‘putting one over’ on the established order 
on its home ground.” 
 
Once the range of managerial claims over the work process are taken into 
account, it is possible for an account of resistance to end up setting out from a 
negative starting point — i.e. ‘what is left’ for resistance when managers have 
thought of a vast number of ways to discipline, incentivize, control, persuade 
and curtail workers from all paths but productive compliance?  Such a position 
takes ideal managerial types at their word, and ignores the point that the 
introduction of a new technology can never be fully planned (Srnicek and 
Williams, 2015: 146), and from a strategic perspective (Cleaver, 1979: 25) this 
approach offers vanishingly little in assessing the potential for workers to 
exercise autonomy, which — as the examples above show — is worked out 
through use over time.  My argument is therefore not to insist on a blind 
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optimism of the will, but rather to prioritize a basic and common starting 
principle of successful challenges to the work process: beginning with what is 
shared by workers as the basis for exploring what might be possible (and how). 
 
As I discussed in the opening chapters, managerial (and indeed governmental) 
interventions have sought to curtail or control some of the most obvious forms 
of collective action throughout history, but nonetheless we see the persistence 
of resistance in the workplace — as I discussed in Chapter 1, through inquiry 
we see that workers are never fully subsumed (Ferrero et al, 2006: 42 in 
Fasulo, 2014: 327).  While formal modes of collectivism might be elusive, there 
remains a commons present in even individual acts in the form of shared 
situational understanding and knowledge based on the ‘hidden transcript’ — 
the “critique of power spoken behind the back of the dominant” (Scott, 1990: 
xii) — of the workplace.118  This is the basis of much everyday resistance, the 
possibility of communicating with a co-worker ‘on a level’, and certainly a 
foundational requirement of any effective collective action.  Importantly, an 
understanding of (and access to) the commons cannot be deduced from sorting 
through all the formal managerial claims over workers — it necessarily takes 
time to emerge.  It does not merely reside in the gaps between steps in a 
process, but in a disposition developed within and between workers over time 
through interaction with one another and with their surroundings.  This is the 
difference between new workers who are scared to deviate from that which is 
expected, and the worker who knows what they can get away with.  It is 
something which is not readily available to managers, no matter how many 
gemba walks they take,119 because it cannot be gleaned from the perspective 
                         
118 It is important to note that the hidden transcript “does not only contain speech acts but a 
whole range of practices” (Scott, 1990: 14). 
119 As discussed in Chapter 2, gemba walks are sometimes a feature of kaizen management 
practices. Lauded as a technique by Amazon, they involve managers walking through the 
productive process on a daily basis in order to identify things to improve. 
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of an auditor.120  Moreover, it cannot be researched without inquiring into the 
daily lives of workers.  As an anonymous supermarket worker wrote for Plan C: 
 
The first few weeks you assume everyone’s a jobsworth. You feel 
watched all the time. But after three months you stop giving a shit and 
start to slack off. Then you notice other people slacking off in the same 
way as you. You bump into someone by the bailing machine and give 
them a knowing smile as you get your phone out. It’s never explicit, but 
after six months you give each other the look; ‘I know you’ve just been 
doing fuck all for the last half hour, good on you.’ Then you get close to 
people, and try and one up them on how much shit you have or haven’t 
done. ‘We once took 40 minutes for a 15 minute break but got fucking 
dobbed in by Mary’. (Plan C, 2017c) 
 
In laying out the rationale for his Principles, Taylor (1911: 8) expressed his 
concern regarding the transference of resistance tactics from older to younger 
employees, recognizing the existence of a commons between workers (ranging 
from traditional knowledge to ‘systematic soldiering’) which creates the 
possibility of autonomy (literally, knowledge of and command over the rules of 
the self).121  In this sense, one aspect of Taylor’s suggestion of breaking down 
                         
120 Indeed, the fact that the organization of the work process is subject to changes and 
adjustments over time means managers who were once workers are liable to have their own 
experiential knowledge surpassed, as their own work flow is different from that of ordinary 
workers. 
121 And yet Taylorism fails to subsume the commons, in most part because it assumes the 
possibility of managers obtaining “with absolute uniformity” the “‘initiative’ of the workmen” 
(Taylor, 1911: 15). Although Taylor identifies the realm of ‘traditional knowledge’ which is 
something of a mystery to managers (to their detriment), his solutions presuppose the 
content of that ‘traditional knowledge’ before they gather it. The possibility of the continuous 
expansion or constant change in the content of knowledge to be gathered is the insight of 
both Human Relations and TQC/kaizen approaches. These are underdeveloped in 
distribution workplaces — and in any case fallible — and exist mostly as ideological set-
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work tasks and intensifying the work rate is about disrupting the common 
infrapolitical realm that exists at the level of metis amongst workers.  Readings 
of metis sometimes stress the difficulty or impossibility of transferring the 
content of metic knowledge across situations (Letiche and Statler, 2005) due 
to both the situatedness of metic knowledge and the impossibility of codifying 
something as intangible as a knack.  But less is said of the possibility for 
generalization of metic principles within a shared situation across actors, 
particularly when they share a situation over time and are each able to engage 
in trial and error.  What charges of individualism miss about informal action is 
that these tricks and tips are often transferred between workers, creating 
chains of discovery through the workforce.  Even where they are not, we can 
still say some forms of resistance are generalized, in that they are regularly 
enacted by workers from day to day — they might not be acting ‘for the class’ 




One challenge of thinking about resistance in terms of metis is that it forces us 
to think about the situatedness of political action away from ideal types, such 
as found in the organizer’s repertoire.  While this may be advantageous to 
workers (in that it may elide managers), it also presents political and 
methodological challenges.  Where the notion of the commons allows us to 
think about the social prerequisites for political action (especially in terms of 
established concepts such as hidden transcripts), the concept of metis 
encourages us to think about the place and space of the labour process, as 
well as the forms of social organization and social knowledge arising from the 
phenomenological reality of working in particular workplaces.  Metis also 
                         
pieces. Nonetheless, the presumption of even the most sophisticated algorithmic 
management infrastructures is that these aspects can more or less be either captured or 
mediated by computational devices. What we are left with is a management apple picker but 
workers who are dealing in both apples and oranges. 
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encourages us to think about the resister as a cunning and intelligent actor, an 
active agent implicated in the infrapolitical realm.  But, furthermore, the lens of 
‘metic commonality’ forces us to think about where collectivity and organization 
already exist.  Woodcock (2017c: 106) documents one example: 
 
At the start of each three-and-a-half-hour shift there was a buzz session 
with the supervisors…The length of the buzz session was never officially 
defined and therefore it was at the discretion of the supervisors. This 
meant that as long as the games or discussion continued it could be 
stretched out. This involved a level of informal organisation as one 
individual worker could extend the session by asking more questions as 
the supervisors would catch on that they were trying to distract them and 
therefore cut the buzz session short. A successful extension involved a 
careful balancing act of feigning interest, posing questions and 
stimulating discussion. …a collective approach emerged around this. 
Subtle cues would be exchanged under the gaze of the supervisors, a 
nod or raise of the eyebrows encouraging others to participate in the 
process. Although even the best attempts — which were then gleefully 
relayed to others in the breaks — could delay the start of work by at the 
most forty-five minutes, it was viewed as a significant victory. 
 
In this case we get a sense of the trial and error of repeated buzz sessions, the 
shared social understanding between workers, the political desire to reclaim 
time and have fun, and the metic creativity of inventing reasons to keep the 
sessions going.  In the earlier examples arising from the cases, we can 
consider the exploitation of menu options to bring about breaks; the stealing 
and sharing of supervisors’ codes or computer log-in details; the use of the 
knowledge of what supervisors can and can’t know, and how busy they will be 
at a given moment, to amuse oneself and create problems for the stock 
database; the defiance of the narrow forms of communication demanded by 
interfaces; the shared experience invoked in slowing down to seventy percent 
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of productivity, reasserting workers’ autonomy over performance; the ingenuity 
of testing new equipment in order to find new ways to subvert it — and all the 
lessons passed between workers through these actions, the blind eyes turned, 
and the sense of empowerment felt.  We see confirmed in acts of metic 
commonality the illusion of the extent of managerial control, a “precarious 
assemblage” (Woodcock, 2017a) exposed by workers’ guile. 
 
Within the algorithmically-managed workplace, metic commonality manifests 
as a sort of tactical shrewdness that savvies the way computational structures 
intersect with the human dynamics of the work setting.122  The examples above 
make use of the way algorithmic management affects work, such as 
communicational forms and work flow, as well the way it rearranges authority.  
Managerial distantiation represents a clear opportunity for metic commonality 
to emerge, and there is also a sense in which it suggests operating under the 
algorithmic radar, carving out space between tracking and action in the 
knowledge that managers will first and foremost trust the system.  As such, 
metic commonality brings a different sort of asymmetry to the management 
interface, which all workers could potentially have access to.  Moreover, while 
this dissertation only raises the idea of metic commonality as a prospective lens 
for thinking about subversion under algorithmic management, and in particular 
the methods I have used provide only a limited insight into the realm of the 
commons in these workplaces, a properly situated workers inquiry could 
provide the methodological and political framework for both locating forms of 
metic commonality where they exist and maximizing their potential scope and 
spread. 
 
                         
122 Drawing on game studies literature, Allen-Robertson (2017) discusses the example of 
‘rule discovery’ among Uber drivers, as they learn the limits of the algorithmic infrastructure 
through interaction. 
239 
Conclusion: a new spirit of approach 
 
In this chapter I have discussed worker resistance in algorithmically-mediated 
distribution workplaces.  Using examples from interviews, I have shown that 
workers are instigating resistance despite the claims put upon them via 
management technologies, and I have argued that the qualities evoked by 
these forms of resistance offer principles for ‘seeing’ resistance where it is not 
immediately obvious.  While mitigating aspects of managerial regimes such as 
productivity calculators, paternalism and the length of work, the workers 
featured in this chapter also exhibited metis in taking advantage of their digital, 
physical and social environment in order to advance claims to time, dignity and 
autonomy, often covertly.  They are establishing ‘defensive cordons’ for 
themselves, subverting the processes and technologies they find themselves 
enmeshed within and exercising positive refusal. 
 
By focusing on the situated political action of workers in this sector, I have taken 
a very different road to that generally taken by trade unions at the moment.  
Others have noted the difficulty of connecting the realities of workplace 
resistance to the activities of trade unions (Woodcock, 2017c: 118), and in this 
chapter I have shown the gulf that exists between the strategies of unions and 
the tactics of workers.  The warehouse workers I spoke to were generally 
indifferent to their own trade unions, and while the legal battles being fought by 
unions are significant, their focus covers only a small part of workers’ 
grievances and their irrelevance to large sections of this chapter is indicative of 
their lack of presence in shopfloor struggles.  As it stands, unions lack whole 
swathes of knowledge of the workplaces they aim to represent, and while they 
may have largely relinquished claims to the labour process (ibid.: 113), workers 
in those workplaces have not. 
 
While the technologies of management are intended to curb and direct worker 
(mis)behaviour and extend control to every corner of the workplace, worker 
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resistance demonstrates guile against adversity, displaying cunning 
intelligence to re-thread power and technology against management, to 
paraphrase Raniero Panzieri (Dyer-Witheford, 1999: 71).  In drawing out these 
qualities of contemporary resistance, I have also drawn attention to the social 
basis of even ‘individual’ actions, raising the possibility of thinking about 
resistance in new managerial regimes through the lens of ‘metic commonality’ 
— situated, cunning and social intelligence acquired by workers through 
interaction with both managerial forms, technical processes, and each other.  
While metis implies that tactics cannot be readily lifted from one workplace and 
planted into another, this frame offers a spirit of approach for identifying where 
to look for resistance, how to ‘see’ its sociality, and how to identify the claims 













“Find each other.” 
 




New directions in algorithmic management 
 
In March 2017, Amazon filed a patent for augmented reality goggles which 
could be worn by warehouse operatives to assist them in locating items and 
available shelf space within storage areas (Madan et al, 2018).  When the 
patent application was published in August 2018, the general secretary of the 
GMB union, Tim Roache, said: 
 
This sounds like another measure to extract the final pound of flesh from 
exhausted, insecure workers who are just doing their best to make a 
living. … Technology in the modern workplace can be used to increase 
efficiency, make work easier, better and less stressful. Or it can be used 
like this: big brother bosses spying on their workers every step. (Ellis, 
2018) 
 
The patent application describes the goggles as combining both the scanning 
and instruction functions currently fulfilled by handheld scan guns with a 
locative system whereby location identifiers (such as QR codes) within the 
worker’s field of vision are able to place the worker within the inventory storage 
area at any given time, as well as report when they have deviated from an 
instructed course (Madan et al, 2018; see Figures 7 and 8). 
 
Figure 7. Augmented reality goggle interface showing turn-by-turn directions. 
“108” denotes location identifiers along floor and shelving. 
Source: Madan et al, 2018. 
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The application refers to a speculative technology, but it is indicative of 
Amazon’s intention to deepen its algorithmic management capability.  The 
publication of the patent filing followed news that Amazon had secured patents 
for ultrasonic bracelets that track workers’ hand gestures and direct their 
actions by emitting vibrations (Cohn, 2017; Brady, 2018; Boyle, 2018).  
Integrated as part of a “haptic feedback system” (Brady, 2018), the wristbands 
build on the algorithmic control of workers’ movements through space 
described in Chapter 4.  The designs included with the patents (see Figure 9) 
are reminiscent of the Gilbreths’ early motion studies, but as with handheld or 
existing wrist-mounted scanners, current trends in algorithmic management in 
distribution work suggest the motions that workers are ‘nudged’ into by the 
wristbands’ vibrations are not the sort of thing workers could learn or perfect.  
Instead, as with augmented reality goggles, haptic feedback bracelets look to 
extend the kind the “embodied relation” between user and machine noted by 
Schüll (2012: 174) as technologies of political phenomenology, literally 
augmenting workers’ sense of reality.123 
 
                         




Figure 9. A depiction of a warehouse worker using an ultrasonic bracelet. 
Source: Cohn, 2017. 
 
Industry website SupplyChainDigest (2018) argues suggestions (such as 
GMB’s) that the goggles and wristbands amount to “big brother” management 
are “erroneous” on the grounds that employee tracking has been a feature of 
distribution management for a long time, and that greater locative tracking is 
“likely inevitable”.  It is unclear where the official labour movement stands on 
the “inevitability” of performance tracking technologies.  While GMB, the first 
UK union to turn its focus to Amazon since Unite over a decade ago, has 
reacted negatively to the concept designs, its accusation of “big brother 
bosses” (Ellis, 2018) signals a perception of the relationship between 
workplace technologies and power relations in a way that is absent from the 
union’s formal demands regarding managerial techniques.  Instead, its only 
demand relating to working conditions is constructed around concerns 
regarding the short- and long-term health and safety implications of the 
company’s current approach to productivity management (Baker, 2015; GMB 
Campaigns, n.d.), with one suggestion the union could take Amazon to court 
over unsafe working practices (Pickard and Ram, 2018). 
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For its part, Amazon responded to concerns about the augmented reality 
goggles by saying: “This patent application has nothing to do with surveilling 
employees. Technology has empowered and enabled workplaces throughout 
human history” (Hills-Duty, 2018).  One is reminded of Marx’s (1976: 563) 
suggestion that "It would be possible to write a whole history of the inventions 
made since 1830 for the sole purpose of providing capital with weapons against 
working-class revolt."  This dissertation suggests that even if Amazon has 
some other aim in mind,124 it is disingenuous to suggest such new technologies 
would not be used to control distribution workers more effectively, but it also 
suggests the proliferation of algorithmic management technologies entails a 
rearrangement of power relations which is more complex than ‘big brother’.  
This matters because the politics of distribution workplaces, and indeed the 
politics of an increasing number of sectors, will be informed by the politics of 
algorithmic management, from its effect on the experience of work and the 
authority of supervisors, to the avenues through which workers might exercise 
their political agency.  In short, an understanding of the politics of algorithmic 
management needs to be at the heart of pro-worker responses to its 
development. 
 
This dissertation shows the nature of the political struggle unfolding on the 
terrain of algorithmic management, and shows that everyday struggle is 
already occurring in algorithmically-managed workplaces, usually quite 
independent of formal labour organization.  A class composition analysis shows 
that far from algorithmic management being a foregone conclusion, workers 
are finding ways to navigate their environments tactically in order to push back 
against or subvert the managerial claims being made against them, 
demonstrating that a deep knowledge of the techniques of algorithmic 
management already exists within the workforce.  The overarching aim of this 
                         
124 It has been suggested the data generated by human employees using ultrasound 
wristbands could be used to optimize robot pickers. (Solon, 2018) 
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thesis has been to reassert workers as political agents at a time when news 
stories portray workers’ destiny as becoming evermore robot-like (Butler, 2018; 
Wohlsen, 2013; Osborne, 2016b; Beane, 2018; Rhodes and Kaine, 2018).  But 
to do this, it has also been necessary to increase our understanding of the 
technical composition of algorithmically-managed workplaces and to 
understand the effects of algorithmic management on the balance of forces 
within the workplace more broadly. 
 
A recent report by the Institute for Public Policy Research argues the need for 
greater employer-union partnership in heavily mediated workplaces, in order 
for workers to share in the benefit of productivity-enhancing technologies 
(IPPR, 2018: 101-2, 121).  The demand echoes the approach of some unions 
in the distribution sector, such as GMB at Asda distribution and Amazon, or 
Usdaw at Sainsbury’s.  But such an approach arguably misunderstands how 
such technologies make it harder for unions to organize in the first place, and 
offers little to the workers featured in this dissertation, who are focused on trying 
to mitigate managerial performance directives on a daily basis, including in 
workplaces (such as Todd’s) where a trade union has already ‘negotiated’ 
aspects of the ergonomics. 
 
In the 1960s, Romano Alquati argued new managerial techniques were already 
digging the ground from under the CGIL union’s feet (Wright, 2002: 47) and 
that labour movement renovation therefore depended on going ‘under the 
hood’ of the factories of Piedmont and starting with actual workers.  Alongside 
Raniero Panzieri, Alquati argued the unions’ indifference to new management 
technologies was neglectful of workers and their daily struggles (ibid.: 21, 33, 
47).  Inspired by those researchers, this dissertation has met a relative (but not 
absolute) shortage of critical engagement with algorithmic management by 
providing an initial autonomist response to the algorithmically-mediated 
techniques found in distribution work.  This has taken the form of a class 
composition analysis inspired by the workers inquiry methodology, an 
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‘interested’ methodology which foregrounds the standpoint of workers within 
the work process, both in their experience of algorithmic management and their 
struggles with it.  By enquiring into the ability of workers to exercise political 
agency in spite of the managerial claims against them, I have shown that 
workers need not be (to paraphrase Cleaver) ‘spectators to the algorithmic 
waltz of managers’.  On the contrary, I have shown that workers are able to 
develop guileful techniques to maximize their own interests, often taking 
advantage of the rearrangement of supervisory authority to do so.  In this way, 
workers have opportunities to flout the rules and develop common cause 
‘below the radar’.  These ‘misbehaviours’, I have argued, are not ornaments to 
the realpolitik of unions or policymakers, but are part of workers’ political lives 
and composition and are therefore critical to the development of a pro-worker 
orientation on algorithmic management. 
 
From algorithmic anxieties to algorithmic guile 
 
I began this dissertation with a discussion of existing anxieties regarding the 
reorganization of work along algorithmically-mediated lines, particularly in 
distribution work both in warehouses and across the so-called gig economy.  In 
particular I highlighted the way that even though labour movement discourses 
draw a connection between employment insecurity and the technological 
organization of work, responses to the situation tend to focus on resolving 
issues of precarity, with far less emphasis on the means by which workplaces 
are governed.  I laid out my intention to enquire into the ‘deeper unrest’ 
(Goodrich, 1975: 3) which takes place along the frontier of control within 
algorithmically-managed workplaces, with a view to reclaiming the possibility 
that workers may still exercise power within workplaces that may appear 
impervious to resistance. 
 
I laid the groundwork for my inquiry in Chapter 1, where I excavated the 
persisting labour politics of workplace technology under capitalism, and 
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Chapter 2, where I took a genealogical view of managerial techniques and 
politics.  In Chapter 1, I argued the tradition of autonomist Marxism presents a 
unique and worthwhile perspective on technological politics, which has 
historically been grounded in the actual struggles of workers and has sought a 
strategic orientation to the prospect of workers’ autonomy.  In particular, I 
outlined autonomism’s theoretical contribution of class composition, a 
framework which is useful for understanding class politics over time and 
specifically in relation to changes in the labour process.  I also introduced the 
autonomist (specifically operaista) methodology of the workers inquiry, the 
absence of which, I argue, has been detrimental to the political applicability of 
contemporary ‘post-autonomist’ interventions into the nature of work in 
contemporary capitalism. 
 
In Chapter 2, I situated algorithmic management as a site of struggle by 
discussing management as an historical endeavour of capitalist class interests 
in which organization acts as a technology of control.  In particular, I highlighted 
management’s central problem of overcoming the indeterminacy of labour 
power and enacting effective forms of control within the workplace, both to 
ensure “certainty of result” (Panzieri, 1976: 8) and as a defence against worker 
antagonism.  To demonstrate the forms this dynamic can take I selected a 
series of influential ideas and techniques from the history of management, from 
Taylor’s early principles of scientific management to the Japanese idea of 
kaizen (continuous improvement).  Beer’s core ideas of cybernetic 
management provided a way of illustrating a managerial orientation towards 
performance which, in notions of ‘data driven’ algorithmic management, is 
combined with principles of continuous improvement. 
 
Having rooted the dissertation in the political aspects of workplace relations 
and technology, I moved into an empirical engagement with a series of 
algorithmically-managed workplaces.  Drawing on the philosophy of the 
workers inquiry, in Chapter 3 I presented a range of cases of distribution work, 
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responding to contemporary concerns about the current logistics boom which 
is transforming whole industries, and possibly work and capitalism itself 
(Moody, 2017: 171; Cowen, 2014: 91-127).  The cases I covered bridged 
warehousing and ‘gig economy’ delivery, highlighting the shared managerial 
and technological approaches between them.  In presenting the work process 
from the perspective of labour, I began drawing out the technical composition 
of the algorithmic working class, highlighting the role of tracking and information 
transmission in achieving the balance of social forces in algorithmically-
managed distribution work. 
 
Chapter 3 introduced the empirical basis for Chapters 4 and 5, in which I 
conducted my own class composition analysis of algorithmic management.  In 
Chapter 4 I analysed the technical composition of algorithmically-managed 
distribution work in terms of the balance of forces at play.  The chapter 
contained two substantial sections.  The first asked what algorithmic 
management means for workers and examined the way it reconfigures 
workers’ engagement within the work process.  Drawing on different examples 
from the distribution sector, I showed how algorithmic management can be 
used to control the labour demand in gig economy contexts, as well as how the 
use of handheld devices and the regulation of communication can be used to 
affect workers’ relationships to their work, space, and each other.  The second 
turned the focus back onto the managerial endeavour itself, as I assessed the 
effect of algorithmic management on human supervisors and the supervisory 
function on the shopfloor.  In doing so, I explained how the elevation of the 
algorithmic ‘system’ as an authority in its own right permits managerial 
distantiation, both political and spatial.  I also problematized the idea that 
political distantiation is simply a ploy by highlighting how the authority of the 
algorithm is also bound up with the epistemological hollowing-out of the figure 
of the supervisor, who is re-cast in a ‘subvisory’ role as an auxiliary to the 
authority of algorithmic management.  Finally, I reflected on the nature of the 
political terrain created by algorithmic management; situating it within the 
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Taylorist paradigm, I discussed how its central political and informational 
asymmetry (Rosenblat and Stark, 2016: 3777) presents apparent barriers to 
the ability of workers to exercise political agency within the work process. 
 
In Chapter 5, I turned from the politics of managerial techniques to questions 
of workers’ own political forms.  Breaking with a conception of political 
composition which focuses only on trade unionism, I elaborated a framework 
of refusal, which extends from formal types of resistance to the everyday 
“defensive cordon” (Tronti, 1972) established by workers as a means of 
mitigating the claims of management.  In presenting four examples of worker 
subversion, I drew out tactics used by workers to defend themselves under the 
conditions created by algorithmic management.  Theorizing these activities, I 
discussed the principles of resistance to algorithmic management in terms of 
the notion of ‘metis’ (cunning intelligence) and the commons as an infrapolitical, 
tactical realm.  From here, I proposed the idea of ‘metic commonality’ as the 
potential basis of a shopfloor collectivity in which workers might be able to 
transform their own individual defensive cordons into more collective acts of 
guile. 
 
An expanded horizon of possibility 
 
This thesis sought to assess the political prospects of workers who contend 
with algorithmic management.  Through a class composition analysis of 
algorithmic management as observed in a range of distribution work settings, 
it has uncovered a range of political effects of algorithmic management 
practices, and it has shone light on how workers are pushing back against new 
computationally-facilitated logics of control at work.   
 
The thesis has made a number of original contributions.  It has provided a class 
composition analysis of algorithmic management, elaborating both the 
technical and political composition of algorithmically-managed distribution work 
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by bringing a range of workplace experiences into contact with one another.  
Drawing on original empirical engagement, the dissertation has advocated its 
own political-methodological approach by reasserting the workers inquiry as an 
important component of class composition analysis.  Doing so has enabled the 
dissertation to make original theoretical contributions that go beyond existing 
approaches of algorithmic management as either ‘automating’ or ‘supporting’ 
management to include relations of authority and class on the shopfloor, as 
well as the concept of metic resistance — a principle which the workers inquiry 
is uniquely placed to excavate.  More broadly, this thesis has provided a new 
lens for ‘seeing’ the politics of algorithmic management, and has reaffirmed the 
relevance and political value of autonomist Marxism to understanding 
technological changes to work. 
 
The research also opens up a number of avenues for further research.  Within 
the parameters set out, further research could adopt a more historical 
orientation to its empirical engagement, in particular by foregrounding the 
question of the processes of decomposition and recomposition represented by 
algorithmic management.  Beyond the parameters of consumer-oriented 
distribution,125 further research could enquire into other areas of the wider 
supply chain, even globally (Dyer-Witheford, 2015: 132-8).  And beyond the 
parameters of logistics, this dissertation provides a useful point of reference for 
class composition analyses into other industries in which employers are turning 
to algorithmic management, such as journalism (Whittaker, 2018).  But in terms 
of the current critical scholarship in this area, the most pressing direction for 
further research would be to link this analysis to those studies which have 
discussed algorithmic management techniques in relation to the economic and 
legal context of precariousness afflicting the working class today.  Doing so, 
especially as part of a longer and more collaborative ‘co-research’ agenda, 
                         
125 See Moore and Newsome (2018) for a labour process analysis that extends to the specific 
role of consumers within distribution work. 
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would no doubt help connect the discussion of technical and political 
composition discussed in this dissertation to the corresponding social 
composition (Notes From Below, 2018), especially with regard to migrant and 
gendered labour, in turn presenting a fuller picture of class composition and the 
politics of algorithmic management than has been possible in this study. 
 
Combined with the affordances of the contemporary media environment 
outwith algorithmic management systems, a future co-research project could 
adopt a workers inquiry methodology more fully than has been possible in this 
thesis, in that it could be used to encourage, support and evaluate political 
action in a longitudinal way.  Current research on algorithmic management has 
made reference to the use of online forums (Rosenblat and Stark, 2016) and 
WhatsApp groups (Waters and Woodcock, 2017) by workers to discuss the 
‘negotiation’ of algorithms and to organize political activity; meanwhile mass 
online conferencing tools such as Zoom are becoming a popular tool for “big 
organizing” (Bond and Exley, 2016) within protest movements in both the US 
and UK.  Using these media to offer scholarly reflection and distance to 
workers’ struggles at all stages of their development could help develop 
resistance to algorithmic management beyond its existing manifestations.  
However if this methodological mode would amount to something like 
‘connective action research’, we could also envisage a complementary 
‘collective action research’ agenda.  Deeper research into the idea of metic 
commonality, for example, could involve creative methods such as the 
development of a strategy game along the lines of Plan C’s ‘social strike’ game 
(2017d); a sort of ludic social hackathon, one could imagine bringing together 
groups of experienced algorithmic workers with labour movement researchers 
to play games based on algorithmically-managed workplaces in which they can 
explore and conceptualize possibilities for resistance, compare judgements 
and express productive disagreements with a view to  learning about and 
developing shopfloor tactics. 
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* * * 
 
The announcement of the 2017 UK general election brought the business of 
the ‘future world of work and the rights of workers’ inquiry to an abrupt close.  
Subsequent inquiries of the BEIS committee have focused on the employment 
status of workers in the gig economy (Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
Committee, 2017b), and the (positive) future of automation (Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy Committee, 2018), but parliamentary scrutiny of the 
working conditions of workers in the distribution sector has so far been 
discontinued.  On 17th July 2018, Verd.di members at six Amazon distribution 
centres struck over terms, pay and collective bargaining, as well as the effects 
of the work upon physical and mental health (The Local, 2018), a frame that 
has also been adopted by unions in the UK distribution sector to express 
concerns over high-intensity performance management.  Ver.di board member 
Stefanie Nutzenberger was quoted listing previous wins on health at the 
company: better ventilation and lighting, and a company ‘fruit day’.  The union’s 
current demands include risk prevention advice, longer breaks, and company 
sports (ibid.). 
 
This dissertation argues the future world of work is the future of class struggle, 
and demonstrates that “behind observable institutional phenomena are the 
actions of an actually existing working class” (Woodcock, 2014: 498).  My 
approach has been incompatible with purely abstract or economistic — which 
is to say purely structuralist — ways of thinking about changes to the labour 
process.  At every turn I have been interested in both continuities and 
contingencies, governing principles and agency, which has meant speaking to 
workers and bringing their testimonies into conversation with theoretical 
perspectives.  Technical overviews of the labour process and its peculiarities 
can take us so far, but as with relying on gemba walks to identify improvements, 
understanding the dynamics of a work process in action requires more than 
just looking.  Understanding how managerial techniques affect workers’ 
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political forms requires closer and more sustained attention, which at the very 
least means engaging with those workers where possible.  This was the original 
impetus of the workers inquiry within operaismo, which has been a guiding 
hand throughout this study, a methodological tradition largely lost within 
autonomist Marxism.  This study has raised political and methodological 
implications for understanding contemporary class struggle in algorithmically-
mediated workplaces, and with limited access has demonstrated the value of 
reincorporating an empirical dimension to the development of class 
composition analysis.  Moreover, this thesis has begun to show what those 
actions look like, and has made the case for research into algorithmic 
management and specific engagement with the workers subjected to it.  Its 
wager is that such a research agenda will enhance not only the critical 
scholarship on the emerging world of work, but also the toolbox of those who 
seek to assist workers in their struggles and push back against the political will 
of employers, exposing the contingency of algorithmic management, 
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